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ABSTRACT 
THE PARABLE AS MIRROR: AN EXAMINATION OF THE USE OF  
PARABLES IN THE WORKS OF KIERKEGAARD 
 
 
Russell Hamer 
 
Marquette University, 2018 
 
 
 This dissertation focuses on an exploration of the use of parables in the works of 
Soren Kierkegaard. While some work has been done on Kierkegaard’s poetic style, very 
little attention has been paid to his metaphors, despite their prevalent use in his works. 
Much of the scholarship instead treats his parables as mere examples of philosophical 
concepts. In this work, I argue that Kierkegaard’s parables function primarily to cause the 
reader to see him or herself truly. The parables work like mirrors, reflecting our true 
selves back onto ourself. In this way, the parables prompt Kierkegaard’s readers to 
overcome the illusion of Christendom and to instead recognize the requirements that 
authentic Christianity places upon them.  
 
 My dissertation begins with an examination of the purpose that Kierkegaard saw 
for his authorship. By focusing on his later works, I argue that Kierkegaard primarily 
wanted to bring the religious forward in his readers. He thought that in order to 
accomplish this he needed to start with works describing the life that he thought most of 
his readers lived, a life of pleasure seeking, and to slowly move them towards the 
religious. I then present Kierkegaard’s view of what Christianity essentially consists of, 
subjectivity, and of the style of communication that is tied to subjectivity. Kierkegaard 
claims that when communicating subjective truths that we must employ an indirect style. 
I go on to argue that parables very much fit into this style and that they work to cause 
tension on the part of the reader. The reader of the parable must choose between various 
competing interpretations that the parable presents, and in choosing how to interpret the 
parable, the reader reveals and discloses him or herself. I follow this up with an 
examination of a number of parables from different works of Kierkegaard, showing how 
they function in this manner. I end by arguing that Kierkegaard’s parables are designed to 
function like mirrors, revealing ourselves to us. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 Throughout this dissertation, I use a number of abbreviations to refer to 
Kierkegaard’s works. Unless otherwise noted, the following abbreviations refer to the 
following works. Further information can be found in my bibliography. 
 
CD = Christian Discourses: The Crisis and a Crisis in the life of an Actress 
CUP = Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments 
E/O = Either/Or 
FT = Fear and Trembling ; Repetition 
FSE = For Self Examination ; Judge for Yourselves 
PF = Philosophical Fragments ; Johannes Climacus 
PIC = Practice in Christianity 
SUD = The Sickness Unto Death 
JP = Journals and Papers 
POV = The Point of View 
TD = Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions 
UDVS = Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits 
WOL = Works of Love 
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Introduction 
 
 
 Kierkegaard is often praised for his poetic writing style. Throughout his works, 
especially his pseudonymous ones, Kierkegaard often breaks from philosophical prose 
and instead uses extended metaphors, fairy tales, parables, and allegories. This jarring 
change, which occurs quite often, is rarely explained by the pseudonyms. If these 
parables are supposed to teach something to the reader, one would expect the teaching to 
be outlined by the author. My project will examine the place of the parable in 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works in order to uncover why Kierkegaard uses them in a 
broad sense, but I will also show how some of the individual parables function within 
their respective works. In examining this issue, I will put forth an argument explaining 
why Kierkegaard must remain secretive about the purpose of the parables and how this 
secrecy plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s authorship. 
 It’s quite common for philosophers to use metaphors or analogies in their works. 
A good metaphor can help explain a complicated concept by referring the audience to a 
concept that is already understood. Aristotle’s classic example of Achilles describes him 
as “rushing like a lion”. This metaphor tells us much about the way that Achilles ran into 
battle. Though the description of his battle charge would not be complicated to describe 
without metaphor, the use of the lion metaphor explains the situation to the reader and 
thus simplifies the problem of understanding. The use of metaphor in this manner is quite 
commonplace, and indeed much of our language is inherently metaphorical. Yet, in these 
situations, the metaphor functions as an explanation that seeks to simplify the task of 
understanding. Metaphors also act as examples quite often. In order to explain a concept, 
one might refer to a metaphorical example as a way to elucidate the idea.  
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 Despite the commonality of metaphors and analogies in philosophical works, 
parables are a little rarer.1 We see parables in the works of Plato quite a bit, but the 
parabolic form never quite caught on for philosophy as a discipline. However, 
Kierkegaard uses parables so prolifically that Oden was able to select the best ones and 
publish an entire book just consisting of Kierkegaard’s parables. This curiosity alone 
makes the question of Kierkegaard’s parables worth investigating, but the issue becomes 
much more pronounced when one examines the problem of indirect communication. 
Kierkegaard, in many of his writings, was concerned with the way in which certain truths 
could be communicated. He claimed that there were some things that could not be 
communicated directly, but instead required indirect communication. Given that he finds 
this important, and that there are a number of clues throughout his works that he is trying 
to indirectly communicate with his readers, it is of much importance to recognize the 
effect and purpose of the parables that Kierkegaard has strewn throughout his works.  
 In order to see how these parables function in Kierkegaard’s corpus, we will also 
need to examine the purpose that he saw for his authorship. In The Point of View, we see 
Kierkegaard looking back on his works and describing his goals as an author. He claims 
that he was trying to turn people into Christians. He doesn’t do this by arguing for the 
truths of Christianity, but rather by trying to turn individuals inward and to cause each 
individual reader to seek redemption in Christ. If we are to examine the purpose of the 
parable in Kierkegaard’s work, we must do so specifically with this viewpoint in mind. 
Given that Kierkegaard wants to make his readers Christians and that he doesn’t intend to 
                                                 
1 Though my project will provide a definition of parable, defining the exact limit of the parable versus the 
metaphor, per se, will be outside the bounds of my examination. When I reference parable, I will be 
broadly referring to an extended metaphor, or a very short story. I do not differentiate a parable from an 
allegory, a fairy tale, or a fable for the purposes of my project. 
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do so by convincing them via rational discourse, how does the parable function? It is 
meaningful for us to ask both why Kierkegaard brings in parables and whether or not 
those parables help to achieve his goal as an author. 
 Given that the vast majority of Kierkegaard’s writings are in philosophical prose 
and not parable, what importance is there in the selection of parables that we find? How 
do they function within the individual works and how do they help Kierkegaard achieve 
his larger goals? This project will endeavor to answer these questions and to argue that 
Kierkegaard’s parables hold a central importance when we examine the authorship from 
Kierkegaard’s own point of view.  
 This project will argue that parables and story-telling were, for Kierkegaard, of 
central importance. Kierkegaard stated that one of his goals was to change individuals, 
and not merely convince them of certain philosophical truths (though he also did that). 
There appear to be some effects, if my argument is successful, both for Kierkegaard 
studies and for philosophy more broadly. As far as Kierkegaard studies are concerned, if 
the parables are really as valuable as the prose, then we need to give them equal 
consideration and study. We need to engage with the fields of hermeneutics and literary 
studies as much as with philosophy of religion if we are to be good Kierkegaardians. We 
cannot dismiss the parables as mere examples to prove the point of the prose but must 
recognize them as being unique tools used for a specific goal. If I am right, then any 
attempt to understand Kierkegaard that lacks an understanding of his parables will be 
incomplete. 
 Beyond the scope of Kierkegaard studies, I see even broader implications for the 
success of my thesis. There is an open question as to the purpose of philosophy, both in 
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the academic and general sense, in contemporary life. Academic philosophy seems more 
and more isolated from the general public and yet seemingly desires for the public to 
recognize its value. Articles in academic journals, conference proceedings, course 
offerings, and committee work seem to take up the majority of the time of most academic 
philosophers. Academic philosophy almost takes a Reaganomics approach hoping that 
philosophical insights will somehow trickle down into the general public. I think that this 
approach is wrong-headed and that, instead, Kierkegaard was on to something, though it 
seems he was ultimately unsuccessful with his own audience. 
 If we want philosophy to connect with the general public and have a marked 
effect on the lives of lay individuals, we might want to start telling stories. Our duty, as 
those who have left the cave in search of truth, must be to return to the cave and unbind 
those still there. But as Plato notes, we will be ridiculed upon our return. Kierkegaard 
hopes to have bridged this gap and provided a way to motivate, reorient, and change 
those who are reading our works, and he tries to do so with parable. Thus, in a day and 
age when academic departments are losing funding, when the humanities are seen are 
more and more irrelevant in the eyes of the government and the general public, we must 
change our tactics. If my argument about Kierkegaard is successful, and if Kierkegaard is 
right, we must start telling stories.  
Chapter 1 
 
 
 This argument is broken into five chapters, the first four of which provide a piece 
of the puzzle, with the fifth chapter combining the pieces to form my argument. In 
Chapter one I will examine the purpose that Kierkegaard sees for his own authorship. In 
order to understand why Kierkegaard uses parables in his works, we need to understand 
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the overall intent for his works. In his journals and in The Point of View Kierkegaard 
explicitly expressed his reasons for writing. He was dismayed with the current state of 
Christianity in Denmark and thought that most Danes were only Christians by name. 
Thus, he sought to cultivate the religious in his audience, though this was no simple task. 
One could not take the approach of Martin Luther and declare all of Denmark to be 
lacking the truly Christian. Kierkegaard knew that such an approach would be 
problematic, saying, “If it is an illusion that all are Christians, and if something is to be 
done, it must be done indirectly, not by someone who loudly declares himself to be an 
extraordinary Christian, but by someone who, better informed, even declares himself not 
to be a Christian.”2 Kierkegaard was of the opinion that, as a Christian, approaching 
someone and rebuking them for their lack of a Christian religious life would only cause 
the rebuker to become an outcast. The public would ignore that individual, and the cause 
championed by that person would be lost. Thus, he planned to write a number of 
pseudonymous books by authors who claimed that they were not Christians, while at the 
same time publishing religious works under his own name. Kierkegaard envisioned three 
realms of existence, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. He saw that most 
individuals existed in the aesthetic realm of life, and thus his writings began there. 
Kierkegaard wrote in the aesthetic vein, slowly moving towards the ethical and finally the 
religious. Yet, while his writings began in the aesthetic, Kierkegaard wanted one thing 
kept in mind, “but above all do not forget one thing... that it is the religious that is to 
come forward.”3 Though his writings delve into a number of different issues, Kierkegaard 
planned that in all things the Christian religious was the final end.   
                                                 
2 POV 43 
3 Ibid 46 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 Following our discussion of the purpose that Kierkegaard sees for his authorship 
in Chapter one, Chapter two will focus on the concept of indirect communication. Given 
our knowledge of what Kierkegaard wants to do, we next examine how he does it. 
Indirect communication functions as a way to communicate certain things, such as the 
truth of Christianity that Kierkegaard is trying to spread. "Suppose someone wanted to 
communicate that the truth is not the truth but that the way is the truth, that is that the 
truth is only in the becoming, in the process of appropriation."4 If this is the case, if the 
truth is not an object, but rather the truth is the way in which one comes to the truth, then 
it must be communicated indirectly. If someone had climbed a mountain, and upon 
reaching the peak had the realization that the entire point of the climb was coming to 
understand that the actual journey was what truly mattered, that person cannot simply tell 
this to someone else. When the end is not the truth, but instead the journey to truth is the 
truth, communicating this to another deprives that individual of the possibility of making 
the journey in the first place. Thus, Kierkegaard envisions a way in which we can 
communicate these truths, and he calls it indirect communication. Indirect 
communication is a way in which one can communicate subjective truths, or truths of 
inwardness. “Objectively the emphasis is on what is said; subjectively the emphasis on 
how it is said.”[emphasis in original]5,6 For Kierkegaard, the only way in which one can 
communicate subjective truth is to focus not on what is said, but on how one says it. In 
                                                 
4 CUP 78 
5 Ibid 202 
6 Kierkegaard sees all truths split into two broad categories, objective and subjective truths. Objective 
truths are truths about the world, facts of existence. Subjective truths are truths related to the individual, 
or truths of inwardness.  
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communicating a message in certain ways, one can deprive the receiver of the possibility 
of understanding, internalizing, or appropriating the message. Thus, the focus of indirect 
communication is on how something is said, and not specifically on what is said.  
 By examining the way in which the concept of indirect communication comes 
into play in Kierkegaard’s work, we can better understand why parables are significant, 
and how they fit into this approach. If Kierkegaard is trying to bring about a kind of 
inwardness in his readers in order to bring them to the religious, then he specifically 
wants to use indirect communication in order to do this. Indirect communication allows 
for the communication of possibilities. The audience can then inhabit these possibilities 
and consider them. By allowing for this process to occur, Kierkegaard creates a situation 
in which by engaging the communication at all, the audience is turned inward, and one in 
which this inward turn hopefully informs them of their untruth.  
Chapter 3 
 
 
 Chapter three is going to examine the place that parables have in this grand 
scheme, with specific reference to the relationship that the parable has to the reader. 
Having established Kierkegaard’s goal to turn individuals inward as well as the 
instrument to carry out that goal, indirect communication, we will next examine how 
parables act as a kind of indirect communication. Central to this process will be the 
concept of appropriation. For an individual to appropriate something they must grapple 
with its meaning and come to an understanding of it, but in such a way that this process is 
required in order to understand. One takes the meaning of the communication and makes 
it their own. In this way, the parable is clearly presenting the reader with both the 
opportunity for, and the requirement of, appropriation. However, as the knowledge is 
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obscured by the nature of the parable, the only way in which to do this is to engage the 
parable and to appropriate it. Were a parable to be followed by an explanation, as often 
happens, the parable would lose strength, as the personal appropriation would no longer 
be necessary. “Finally, the preacher must allow the parable to exercise its own power on 
the hearers and not be reduced to moral precepts or theological ideas.”7 In this we can 
recognize that the parable possesses more than just the concept within it. The parable is 
not merely an idea hidden in a story, but rather it is a call to engage with an idea on a 
personal, inward level. The ability of the parable to be appropriated by the individual is 
one of the most important factors in the use of a parable versus a straightforward 
explanation. The knowledge and experience gained from this kind of understanding are 
much greater than that of an explanation or a moral teaching. The individual comes to 
terms with the teaching him or herself and thus has gained a deeper understanding of it 
than would be gained if the moral was simply explained to him or her. In his writings, 
Kierkegaard presents parables in a way that allows for this process to take place.  
 Being that indirect communication is to drive the receiver to action, we can 
understand specifically why Kierkegaard implements the use of parable in his writings. A 
parable is an invitation to interpretation. Parables are able to provide the receiver with a 
situation in which they must appropriate the text in order to understand it; they must 
become active in their relationship to the text. “Metaphor provides Kierkegaard with the 
dialectical tension and the middle ground - as a kind of no-man’s-land - that his indirect 
communication requires of the reader to struggle with existence itself, to examine not 
only life but ideas in life that ethically instruct and prompt the reader to choose.”8 The 
                                                 
7 Donahue 13 
8 Lorentzen 62. 
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parable is a call to action, a call to choice. In this, the parable fulfills the requirements of 
an indirect communication. A parable does not plainly say what truth exists within it, 
instead the reader must come to understand this internally. Operating in this capacity, the 
parable functions as the perfect “how” of indirect communication by requiring 
appropriation on the part of the reader.  
Chapter 4 
 
 
 Having established that the use of parables fits nicely into what Kierkegaard 
wants to accomplish as an author, along with an understanding of how the parable 
functions, it is only fitting to next examine some of Kierkegaard’s parables themselves. 
Kierkegaard saw his literature as guiding the reader through the stages of existence and 
thus wrote a number of pseudonymous books both from and for a certain point of view, 
specifically in relation to the different stages of existence. Either/Or, for instance, 
explored the aesthetic life versus the ethical life and tries to push the reader out of the 
aesthetic and towards the ethical. When we look at a text like Fear and Trembling we see 
the challenge of the ethical, especially when it might conflict with the religious. In 
Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript we finally see Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms 
make the transition from the ethical to the religious, and specifically to the Christian 
religious. In Chapter four, I will examine parables from these and other pseudonymous 
texts and investigate the work that the parables do in their respective positions.  
 If we examine the parable of Agnes and the Merman, for instance, we see a 
situation in which the merman is in the aesthetic, recognizes the ethical, and also faces 
the divine. The merman recognizes the ethical categories of his actions and repents. He 
understands that seducing Agnes and lying to her would be unethical and thus he halts his 
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plan of action. However, given the recognition of the ethical, the merman can now make 
another choice. He can either disclose himself to Agnes and tell her the truth of what he 
had planned, or he can remain closed to Agnes. Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonymous 
author of the book, does not inform the reader of which choice the merman makes. 
Instead, the parable is left open ended and we are only informed of the possibilities. The 
merman is given the options of the demonic and the religious, with Silentio clearly 
favoring the choice of the religious. This choice is not described as an easy one for the 
merman to make. Instead, the merman must choose through a kind of superhuman will. 
The story of Agnes and the merman highlights the passage from the aesthetic to the 
ethical and then focuses on the tension between the ethical and the religious. Given that 
Fear and Trembling was written after Either/Or, but before the Postscript, currently 
Kierkegaard sees his readers in this position. They are not yet ready for the religious but 
can recognize the struggle that the ethical and the religious experience when they come 
into contact.  Here again we see the reader being led away from the aesthetic and towards 
the religious.  
 Throughout these parables, of which more will be explored than what was here 
mentioned, we see Kierkegaard building a road for his readers to follow. Kierkegaard 
starts with the despair that the aesthetic brings and moves from the aesthetic to the ethical 
life. He then recognizes the conflict between the ethical and the religious and nonetheless 
accepts faith and thus moves into the religious.  Finally, he ends with parables of the 
practices that makes one truly Christian. The continual upward movement that we find in 
the authorship as a whole is mirrored in the parables that we find along the way. But 
these parables are not set up as mere examples for the reader, in order to promote greater 
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understanding. Instead they function as indirect communications meant to take hold of 
the reader and bring them on the upward journey. 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 Remembering from Chapter one the claim that Kierkegaard is trying to turn us 
inward, we can now fully understand how parables fit into his philosophy. Given that 
Kierkegaard doesn’t think that it is within his power to make his readers Christian, the 
parable cannot teach us anything new. We cannot be convinced by Kierkegaard that we 
are not Christians and that we are in need of salvation. Instead, we must have the 
condition to recognize the truth given to us by God. However, once possessing this 
condition, we may choose to ignore it or refuse to act on it. It is to block this possibility 
that we see the parable coming into use. Kierkegaard wishes to turn us inwards, to 
recollect that truth that had already been revealed to us. To this end, Kierkegaard’s 
parables function as mirrors. The parable presents an image of a character or situation. As 
the reader strives to make sense of the parable, they seek to understand this situation or 
this image, and in seeking to gain this understanding, they can only rely on their own 
experiences. Thus, as they seek understanding of the parable, they must see themselves as 
the character or in the situation that the parable presents. By doing this, they open the 
possibility of facing the truth that Kierkegaard wants them to face, which is only a truth 
about themselves. In thinking about how the merman must make his choice, I must think 
of myself as a merman and in doing so I must imagine what it is like to admit fault in the 
face of a perfect creature. This type of imagination does not reveal anything to me about 
the merman or about some philosophical truth, instead it reveals something about myself. 
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This is the subjective truth that Kierkegaard wants to engender, truth about the self that 
can only be revealed using indirect communication.  
 Kierkegaard uses parables as mirrors, reflecting back upon us what we already 
know to be true but which we deny. In this sense Kierkegaard operates as Socrates does. 
He is the gadfly who wants to bring about recollection. Just as Socrates claims that he 
knows nothing, so too do we see Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms make similar claims on a 
number of occasions regarding Christianity. Thus, we can see how the parable functions 
in Kierkegaard’s works and also why it’s important to carefully consider these parables. 
If Kierkegaard wants to make us Christians but cannot actually do so, then he must 
function as the teacher who is only able to cause his students to recollect the truth. In this 
regard we see indirect communication and the use of parables playing an important role. 
Kierkegaard uses parables as mirrors for his audience, slowly causing them to see the 
truth in themselves, and using this self-awareness to guide them from the aesthetic to the 
religious. The parable is able to do this in part because it does not address the reader, but 
instead invites the reader to participate, and as the reader participates he or she comes to 
see the truth for themselves.  
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Chapter 1: Kierkegaard the Religious Critic 
 
 
If history were taught in the form of stories, 
 it would never be forgotten – Rudyard Kipling  
 
 
 We begin our study of parables in the works of Kierkegaard by first examining 
Kierkegaard’s intentions concerning his authorship. In order for us to understand why 
Kierkegaard constantly employed parables in his writing and the function that those 
parables serve, we must have an understanding of the goals that have been set out for the 
authorship. Luckily for us, late in his career Kierkegaard published a number of works 
that addressed this issue.9 Thus we start out our study of parables by digging into these 
works and examining clues that Kierkegaard gives us concerning his intentions. Little of 
what I present in this chapter is a novel or original interpretation of Kierkegaard. The vast 
majority of what I present in this chapter has been covered in the scholarship to some 
extent. My main contribution here lies in that I am bringing together parts of the 
scholarship that are often not in conversation with one another. I’m working to both to 
frame the arguments and concepts that the rest of this project will be concerned with and 
rest upon, as well as to unify different works of scholarship and some of the later works 
of Kierkegaard, which are often overlooked by the scholarship at large. Most scholars 
focus on the early pseudonymous writings of Kierkegaard and while I will be examining 
those works, I want to put them into conversation with the later writings, specifically The 
Point of View and For Self-examination. In these works, we see Kierkegaard, maybe only 
in hindsight, lay out what his goals were for his authorship.10 Thus we must begin by 
                                                 
9 The works have been collected in The Point of View and For Self-examination / Judge for Yourself. 
10 Tietjen spends considerable time arguing that we should trust the content of The Point of View versus 
scholars like Garff or Fenger who think it should be viewed with distrust. I find Tietjen’s arguments 
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examining these goals, and with that approach framing our discussion, move on in later 
chapters to explore Kierkegaard’s use of parables and how they relate to this goal.  
 Kierkegaard graciously informs us of his goals in The Point of View when he 
writes, “The content, then, of this little book is: what I in truth am as an author, that I am 
and was a religious author, that my whole authorship pertains to Christianity, to the issue: 
becoming a Christian, with direct and indirect polemical aim at that enormous illusion, 
Christendom, or the illusion that in such a country all are Christians of sorts.”11 
Kierkegaard goes on to claim, “Because I am a religious author, it of course is on the 
whole a matter of indifference to me whether a so-called esthetic public has found or 
would be able to find some enjoyment through reading the esthetic works, or through 
reading the esthetic in the works, which is the incognito and the deception in the service 
of Christianity.”12 Though Kierkegaard lacks specificity here, we see that he is primarily 
concerned with Christianity and that he sees his writings as being in service to 
Christianity, centrally located around the problem of becoming a Christian.13 Though not 
all of his writings have overtly dealt with religious themes, Kierkegaard claims that this 
has all been a part of his deception. Regardless of the content of the individual works, 
Kierkegaard claims that, taken as a totality, they are concerned with the issue of 
becoming a Christian.  
                                                 
convincing and follow him in this respect. His argument centers around the claim that in order to 
dismiss The Point of View, we seemingly must adopt a deconstructionist approach for which there is 
very little justification. 
11 POV 23 
12 Ibid 24 
13 For a wonderfully detailed examination of Kierkegaard’s religious authorship, refer to Lane’s 
Kierkegaard and the Concept of Religious Authorship in which he defines a religious authorship as, 
“Before God, to speak or write about God and the world (including religion and things religious), in a 
religious way, with a religious concern or interest, to a specific audience.” Pg. 4. I share a similar 
methodological approach as does Lane, in that I want to view Kierkegaard’s works through the lens that 
he provides with his late writings. 
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When looking at the question of intention, one might ask why the issue of 
becoming a Christian would need require an author to use, as Kierkegaard just described, 
deception and incognito. Why would Kierkegaard write in such a way that near the end of 
his authorship he has to clearly state what his intentions have been all along, having used 
this deception to obscure them until the very end? To answer this, let’s look at an 
imagined discourse found in For Self-examination in which Kierkegaard describes a 
scene between Martin Luther and a generic Danish Christian who is a contemporary of 
Kierkegaard’s.14 We start by assuming that Luther has risen from the grave and has lived 
in Kierkegaard’s Denmark and learned their ways. Having done so, Luther asks 
Kierkegaard if Kierkegaard is a Christian. To this, Kierkegaard’s response is, as it always 
is, that he is not a believer but rather that he is someone who has deep respect for true 
belief. Kierkegaard continues to imagine a conversation that Luther would have with an 
individual who did identify as a believer, an action that Kierkegaard thinks likely true of 
members of the general populace in Denmark at the time. Luther asks this individual how 
they suffer for Christianity. If they are indeed a believer, what have they sacrificed for 
their faith? To this challenge the common man responds that he can give plenty of 
assurances that he is indeed a believer. He goes on to demonstrate to Luther that he has a 
number of books that all describe faith very well, so we can rest comfortably in his self-
assured faith. Luther is angered by this response and says, “I do believe this man is crazy. 
If it is true that you are able to describe faith, that merely shows that you are a poet, and if 
you do it well, that you are a good poet – anything but that you are a believer.”15 This 
imagined exchange introduces us to some of the issues that Kierkegaard is considering 
                                                 
14 This occurs in FSE 17-18 
15 FSE 18 
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when he claims that his writings are all aimed at becoming a Christian. He faces a 
situation in which most of his peers and countrymen identify as Christians. As we see, 
however, he has very serious doubts about whether they are true Christians. Given these 
doubts, Kierkegaard turns to the use of the incognito, deceptions, and indirect 
communications in order to bring about the truly Christian in his audience.16 Thus in 
order to understand why these methods were used, we must begin by examining that 
problem that Kierkegaard saw himself needing to fight against.  
Section 1: Everyone’s a Christian So No One’s a Christian 
 
 
 Recognizing that Kierkegaard’s intent is to bring the religious17 forward, one 
might assume that his audience are the Danes who refuse to acknowledge the truths of 
Christianity. After all, one cannot bring forward the religious in those who already 
possess it. However, Kierkegaard's target audience was indeed those who professed 
Christianity, but whom he thought failed to recognize what Christianity truly was. 
Specifically looking at the Postscript, Muench argues that in order to interpret 
Kierkegaard we must have an understanding of his audience.18 To this end Muench 
presents a case that Kierkegaard is specifically targeting those who make Christianity too 
easy. When we examine the language used in the Postscript when Climacus, the 
pseudonymous author of the Postscript, writes that he will “make something more 
                                                 
16 Sketching out what the truly Christian looks like would be a book in itself. Instead, what I endeavor to 
present is Kierkegaard’s demonstration of what is not Christian. While this only gives us a negative 
understanding of the truly Christian, the purpose of this chapter is to outline and explain what 
Kierkegaard is working against and seeking to overcome. 
17 By “religious” here and forthwith, I mean the specifically Christian religious that Kierkegaard is 
concerned with. He specifies different forms of the religious, separating Religiousness A (a religious 
approach that isn’t distinctly Christian) from Religiousness B (a religious approach that is distinctly 
Christian) in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.  
18 Muench 430 
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difficult” and “So only one lack remains, even though not yet felt, the lack of difficulty” 
we find evidence for the claim that Kierkegaard wishes to make Christianity more 
difficult for his audience.19 Indeed, the majority of the Postscript demonstrates just how 
difficult Christianity is, and what it requires of each individual. Kierkegaard looks at the 
common Dane and sees individuals who regularly attend church services and have been 
told their entire life that they are Christians. In this kind of a social setting, Kierkegaard 
thinks that the majority of Danes consider themselves Christians. Yet Kierkegaard and 
Climacus want to demonstrate that Christianity requires much more than regular church 
attendance or the proper interpretation of doctrine.20 Thus their goal is to make 
Christianity difficult, and their audience are those who find Christianity simple and 
straightforward.  
 Given this audience, Kierkegaard thinks that, from the viewpoint of the religious, 
most individuals are under a grand illusion. In The Point of View, when Kierkegaard is 
retrospectively explaining his authorship, he writes,  
“Everyone who in earnest and also with some clarity of vision considers what is 
called Christendom, or the condition in a so-called Christian country, must 
without any doubt immediately have serious misgivings. What does it mean, after 
all, that all these thousands and thousands as a matter of course call themselves 
Christians! These many, many people, of whom by far the great majority, 
according to everything that can be discerned, have their lives in entirely different 
categories, something one can ascertain by the simplest observations! People who 
perhaps never once go to church, never think about God, never name his name 
except when they curse! People to whom it has never occurred that their lives 
should have some duty to God, people who either maintain that a certain civil 
impunity is the highest or do not find even this to be entirely necessary! Yet all 
these people, even those who insist that there is no God, they are all Christians, 
call themselves Christians, are recognized as Christians by the state, are buried as 
Christians by the Church, are discharged as Christians to eternity.”21 
                                                 
19 CUP 186 
20 An expansion of this project will be to fully explain what Kierkegaard’s Christianity is, but for now that 
question must be bracketed. 
21 POV 41 
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Kierkegaard is surrounded by individuals who all consider themselves Christian, and who 
are all considered Christian by the state and the church. Simply by virtue of being 
Danish, one must be a Christian. The language that Kierkegaard uses here demonstrates 
his anger with this approach, and thus help us understand the specific problem that he 
wants to address. Denmark is functioning under a grand illusion, the illusion of 
Christendom.  
 In order to explain how exactly this illusion functions, and what it has done to 
Christendom in Kierkegaard’s Denmark, let us first examine one of Kierkegaard's 
parables. In For Self-examination, Kierkegaard describes the situation of a lover who has 
just received a letter from his beloved.22 The letter is written in a language that the lover 
cannot understand and thus he needs to translate it before he can read it. The lover toils 
away at translating the letter, a process that he completes in its entirety before he actually 
reads the letter for its content. Having translated the letter, the lover realizes that it 
contains a wish on the part of his beloved for him to accomplish something. Upon 
reading of this wish, the lover sets off immediately and earnestly to complete his task. 
Eventually when the lovers meet, the beloved reveals that the lover must have 
mistranslated the letter, for the task that the lover completed was the wrong task. 
Kierkegaard asks if in this situation the lover would be upset with himself for acting the 
way that he did. Would he instead prefer to have taken a longer time translating, getting a 
second opinion and making sure that his syntax and word choice were correct? 
Kierkegaard claims that the lover would not have felt this way, but instead would be 
pleased with the fact that he complied with his beloved's wish immediately, even if he 
                                                 
22 FSE 26 
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didn't quite translate the wish properly. Kierkegaard goes on to describe how this relates 
to Biblical scripture. He thinks that we can approach scripture in a similar way that the 
lover approached the letter. We first need to translate but, given a translation, we have to 
make a choice. We choose to either act upon what we find in scripture, or we choose to 
seek precise knowledge of what scripture is communicating. Though Kierkegaard is 
careful not to disparage scholarship,23 he argues that the correct way to approach 
scripture is as an individual who desires to fulfill the commands and wishes found in 
scripture. He writes, “If you understand only one single passage in all of Holy Scripture, 
well, then you must do that first of all, but you do not have to sit down and ponder the 
obscure passages.”24 Kierkegaard wants our response to the Bible to be one of action, and 
not one of study. We are not to be interpreters of the Word, we are to be doers of the 
Word.  
 While he is careful to mention that scholarship is a good thing, Kierkegaard warns 
even the scholar from falling into the trap of only being a translator. He sees the Bible as 
a document that has claims on the lives of its readers, and thus when we interact with the 
Bible it should always cause us to act. To the extent that isn't happening, Kierkegaard 
thinks that we aren't truly readers of the Bible, and are thus missing out on true 
Christianity. He writes, “If you are a scholar, remember that if you do not read God's 
Word in another way, it will turn out that after a lifetime of reading God's Word many 
hours every day, you nevertheless have never read – God's Word.” Kierkegaard strongly 
cautions us away from a reading of scripture that sees us primarily as interpreters of the 
text, and not doers of the text. Instead he wants us to use scripture as a mirror for 
                                                 
23 Ibid 28 
24 Ibid 29 
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ourselves. We should approach scripture in such a way that we look to see ourselves in it. 
We cannot merely look at the mirror, we have to see ourselves within it. In this way, 
scripture propels us to action. By seeing ourselves in the mirror of the Word, we cannot 
remain interpreters, for the Word has claims upon us and our actions, and thus we must 
act as the Word compels us.25, 26  
 Kierkegaard sees himself as instead being surrounded by readers of the Word, and 
not doers. The illusion of Christendom seems made up both of the fact that everyone 
assumes that they are Christian, but also of the fact that Christianity has been altered into 
a mere set of doctrines. Everyone reads the Bible only as a scholar, and not as a true 
reader. In a short essay entitled Armed Neutrality Kierkegaard writes,  
“I do not think that without exaggeration one can say that Christianity in our time 
has been completely abolished. No, Christianity still exists and in its truth but as a 
teaching, as a doctrine. What has been abolished and forgotten (and thus can be 
said without exaggeration), however, is being a Christian, what it means to be a 
Christian; or what has been lost, what seems to exist no longer, is the ideal picture 
of being a Christian.27  
 
Kierkegaard laments the attention that is being given to the doctrines of Christianity 
without any focus on what it means to be a Christian. His attack on those who 
concentrate on scholarship or translation without also acting on the commands of 
scripture is echoed here in his complaint that Christianity has become solely doctrine. 
Kierkegaard's Christianity requires action, it requires a kind of existential re-ordering of 
                                                 
25 Kierkegaard writes another parable to describe this point. Kierkegaard describes a land in which a royal 
decree is laid out over a country. However, for some reason, everyone begins only to interpret the 
decree. Scholarship and criticism arise and focus on the royal decree, and entire areas of study are built 
around the royal decree. But would this not anger the king, for he only desires for the decree to be 
followed? The full text can be found in FSE 33-34 
26 In Chapter 5 I will again examine the concept of the mirror and the way in which it acts on us as readers. 
Thus, for now, I’m going to bracket questions about the effectiveness of the mirror as a tool and 
questions about whether or not the reader always perceives themselves accurately in the mirror, as these 
will be addressed in Chapter 5 
27 POV 129-130 
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oneself.28 However, this is not what we get from the Christianity that Kierkegaard is 
fighting against. Instead, doctrine is concerned with things like the proper interpretation 
of scripture, as the next parable I bring up will demonstrate. This approach, for 
Kierkegaard, is irrelevant to what Christianity truly requires of the individual.  
 Kierkegaard's concern with the focus on doctrine that he sees in his contemporary 
world is mirrored in another great parable of his. In Judge For Yourself, Kierkegaard tells 
the story of a theology student who, upon graduating, searches for a job far and wide. 
After a long search he is finally able to find one, though it is only a small appointment. 
Nonetheless he is happy with what he has found and looks forward to his new job. 
However, to his dismay, he eventually learns that he will be paid a smaller amount than 
he had initially thought. This upsets him greatly and he considers resigning the post. Yet, 
he sticks with it and eventually is led to give his first sermon. He chooses his text and 
gives a wonderful sermon on the verse, “But seek first His kingdom and His 
righteousness.”29 The pastor’s sermon is well received yet a question remains. Is there not 
some discrepancy between the pastor’s life and the verse that he is sermonizing? The 
pastor himself is very clearly not seeking the kingdom of God first and foremost, but is 
instead concerned with his salary. The response that Kierkegaard envisions the church 
fathers giving is, “Quite right, that is just the way he should preach; this is what is 
required of him. It all hinges on the doctrine and on its being proclaimed pure and 
unadulterated.”30 Kierkegaard sees Christianity in his time as being solely focused on 
doctrine. It doesn’t matter if the pastor follows the doctrine, his actions outside of his 
                                                 
28 This will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2. 
29 Matthew 6:33 NASB translation 
30 FSE 112 
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sermon are irrelevant. All that matters is that he gets the doctrine correct, and preaches it 
in the right way. As long as this is done, Christianity is preserved as it should be. Finding 
this whole approach problematic, Kierkegaard wishes to work against it. If all that you 
have to do to be a good Christian is agree with the official Church doctrine, regardless of 
what you believe or how you act, then it is quite easy for anyone to be a Christian. This 
valuation of doctrine over existential requirements is what causes the illusion of 
Christendom to fall over Kierkegaard's Denmark.  
 All of this paints a picture for us of what Kierkegaard thinks Christianity is not. 
Christianity is not Christendom. Christendom is overly concerned with tradition, public 
spectacle, formal organizations, and doctrine. Christendom wants to make sure that every 
person goes to church weekly and that they participate in the community and beliefs 
ascribed by the official church. Christendom thinks that it’s more important for the 
individual to believe all the right things than for them to act in a certain way. From the 
standpoint of Christendom, it doesn’t matter if you truly believe in Christ, as long as you 
do what the church tells you to do and were baptized, then you are good to go. It is this 
general approach to Christianity that Kierkegaard is fighting against. Given that this isn’t 
what Kierkegaard thinks Christianity is, let us now take a quick detour into a description 
of what Kierkegaard is aimed at: true Christianity. 
 As will be explained in much greater detail in chapter two, Kierkegaard thinks 
that there are two different approaches to truth, the subjective and the objective. The 
objective is concerned with knowledge and facts, while the subjective is concerned with 
the relationship that the individual has to the truth. For Kierkegaard, both are necessary 
parts of true Christianity. We must be passionate in our approach to the truth (subjective) 
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but must also make claims that are objectively true, such as that Christ is God, or that we 
are sinners. We cannot possess the objective truth but lack the subjective approach, for to 
do so might land us somewhere close to Christendom. Such an approach is only 
concerned with getting the answers correct, but not at all with transforming the 
individual. At the same time, we can’t take a purely subjective approach, for true 
Christianity requires us to worship Christ and to follow his commands, and not merely to 
act on our passions. So both the objective and subjective are needed. However, 
Kierkegaard claims multiple times in Postscript that Christianity is essentially subjective. 
Though we need to make sure that we are worshipping the correct God, the most 
important factor is that we are worshipping with passion and commitment. Thus, in 
understanding what Christianity is for Kierkegaard, our first recognition is that 
Christianity is focused around a changed individual. Christianity is not as much about the 
content of our beliefs as it is about our direct relationship with the divine.  
 Kierkegaard envisions human existence as fitting into one of three stages. The 
first stage is the aesthetic, and he thinks that the majority of human beings are in this 
stage. The aesthetic stage is characterized by immediate pleasure. Individuals in this stage 
are concerned with doing the most pleasurable thing as often as they can. All of their 
goals in life are built around pleasure, and everything is done for that sole purpose. The 
next stage is the ethical, which is marked by meaningful choice. The ethical stage is 
where human beings make choices according to certain universal principles. These 
principles, such as, “murder is wrong” guide our actions and form the basis for all of our 
desires and wills. Beyond the ethical, we find the religious, which Kierkegaard then 
separates further into two categories, Religiousness A and Religiousness B. 
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 Religiousness A is characterized by Kierkegaard as a religiousness of immanence. 
It is generally accompanied by a sense of guilt before the divine. However, Religiousness 
A is not distinctly Christian, and thus Climacus, for instance, characterizes Socrates as 
having existed within Religiousness A. Where the ethical provides us with rules to live 
by, Religiousness A is a recognition of something beyond those rules of morality, but 
something which we cannot necessarily achieve or know. Thus, we feel a sense of guilt 
before it, as we recognize our lack even if we don’t quite know what we are lacking. In 
Practice in Christianity, Anti-Climacus identifies a type of offense that comes with 
Religiousness A.31 He writes, “that is not related to Christ as Christ (the God-man) but to 
him simply as an individual human being who comes into collision with an established 
order.”32 This type of offense stems from an individual having come into conflict with the 
existing way of doing things and pushing against it. This type of offense is not essentially 
Christian, as it can occur in any situation in which an individual rebels against the 
established order. For instance, Westphal notes that Socrates fighting against the old 
guard of Athens would fulfill this requirement. So we see Religiousness A as being a 
proto-Christianity, if you will. It comes into being by recognizing something beyond the 
ethical, and feeling guilt in the face of that thing, but it doesn’t yet recognize Christ as 
God. 
 Religiousness B, on the other hand, is the distinctly Christian religiousness. 
Religiousness B is transcendent in nature and recognizes Christ as God. When this 
recognition occurs, the individual sense of guilt is transformed into a sense of sin. Instead 
                                                 
31 This analysis of the types of offense as being tied to the types of Religiousness comes from Westphal 
535-537. 
32 PIC 85 
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of being conscious of some lack, we become acutely conscious of our sin in the face of 
God. This consciousness also breaks, for us, any connection that we might have thought 
we had to the divine. In becoming conscious of sin we recognize that we are wholly other 
from God. Westphal identifies a second kind of offense that accompanies Religiousness 
B. This offense stems from, as Anti-Climacus puts it, “loftiness, that an individual human 
being speaks or acts as if he were God, declares himself to be God.”33 As we move from 
Religiousness A to B, we recognize that we are not the divine, and that we are wholly 
different from the divine, and take offense. Religiousness B is thus the distinctly 
Christian religiousness and that which Kierkegaard wants to drive his audience toward.  
 Westphal goes on to recognize a third type of religiousness, though one not 
named by Kierkegaard. Westphal refers to this as Religiousness C, and it stems from his 
analysis of the three types of offense. The first type comes as we enter into Religiousness 
A, the second type as we enter into B, and thus he claims that the third type must come as 
we enter into another form of religiousness, that of C. He claims that the third type of 
offense comes from the recognition that God became a man, and a lowly one at that. 
Christ was a human who suffered and bled, who was poor and lowly. This type of offense 
comes as we enter into Religiousness C, which is characterized by the requirement to act 
Christ-like, and very specifically, to have self-giving (agape) love for all of our 
neighbors. Thus, though Climacus never seems to outright recognize it as such, the 
attempt to imitate Christ, the fulfillment of Religiousness C, seems to be the goal that 
Kierkegaard is driving towards. For this reason he finds the current state of Christendom 
problematic and wishes to move his audience away from it, as Christendom is concerned 
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with passively believing what you’ve been instructed to believe and not imitating Christ 
and being a doer of the Word. 
 Recognizing the illusion of Christendom, Kierkegaard wishes to remove it. But 
how does one go about removing an illusion that affects nearly every single individual? 
Kierkegaard presents us with one option, writing,  
“Every once in a while a pastor makes a little fuss in the pulpit about there being 
something not quite right with all these many Christians – but all those who hear 
him and who are present there, consequently all those he is speaking to, are 
Christians, and of course he is not speaking to those he is speaking about. This is 
most appropriately called simulated motion. -Every once in a while a religious 
enthusiast appears. He makes an assault on Christendom; he makes a big noise, 
denounces nearly all as not being Christians – and he accomplishes nothing. He 
does not take into account that an illusion is not so easy to remove.”34 
 
The direct approach is one that Kierkegaard does not find advisable. On one hand we 
might end up preaching to the choir when we tell a group of Christians that there is 
something wrong with Christianity. Those who hear our message will assume that we are 
talking about some other group of Christians, perhaps some new heretical approach, or 
some group from another society. Thus our message falls on deaf ears, for there is an 
assumed difference in those we are talking to and those we are talking about. Our other 
direct option of trying to remove the illusion is to confront everyone and denounce them 
as not being Christians. But as Kierkegaard mentions, this fails to take into account the 
strength of the illusion. If I consider my Christianity as something that is central to my 
identity, in the same way that I consider my nationality central to my identity, how might 
one tell me that that I am not actually a Christian? It would be as if Kierkegaard were to 
say to one of his countrymen, “You are not Danish.” The Dane might respond, “But of 
course I am Danish, I was born in Denmark, I speak Danish, and I pay taxes to Denmark, 
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besides that I have lived here my whole life and so have my parents. How am I not 
Danish?”35 The direct approach in which those who consider themselves Christians are 
denounced will result only in those individuals dismissing the individual denouncing 
them. They will consider him or her a religious extremist, one who is mentally unstable, 
and thus one who should not be listened to. It might even go further as to solidify them in 
their illusion, certain that their beliefs must be true.  
 Thus Kierkegaard envisions a number of considerations that the individual who 
wishes to remove the illusion must constantly keep in mind. He first mentions that we 
cannot remove the illusion directly, but rather that only by approaching the problem 
indirectly can any progress be made.36 Kierkegaard ties this indirect approach to patience. 
The individual who wants to remove the illusion of Christendom must act patiently, for 
lacking patience will lead someone to make a direct attack. Given that Kierkegaard 
describes this indirect strategy as “approach[ing] from behind” we can envision this as an 
almost sneaky approach.37 In order to be indirect one must approach the target in such a 
way that they are not aware. It takes time to do this as one must be very careful with their 
movements. Kierkegaard writes, “Generally speaking, there is nothing that requires as 
gentle a treatment as the removal of an illusion.”38 We might think of a doctor trying to 
give a vaccine to a young child, distracting them while gently administering something 
painful. Thus, Kierkegaard finds patience to be necessary to the indirect approach. To this 
end, Kierkegaard claims that the religious author must start by becoming popular. In 
                                                 
35 One could imagine Antony Flew invoking the “No true Scotsman” fallacy in this type of situation. 
36 POV 43 
37 Ibid 43 
38 Ibid 43 
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order to accomplish this, one must publish a book in the aesthetic vein.39 Having done 
this, our author must continue in their writings to slowly move their audience towards a 
religious goal. Kierkegaard's strategy revolves around this deception. The reader thinks 
that the author is an aesthete, a lifestyle that the reader shares. Thus the reader engages 
the author, convinced that they are like-minded. However, over time the author slowly 
nudges the reader towards the religious, but in a way that the reader does not overtly 
notice. If the change takes too long, the reader will think that the author has merely 
changed their mind and is no longer an aesthete, and if the change happens too suddenly 
then the reader will dismiss the author and move on. Thus the religious author who 
wishes to strip the illusion from their reader must start with a deception, and with 
patience slowly bring the religious forward.  
 Kierkegaard was cognizant of the treachery that was involved with his plan to 
remove the illusion of Christendom.40 As was mentioned, such a course of action was 
quite difficult and Kierkegaard imagined that if approached in any other manner, his 
project would end with the public merely dismissing him.41 No one wants to be told that 
they are indeed not a Christian when they consider themselves to be a Christian. Mooney 
argues that this is partially due to the fact that no neutral standpoint exists for one’s own 
self.42 I cannot analyze whether or not a deeply held belief is authentic from a neutral or 
abstract standpoint, because such a belief is central to who I am. Thus, in order to 
overcome the illusion, Kierkegaard turned to deception. To that end, Kierkegaard 
                                                 
39 For Kierkegaard, the aesthetic is the immediate. Thus an aesthetic publication is one that provides 
immediate gratification or pleasure in the eyes of the reader. 
40 FSE 140 
41 Given our historical knowledge of the relationship between Christianity and Denmark both during 
Kierkegaard’s life and afterwards, it’s safe to assume that Kierkegaard was ultimately unsuccessful in 
attaining his goals to the extent that they relate to Denmark.  
42 Mooney, Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. 266 
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conceals his true goals from his contemporary audience.  
 This deception begins with the use of pseudonyms. The majority of Kierkegaard's 
work was published pseudonymously. These pseudonyms took up a number of various 
positions. As was noted, Kierkegaard thinks that a successful religious author needs to 
start with an aesthetic work, and he did with Either/Or. His pseudonymous works then 
slowly turned towards the religious across a number of texts. However, one important 
thing to note is that none of the pseudonyms ever called themselves Christians. Instead, 
they were always individuals who very much admired Christianity and who only sought 
to more fully understand it. Kierkegaard declares, “If it is an illusion that all are 
Christians, and if something is to be done, it must be done indirectly, not by someone 
who loudly declares himself to be an extraordinary Christian, but by someone who, better 
informed, even declares himself not to be a Christian.”43 If I declare myself a great 
Christian who has access to the true teachings of Christ, which declare that you are doing 
things entirely wrong, your reaction is likely to be a negative one. You will dismiss me or 
think me a heretic or zealot. So instead, I should try to approach you as a non-Christian 
who is merely interested in Christianity. This kind of an approach will leave you open to 
exploring the questions without getting defensive concerning them. We see Kierkegaard 
and his pseudonyms make this movement a number of times. When writing under his 
own name, Kierkegaard constantly disavows that he is a good Christian. He instead refers 
to himself as someone who knows what Christianity is; he claims no spiritual superiority, 
only intellectual superiority.44 Also in the Postscript, Fear and Trembling, Practice in 
Christianity, and many other works, we see Kierkegaard's pseudonyms claim that he is 
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not a Christian nor a religious authority. Here we see Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms doing 
something akin to Socrates in that they claim to not be a Christian just as Socrates claims 
to not know the answers to the questions that he’s asking.45 Given his explanations 
concerning the need for an indirect approach, we can only assume that Kierkegaard takes 
this kind of an approach because he is trying to accomplish the very specific goal of 
bringing the religious forward.  
 Part of this grand deception of Kierkegaard's involved an attempt to convince the 
public that he could not have been the author of the pseudonymous works. He had a very 
strict publishing strategy in which he would publish pseudonymous works at the same 
time as works that he would list himself as the author. In this way, he hoped to dissuade 
individuals who thought that he might be publishing the pseudonymous works by arguing 
that he could not have written two books at once. He writes, “With my left hand I passed 
Either/Or out into the world, with my right hand Two Upbuilding Discourses; but they all 
or almost all took the left with their right.”46 Kierkegaard published Either/Or and Two 
Upbuilding Discourses within 3 months of each other, and published Repetition, Fear 
and Trembling, and Three Upbuilding Discourses all on the same day. He continued a 
schedule of that sort throughout his career, publishing multiple works on the same day or 
within days of each other to throw off suspicion that he was the author. These actions are 
not merely for some sense of artistic fulfillment on Kierkegaard's part, but when we take 
into account his claims about what the successful religious author needs to do, we see 
how Kierkegaard's publishing are aimed at the religious. If Kierkegaard claims himself as 
the author, or is suspected of being the author, the public will ignore his message. They 
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will find some reason to dismiss him because of his personal life or something else. But 
when the author is unknown, one has to contend with the work itself. So Kierkegaard 
removes himself from the picture, and has his pseudonyms instead make the case for 
Christianity, but make sure to do so from the standpoint of one who is not a Christian.  
 Beyond just his publishing strategy, Kierkegaard also tried to act day to day in a 
manner that would not arouse suspicion. He describes how this was intentional when, 
describing himself, he writes,  
“Here was a religious author, but one who began as an esthetic author, and this 
first part was the incognito, was the deception. Very early and very thoroughly 
initiated into the secret that the world wants to be deceived, I was unable at that 
time to choose to pursue this strategy. Quite the opposite, it was a matter of 
deceiving inversely on the largest possible scale, of using all my familiarity with 
people and their weaknesses and their obtusities – not in order to profit from them 
but in order to annihilate myself, to weaken the impression of myself. The secret 
of the deception that indulges the world, which wants to be deceived, consists 
partly in forming a clique and all that goes with it, in joining one or two of those 
mutual admiration societies whose members assist each other by word and pen for 
the sake of worldly gain, and partly in hiding from the human throng, never being 
seen, in order in this way to produce an effect on the imagination. Therefore the 
very opposite had to be done. I had to exist and safeguard an existence in absolute 
isolation, but I also had to make a point of being seen at every time of the day, 
living, so to speak, on the street, associating myself with every Tom, Dick, and 
Harry in the most casual situations. This is the truth's way of deceiving, the ever-
sure way to weaken the impression of oneself in the world, furthermore certainly 
also the way of self-renunciation taken by men quite different from me in order to 
make people aware.”47 
 
Here we see Kierkegaard describing the deception that he is employing. But beyond the 
literary deception, he has to extend the deception into his life. Kierkegaard was well 
known for going on daily walks throughout Copenhagen.48 In this passage we see the 
method to his madness. Kierkegaard argued that a successful religious author must start 
with aesthetic works and slowly lead to the religious, and also that in order for the 
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religious to come forward, the author cannot claim to be a good religious individual. Thus 
Kierkegaard needed to make himself into a nobody so that his works could stand on their 
own. His strategy of double publishing and his daily walks seem to be a part of this. He 
made it a point to be seen on his walks throughout the city and to engage with everyone 
whom he saw, a skill for which he was quite well known. All of this seems to be for the 
purpose of deception. It’s easy for us to imagine the public dismissing Kierkegaard’s 
works once they found out who the author was. If you know that it’s Kierkegaard who is 
challenging your religious beliefs, then you can find an excuse to disregard him. Maybe 
you think of his failed engagement with his Regine Olsen as good reason to dismiss him, 
or you laugh at the fact that Kierkegaard was, in all likelihood, a hunchback. Whatever 
your reason, you can find flaws in the human that provide enough of a psychological 
reason for you to dismiss the work. Yet, if the work has no real human individual 
attached to it, you can only contend with the ideas found within it. His daily life was 
warped in service to the goal of the religious author. In all that he did, both in writing and 
in daily action, we see Kierkegaard wholly concerned with removing the illusion of 
Christendom from Denmark.  
 In a short essay entitled On My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard lays out this 
process from start to finish. He begins by mentioning that his works, taking as a totality, 
can only be understood religiously,49 a claim that he echoes in other writings.50 By this, 
Kierkegaard seems to mean that his writings as a whole only make sense when we 
approach them as being aimed at what he considers the truly religious, which is a specific 
variety of Christianity. Given his commitment to also bringing about the truly religious in 
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his audience, we can see this as being part of the interpretive apparatus that is required of 
us. Understanding that the writings are of this religious nature allows us to recognize how 
they are a vast deception. Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings work to deceive the 
reader into the truth.51 But how exactly does the deception function, and over what is 
Kierkegaard deceiving his audience? He gives us some clues at the end of the short essay. 
He writes, “Here again, the movement is: to arrive at the simple; the movement is: from 
the public to ‘the single individual.’ In other words, there is in a religious sense no public 
but only individuals, because the religious is earnestness, and earnestness is: the single 
individual.”52 There are a few ways to read this passage. Those who are interested in 
reading Kierkegaard’s personal life into his philosophy, an approach that I don't think is 
entirely problematic, but which I find fruitless if it is the primary concern, generally read 
“the single individual” as referring to Regine Olsen, Kierkegaard's ex-fiancée. However, I 
think that interpreting “the single individual” as a reference to Kierkegaard's audience is 
much more fitting when we examine Kierkegaard’s overall views concerning his 
authorship. Though he may well be referring to Regine in whole or in part, if we are to 
take his other claims in The Point of View seriously, then we must recognize that at least 
in part, Kierkegaard is addressing his Danish countrymen who consider themselves 
Christian but who lack what Kierkegaard thinks is truly Christian. In this passage 
Kierkegaard claims to want to separate the individual from the public at large, a public 
which was under the illusion of Christendom. In order to have the best chance at 
removing this illusion from the individual, the individual must be isolated, for otherwise 
                                                 
51 We also see Kierkegaard refer to the maieutic; he compares himself to the Socratic midwife, the person 
who brings the truth forward but who is not actually supplying it. POV 7 
52 POV 10 
34 
 
 
the illusion will be perpetuated by the individual’s peers. By separating the individual, 
Kierkegaard can then remove the illusion by re-revealing Christianity to the individual. 
While the individual might still deceive themself and thus perpetuate the illusion, 
removing the external influence provides Kierkegaard with the best possible chance at 
removing the illusion.  
In Mackey’s examination of Kierkegaard’s works, he distinguishes between the 
possibility of a doctrinal goal in which Kierkegaard is looking to get the church to take a 
specific stance on a theological issue and a poetic or existential goal in which 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms are working to re-reveal Christianity to a public who 
already assumed themselves to be Christians. Mackey’s work is primarily concerned with 
arguing that we need to interpret Kierkegaard first and foremost as a poet and thus we 
have to conclude that the poetic goal is of central importance.53 Kierkegaard is not 
looking to convert pagans to Christianity, but rather to remove the illusion of 
Christendom from those who already consider themselves Christian. He is looking to 
make Christianity difficult to a populace who thinks it a simple matter of believing the 
correct doctrines. His goal is to re-reveal Christianity in all of its awe and terror to the 
isolated individual, therefore forcing them to reconcile the two worldviews: what 
Kierkegaard considers the illusion of Christendom and what he considers the truly 
Christian.  
Section 2: With All Your Power, What Would You Do? 
 
 
 In examining Kierkegaard's goals and constraints for his authorship, we inevitably 
run into the question of what Kierkegaard actually thinks he can do about the problem. If 
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Kierkegaard is to remove the illusion of Christendom, then he must think that at least 
some individuals who identify as Christian are not actually true Christians.54 Thus his 
goal seems aimed at converting these contemporaries of his to Christianity. This goal 
runs into a specific problem that Kierkegaard identifies as the problem of the teacher and 
learner, hearkening us back to the paradox that we find in the Meno.55 Johannes 
Climacus, Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author of Philosophical Fragments, begins his 
book by reminding us of the paradox that Meno brings up in his dialogue with Socrates. 
Socrates claimed that he did not know what virtue was, and thus could not answer Meno's 
question as to whether virtue could be taught. Despite not knowing virtue, Socrates 
engages Meno on the topic until Meno gives up in exasperation. He goes on the ask 
Socrates how Socrates would search for virtue or recognize the correct answer if Socrates 
knows nothing of virtue. Kierkegaard is dealing with a very similar problem. Meno's 
paradox essentially boils down to the question of learning. How does one learn 
something? For seemingly if we know nothing about a subject, we cannot recognize the 
truth. So how does one gain the truth? For Kierkegaard this question is directly related to 
the truth of Christianity. If one knows nothing of Christianity, how does one look for it? 
If the divine truth of God has not been revealed to someone, how could they learn it? This 
is an important question for us to engage, for it directly speaks to the purpose that 
Kierkegaard sees for his authorship. If one can gain the truth through learning, then 
Kierkegaard only needs to become the teacher. He needs to instruct his contemporaries 
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chapter, Kierkegaard relates Christianity specifically to the subjective and indirect approach and thus we 
get a glimpse of what authentic Christianity looks like. However, it is nonetheless outside the bounds of 
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and then they can know the truth. But if the truth cannot be gained through learning, what 
purpose can Kierkegaard's authorship serve? 
 Climacus examines this situation from start to finish. We start with ignorance, for 
we do not yet know the truth. “The seeker [of truth] up until that moment must not have 
possessed the truth, not even in the form of ignorance.”56 Our initial state is one in which 
not merely do we not know the truth, but we don't know that we don't know. We lack the 
Socratic wisdom of minimally being aware of our ignorance. This is also precisely the 
position that Kierkegaard finds his audience in. Not only are his countrymen not true 
Christians, they also do not know that they are not true Christians. They are under the 
illusion of Christendom which has convinced them that they are all Christians. If you are 
aware of your ignorance then you are only a seeker of the truth, but this is not the 
position of Kierkegaard's contemporaries. For this reason, he refers to the default form of 
existence as “untruth”. So the question that we must ask is this: How does one reveal the 
truth to someone who is untruth? 
 Climacus goes on to phrase the question in terms of a teacher and a learner. The 
learner is untruth and the task of the teacher is to bring the truth to the learner. So what 
must the teacher do? Climacus starts with Socrates' response in the Meno, that of 
recollection. Can the teacher cause the learner to recollect? In this situation, since the 
learner is untruth, the only thing that the learner can recollect is untruth. Thus Climacus 
finds that the teacher can cause the learner to recollect her untruth. However, recollecting 
your untruth does not provide you with a pathway to find the truth. Instead, it only makes 
you aware that you lack the truth. You still don't know what you are looking for, you 
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merely know that you do not have it. In causing this recollection, the teacher isn't actually 
giving you any amount of knowledge, but instead is turning you inwards, and it is this 
inwardness that brings forward your awareness of your untruth. So in this situation, the 
teacher isn't actually accomplishing much, for the teacher is only acting as the occasion 
of recollection, not the occasion of truth. The teacher is not teaching truth to the learner, 
rather, he is only propelling her to recollect.  
 Once the learner is aware of her untruth, how does she gain the truth? Climacus 
writes, “Now, if the learner is to obtain the truth, the teacher must first bring it to him, but 
not only that. Along with it, he must provide him with the condition for understanding 
it.”57 As untruth, you don't yet possess the ability to even understand the truth, for you 
only know untruth. The truth is wholly foreign to you and thus you must first gain what 
Climacus calls the condition. The condition refers to the capability to recognize the truth. 
If you lack the condition, then even if the truth were given to you, you could not 
recognize it. Therefore, Climacus writes, “Ultimately, all instruction depends on the 
presence of the condition; if it is lacking, then a teacher is capable of nothing, because in 
the second case, the teacher, before beginning to teach, must transform, not reform, the 
learner.”58 The condition is not something that can be taught, for it is a capability to 
understand and recognize, and a capability is not the kind of thing that can be passed 
from teacher to learner. Instead, the learner must be transformed; something about their 
human constitution must change. They must become a different kind of creature, one who 
possesses a new capability. For Climacus, no human teacher could cause this 
transformation, and thus he labels this teacher a god. Only the god could transform the 
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learner in such a way that she now possesses the condition. How exactly this process 
occurs is not something that Climacus endeavors to explain, but given the description that 
we find, the transformation of the individual appears to be miraculous in nature.  
 So the god transforms the learner and gives her the condition. Once possessing the 
condition, she can learn the truth, but doing so is not merely an intellectual matter for as 
will be explained in the next chapter, Kierkegaard thinks of Christianity as a way of 
existing and not merely a set of beliefs. Climacus goes on to name the state of untruth, 
sin. With this we can see the full picture that he is painting. Humans who are in sin do not 
even recognize themselves as sinners, much less do they understand the truth of 
Christianity. Thus the first step that must be taken is for the sinners to recognize 
themselves as sinners. They must accept their untruth. Having done that, they must also 
possess the condition. The condition has to be given by God, it is not something that can 
be sought out and achieved through hard work. Only God can transform the sinners into 
creatures who can recognize truth. Once the sinners recognize their state of sin and they 
possess the condition, then they can begin to learn the truth of Christianity. Since this 
process is not something that can be achieved solely by the sinners, Climacus is thus 
disallowing any possibility of earning one’s salvation. For in order to earn one’s 
salvation, one must assumedly do good, yet if one does not possess the condition, then 
one lacks the ability to even understand what good is, much less do it. Salvation, and the 
truth of Christianity, only come to us through divine grace.  
 Thus we see that Kierkegaard cannot act as the teacher, for only the god can be 
the teacher that Climacus describes. In this situation, how can Kierkegaard function? He 
provides us with some clues when we return to The Point of View.  
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“A person may have the good fortune of doing a great deal for another, may have 
the good fortune of leading him to the place to which he desires to lead him, and 
to hold to what in essence is continually under discussion here, may have the 
good fortune of helping that person to become a Christian. But this is not in my 
power.”59 
 
Kierkegaard seems very aware that he cannot cause a conversion. He cannot make others 
Christian, for he cannot provide anyone with the condition. Again we return to Meno’s 
problem in that if Kierkegaard speaks to those without the condition, they cannot 
understand him, and if he speaks to those with the condition, he is wasting his time for 
they already have access to the truth. In this situation, Kierkegaard's possibilities seem 
very limited. Either he functions as the teacher who causes the learner to recollect their 
untruth or he addresses himself to the learners who possess the condition and he functions 
merely as a teacher who wishes to disseminate knowledge to his students in the same 
manner that every teacher does. In the first case, Climacus thinks that the teachers job is 
insufficient, as the teacher is not actually teaching anything to the learner. Instead the 
learner is traveling down a path of self-discovery, and at best all that the teacher can do is 
help to start them on that path. If this is Kierkegaard's plan for his authorship, then his 
goals are rather mundane. This doesn't match up with what he's claimed to want out of his 
authorship. In the second case, Kierkegaard would be functioning only as a standard 
teacher. He would be ministering to those who already possess the condition and his 
function would be to help them understand the truth in a greater sense. This more closely 
matches his claims, but still does not directly addresses the goals that he has laid out for 
his authorship. So if Kierkegaard operates as neither of these functions, what part does he 
play in reference to the problem of the teacher and the learner? 
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 It's telling, I think, that Climacus constantly refers back to Socrates, and even 
devotes some time to the concept of Socrates as the midwife. Climacus has maintained 
that the teacher cannot provide the truth, nor can the teacher transform the learner, and in 
this way I think that the midwife analogy is apt. The midwife cannot give birth, she can 
only deliver the child, and here I think we find Kierkegaard's role, as he writes, “between 
one human being and another to deliver is the highest; giving birth indeed belongs to the 
god.”60 Kierkegaard's role is not to provide the truth, nor to give the individual the 
condition, for neither are things that he can accomplish. Instead, he is here to help deliver 
the truth. The truth that he is going to deliver is one that will be more fully explored in 
chapter five, but suffice to say, Kierkegaard is helping us to birth the truth about 
ourselves. He wants us to see ourselves truly and clearly. This truth, that we are sinners in 
need of a savior, can only be given to us by God, and thus Kierkegaard is not providing 
this. Instead he is helping us to receive it, to make sure that we do not turn away or that 
we are not unduly harmed in the process. The midwife’s job is to safeguard the health of 
the mother while bringing the child into the world. Kierkegaard is not trying to merely 
teach, for such an approach would be overly concerned with knowledge. Instead he is 
trying to bring the truth out of us, the recognition of what we truly are.61  
 Climacus later remarks that the teacher is the occasion for the learner to 
understand herself. The teacher is not giving truth to the learner, but instead he is only 
functioning as a vehicle for the learner's self-discovery. This matches the line of thinking 
                                                 
60 PF 11 
61 This truth is a separate thing from the truth of Christianity. The truth of Christianity must entail the truth 
of the self, as we might call it, that Kierkegaard is helping us to birth, but the truth of the self does not 
entail the truth of Christianity. Thus, Kierkegaard is helping us to see ourselves, though doing this 
already requires the condition, the ability to recognize untruth.  
41 
 
 
that we find in The Point of View concerning the job of the teacher and the helper. 
Kierkegaard writes that the individual who wants to help anyone must first humble 
himself. “But all true helping begins with a humbling. The helper must first humble 
himself under the person he wants to help and thereby understand that to help is not to 
dominate but to serve.”62 This aligns with what path that we see Kierkegaard's authorship 
taking. He thinks that most individuals live an aesthetic existence and thus he begins his 
authorship with an aesthetic work. Over time he slowly tries to bring the religious 
forward, but he only does this first after claiming that he is not a Christian, and also after 
starting where his audience already is. “To be a teacher is not to say: This is the way it is, 
nor is it to assign lessons and the like. No, to be a teacher is truly to be the learner. 
Instruction begins with this, that you, the teacher, learn from the learner, place yourself in 
what he has understood and how he has understood it.”63 When we combine the ideas that 
the teacher must learn from the learner, that the teacher must humble himself beneath the 
learner, and that Kierkegaard’s goal is to move his audience from the aesthetic mode of 
existence to the religious, an image of the teacher comes forth. The teacher is not the 
pastor who preaches from the pulpit. The teacher, for Kierkegaard, is the individual who 
seeks to understand the learner and be humbled before her. This act of humbling allows 
the teacher to connect with the learner and thus communicate on a level that the learner 
understands. Kierkegaard seems to have this in mind when he claims that he needs to 
start with the aesthetic, with the pleasure seeker. An individual who only seeks pleasure 
in life will not understand the appeal of a strictly religious life, for such a thing lacks 
pleasure. The pleasure seeker and the religious individual live in incommensurable 
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paradigms. So in order to prompt the movement of the pleasure seeker towards the 
religious, one must first become a pleasure seeker and speak in terms that the pleasure 
seeker understands. This is what it is to be a teacher for Kierkegaard, and we can see this 
not only in the structure of his authorship but also with the relatively narrow role that he 
sees himself playing in the grand scheme of things. He is not the individual who shows a 
sinner their sins, or who shows them the truth of Christianity. Instead, he is the teacher 
who humbles himself before his audience and helps deliver the truth as a midwife, 
specifically to an individual who possesses the condition.  
 How exactly does this midwifery occur?64 Kierkegaard identifies what his 
authorship has been trying to accomplish when he writes, “[I have] worked to arouse 
restlessness oriented toward inward deepening.”65 Kierkegaard, functioning as the 
midwife, cannot actually communicate truth to his audience. So instead he sees his 
function as being the agent of inwardness. He works to turn his audience inward, in this 
hoping that they will see themselves in a true sense. If I am under the illusion of 
Christendom and you wish for me to become a true Christian, two things seemingly must 
happen. First, I must throw off the illusion, and second I must accept Christianity. 
Kierkegaard readily acknowledges that he cannot bring about the second of those 
occurrences. Thus he is aimed at the first. You cannot simply tell me that I am under the 
illusion of Christendom, nor can you make me see it. In order for me to overcome the 
illusion, I have to first recognize it. Thus, when Kierkegaard wishes to engender 
inwardness, he is driving towards the only thing that can overcome the illusion, the single 
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individual. The individual needs to turn inward and examine themselves in order to 
recognize that there is a contradiction between the belief that they are a good Christian 
and their actions which betray what Kierkegaard thinks is the truly Christian. Only when 
this occurs can the individual move past the illusion and thus enter into the possibility of 
true Christianity.  
 These two actions, the removal of the illusion and the acceptance of Christianity 
must happen in an ordered fashion. I cannot truly accept Christianity while I am under the 
illusion of Christendom. Thus, Kierkegaard’s goal is the removal of the illusion. 
However, when we examine the acceptance of Christianity we realize that there is 
actually specific content to Christianity that I must relate to properly. So, Kierkegaard’s 
diatribe against doctrine doesn’t stem from the fact that doctrine is meaningless when it 
comes to Christianity, but rather that doctrine should only come into play after the 
illusion has been removed. Because of this, Kierkegaard often discusses Christian 
doctrine and the truth of Christianity. The nature of God and Christianity, the nature of 
our relationship with God, the possibility of salvation, and our consciousness of sin, 
among many other things, are all relevant and important topics for Kierkegaard.66 
However, only the individual who has turned from untruth and is trying to properly orient 
themselves towards Christianity has concern for things of this sort as they relate to the 
content and doctrine of Christianity. The problem that has arisen is that instead of 
orienting ourselves properly and then examining the content so that we can be oriented 
towards the correct thing, we have skipped the step of orientation. Thus, the illusion of 
Christendom tells us that we don’t need to exist in a certain way, we just have to have the 
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correct object of belief. As will be explored in the next chapter, this runs afoul of the idea 
that Christianity is essentially subjective for Kierkegaard. 
 With his primary goal being to overcome the illusion of Christendom, and thus 
engender inwardness in his audience, Kierkegaard's plan of action ends up being quite 
different from the that of the church during his time. He writes,  
“For a long time the strategy employed was to utilize everything to get as many as 
possible, everyone is possible, to accept Christianity – but then not to be so very 
scrupulous about whether what one got them to accept actually was Christianity. 
My strategy was with the help of God to utilize everything to make clear what in 
truth Christianity's requirement is.”67  
 
By presenting those who think they are Christian with the requirements of true 
Christianity, Kierkegaard is hoping that they will reject the illusion. This is not easily 
accomplished though, and thus we see Kierkegaard engaging in what he refers to as the 
vast deception, the use of pseudonyms, his daily walks, his publishing schedule, and the 
way in which he addresses his audience as one who is not a Christian but who is merely 
interested in what Christianity truly looks like. What we've examined thus far 
demonstrates that Kierkegaard's hope for his authorship is that it will challenge the 
individual to think and judge for themselves as to whether or not the illusion of 
Christendom that they are under is true Christianity. Thus Kierkegaard wants to turn them 
inward, for he cannot accomplish this realization for them.  
Section 3: Who Gets Saved from Tonight’s Elimination? 
 
 
 The claim that Kierkegaard is trying to re-introduce Christianity to his 
countrymen who are under the illusion of Christendom can lead us to also question the 
breadth of applicability of Kierkegaard's works. As I've argued, Kierkegaard sees himself 
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as the midwife, the author who can push the individual to turn inward and see 
themselves, as if in a mirror. But to whom does this apply? If God is providing the 
condition, something that Kierkegaard cannot do, who exactly has the condition? If the 
condition is limited to a certain number of individuals then Kierkegaard's target audience 
can only be those people, for he wants the religious to come forward, and the condition is 
a prerequisite for the religious.  
 The question of theological universalism comes into play here. The doctrine of 
theological universalism states that all persons will eventually experience salvation. If 
Kierkegaard were to accept this approach, then his writings would serve to hasten the 
salvation of some, perhaps. However, I concur with Mulder that there is good reason to 
believe that Kierkegaard rejects the doctrine of universalism. Kierkegaard's pseudonym, 
Climacus, describes faith as a decision. If faith, and thus salvation, require an act on the 
part of the individual, then it is always possible for the individual to reject God, even if 
God has provided them with the condition, for faith requires that act of willing. This is 
the line of thought that Ferreira takes when examining different models of 
Kierkegaardian faith. As Ferreira writes, “a model in which our eyes are opened but our 
free activity is still needed, a model which is neither a deliberate decision nor totally 
passive and inexplicable.”68 Ferreira argues that for Kierkegaard faith is not something 
that you can accomplish by yourself, and simultaneously something that requires your 
free activity. As was shown earlier, only God can reform the individual and thus convert 
her from untruth to truth in ignorance. This conversion allows for the learner to recognize 
that they lack the truth and they also now possess the ability to understand the truth when 
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they come across it. Thus we see that God is required for salvation. The learner cannot 
understand the truth and thus cannot save herself until God gives her the condition.  
 At the same time, the learner plays an important part in their reception of the 
truth. There is some amount of free will that is involved in faith. Ferreira analyzes the 
language that Climacus uses when describing the situation for the Socratic, the original 
problem of learning that we find in the Meno, versus the situation of faith. In both 
instances, Climacus refers to “willing” as a salient feature in overcoming ignorance. 
However, Ferreira points out that when we look at the Socratic, Climacus says that we 
need to will in order to understand the truth even if we already have the truth. On this 
account of things, will doesn't seem to imply a deliberate decision, but instead a kind of 
focus. For this reason, Ferreira argues that the “decision” of the individual when it comes 
to the possession of faith is not a purely volitional act. God has already revealed the truth 
and provided the learner with the condition. Yet, in order to fully understand the truth, to 
appropriate it, we must actively attend, concentrate, and focus on it.69 This is the act of 
willing, it is a shift in focus and perspective. So the will of the learner is not to save 
themselves, or to accept the salvation of God, but instead to attend to the truth that has 
been revealed to them in such a way that they bring it inward and become changed 
individuals.  
 When we consider that this act of will is one that Kierkegaard finds necessary, we 
can see the purpose that his authorship might serve. If he is a universalist then the 
authorship serves no necessary function, for all will eventually be reconciled with God. 
Instead, Kierkegaard seeks to affect those who already possess the condition and to 
                                                 
69 In chapter 2 I will endeavor to explain the differences between understanding and appropriating, though I 
will use the slightly different language of the objective and subjective approaches to truth.  
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reorient their attention inwards, thus nudging their will towards the kind of focus and 
perspective that is needed for faith.70 This is not something that he can strictly cause, but 
he hopes to influence his readers by drawing them inward, by creating a mirror for their 
soul.  
Conclusion 
 
 
 This chapter has examined the purpose behind Kierkegaard’s writings. I’ve 
argued that Kierkegaard wants to strip away the illusion of Christendom for his audience 
and that he sees this as an important step in individuals being able to move towards 
Christianity. I’ve shown that Kierkegaard cannot bring individuals to Christianity 
himself, for such a thing can only be accomplished by God, and instead that he tries to 
function as a philosophical-religious midwife. He works to properly orient us by bringing 
about inwardness. This understanding of his goal as an author helps to frame what comes 
in chapter two, which is an examination of Kierkegaard’s communication style. In order 
for us to fully analyze Kierkegaard’s use of parables, we must first know what he’s trying 
to accomplish as an author, as well as what principles guide his writing and 
communication style.  
  
                                                 
70 One could argue that he’s merely fulfilling the commandment to spread the Gospel, but that approach 
seems to ignore his meticulous approach towards his authorship, and specifically ignores his own 
claims about the purpose of his authorship. 
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Chapter 2: Kierkegaard the Illusionist 
 
 
“Behold, they are one people, and they all have the same language. And this is what they began to do, and 
now nothing which they purpose to do will be impossible for them.” – Genesis 11:6 
 
 
In this chapter, I will be trying to accomplish two different goals. First, an 
understanding of indirect communication is necessary in order to examine the concept of 
parable that will happen in later chapters, and thus I will work to develop such an 
understanding. Secondly, a significant portion of this chapter will function as a literature 
review, as there is very little literature on parables in Kierkegaard, but quite a bit on 
indirect communication. Therefore, much of this chapter will proceed as explication 
through literature review. I will oftentimes present an author’s view, followed by 
criticism or support of mine, usually culminating in some kind of synthesis that presents a 
full understanding of the different concepts that I engage. 
If we accept that Kierkegaard’s goals are religious in nature, we next must ask 
how he intends to accomplish those goals. I have already argued that Kierkegaard 
recognizes his inability to turn people into Christians and thus that he is aimed at turning 
individuals inward so that they can recognize the truth that God has already revealed to 
them. While Kierkegaard spends a lot of time in both his pseudonymous and his named 
works discussing Christian doctrine, he doesn’t seem to think that an explication of 
doctrine is going to accomplish his goal, for reasons outlined in the last chapter. Instead, 
he employs the use of indirect communication, which I will endeavor to explain in this 
chapter. 
In order to fully appreciate Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication, we 
must first explore the approaches to truth that Johannes Climacus, one of Kierkegaard’s 
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pseudonyms, writes about in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments. Climacus envisions two different approaches to truth, objective and 
subjective. Both of these approaches can be taken towards the same object, but they will 
give different outcomes. Climacus argues that the objective approach and the subjective 
approach are paired with different forms of communication. He links indirect 
communication with the subjective approach and this chapter will begin by exploring this 
connection. Climacus is of the opinion that Christianity is ultimately subjective and thus 
that communicating Christianity requires indirect communication. This is in line with the 
argument that I put together in the last chapter, that Kierkegaard did not want to focus on 
Christian doctrine, but instead on inwardness. Doctrine would be the kind of thing that is 
connected to direct communication, for it is objective and factual, in a sense. By focusing 
on indirect communication and subjectivity, we see Kierkegaard moving Christianity into 
the realm of the individual, away from the objective and thus focusing on inwardness.  
Examining Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication leads us into a few 
questions surrounding interpretation. Kierkegaard admits that indirect communication is 
needed for the religious approach and I’ve argued that, above all, he was a religious 
author, and thus Kierkegaard himself needed to employ the indirect method. His 
pseudonyms tip us off to this on a number of occasions. For instance, Fear and 
Trembling begins with an epigraph that describes an incident of indirect 
communication.71 Given these cues, it is reasonable for us to assume that some of 
Kierkegaard’s works don’t intend to communicate exactly what is written on the page, 
                                                 
71 The epigraph refers to a story in which a ruler wanted to get a message to his son, but he didn’t trust the 
messenger. Thus, instead of giving the messenger a clear message, he performed a certain action and 
told the messenger to describe his actions to his son. The son understood the message, but the 
messenger did not.  
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and instead are an attempt to indirectly communicate with his audience. This situation 
leads some scholars to take a suspicious approach to interpretations of Kierkegaard, as it 
seems difficult for us to be sure if Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms are communicating 
directly or indirectly, in jest or in earnestness. In this chapter I will examine some 
arguments to determine whether or not we can trust the writings of Kierkegaard and 
meaningfully interpret them. While it is clear that Kierkegaard employs indirect 
communication throughout his works, and thus puts his readers in a kind of interpretive 
limbo, I will argue that ultimately we can interpret Kierkegaard’s works by using indirect 
communication as an interpretive lens. 
Section 1: Is the Earth Not Round? 
 
 
 In order to understand the subjective approach and the style of communication 
that is required of it, let’s first examine the objective approach. Kierkegaard, through his 
pseudonyms, doesn’t spend a lot of time specifically describing objectivity, for the 
objective approach should be familiar to most individuals. When we commonly think of 
“truth” we think of truth in the objective sense -- that is, truth as something that is 
independent of human beings. When we claim that mathematical truths are objective, we 
traditionally mean that the mathematical truth will remain regardless of who is perceiving 
it or if there is anyone at all to perceive it.72 Kierkegaard points towards this standard 
view of truth and knowledge when he writes, “The way of objective reflection turns the 
subjective individual into something accidental and thereby turns existence into an 
indifferent, vanishing something… the truth also become indifferent, and that is precisely 
                                                 
72 I am not intending here to make a claim about mathematical realism or anti-realism, just merely claiming 
that such a truth is not dependent on any human being. 
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its objective validity.”73 The objective approach is concerned primarily with facts that are 
independent of human beings. Indeed, as Climacus, the pseudonymous author of 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, notes, the indifference of 
objective truth towards the individual is precisely why we call it objective. Objective 
truth and knowledge are independent of human existence, and it is this independence that 
gives them the stability that we desire. We want mathematical truths to be objective, for 
their objectivity gives them dependability, in that they rely on nothing other than the 
nature of the universe.  
Climacus notes that a certain kind of communication must be paired with 
objectivity. He refers to this type of communication as direct communication. Direct 
communication takes the form of a message that ignores both the communicator and 
communicatee and their subjective outlooks on life. Instead, a direct communication 
looks to clearly transmit information from one source to another. For example, if I were 
to tell someone that today was Sunday, I would be directly communicating to that person, 
in all likelihood. The context is very important here, as direct communication ideally 
occurs in a vacuum of sorts. Had I been telling someone that today was Sunday in a 
covert effort to get them to go to church, I would not be directly communicating. 
However, if a stranger asked me what day it was and I responded that it was Sunday, I 
would be directly communicating with that person. Direct communication has no other 
agenda beyond what it communicates directly. Climacus uses the example of the 
objective approach to God. “Let us take the knowledge of God as an example. 
Objectively, what is reflected upon is that this is the true God.”74 Objectively, our 
                                                 
73 CUP 193 
74 Ibid 199 
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concern with God is that we have the correct God, that scripture is accurate, and that our 
beliefs correctly correlate with the beliefs that God intends us to have. How an individual 
relates to the truth of God, or how that truth affects them are not of concern to the 
objective approach. The style of communication that is used needs to reflect the concerns 
of the communication. Thus, a direct communication of a religious nature will look to set 
out doctrine. In order to directly communicate the objective truth of God to you, I need to 
tell you all about God’s existence, God’s nature, God’s moral laws, and any relevant 
history of the one true religion. However, at no point am I trying to motivate you to do 
anything beyond accepting a certain proposition as true. In this sense, we might imagine 
the religious studies professor as inhabiting the sphere of direct communication whereas 
the priest or pastor would ideally inhabit the sphere of indirect communication. The 
religious studies professor is trying to demonstrate to you the tenets of a certain religion, 
outline its arguments and its history. You might be taught about the founders of the 
religion or the different sects that grew and waned over time. However, at no point is it 
incumbent upon the professor to make you an adherent of said religion. A course in 
comparative religion is not designed to make you religious, it is designed to directly 
impart knowledge about religions to you. And how does one best communicate this kind 
of knowledge? By plainly laying out the facts. Direct communication functions in this 
basic manner, that it sticks to objective and factual information and tries to communicate 
it as clearly as possible.  
Unfortunately, for Kierkegaard, the objective approach doesn’t fully encapsulate 
everything that we want out of knowledge and truth. The objective approach is concerned 
with factual knowledge and direct communication, and thus is unable to communicate 
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something that might relate to or be dependent upon an individual. Climacus gives us the 
following situation,  
“Suppose, then, that someone wanted to communicate the following conviction: 
truth is inwardness, objectively there is no truth, but the appropriation is the truth. 
Suppose he had enough zeal and enthusiasm to get it said, because when people 
heard it they would be saved. Suppose he said it on every occasion and moved not 
only those who sweat easily but also the tough people – what then? Then there 
would certainly be some laborers who had been standing idle in the marketplace 
and only upon hearing this call would go forth to work in the vineyard – to 
proclaim this teaching to all people. And what then? Then he would have 
contradicted himself even more.”75  
 
The application of inwardness is not contained within the objective approach and thus I 
cannot communicate it directly. Inwardness and appropriation relate to one’s ability to 
apply ideas to their own lives and become changed individuals. An explanation of the 
concept of inwardness would fall under the objective approach, but ostensibly, one’s 
desire for inwardness is not mere knowledge of a concept, but instead is a desire that 
drives one to engender inwardness for oneself. The communication of that kind of 
practical application falls outside the realm of the objective, for it will both depend upon 
and be different for each individual. Thus, the limit of the objective approach 
demonstrates the need for a different kind of knowledge. 
The objective approach also is unable to fulfill the promise that it holds 
concerning reliability. We like objective knowledge and objective truth because they are 
not dependent upon any individual and thus are reliable and constant. Climacus draws 
this into question with a wonderful little parable about a lunatic. Someone is able to 
escape from an insane asylum and decides to head to the nearby town. However, this 
lunatic is sane enough to realize that everyone will recognize him as belonging in the 
                                                 
75 Ibid 77 
54 
 
 
insane asylum and thus he will be returned. So, he decides to that he will demonstrate his 
sanity to everyone by stating something that is objectively true. He takes a ball and puts it 
in his coat tails, and with every step that he takes, the ball hits him and he announces, 
“Boom! The earth is round.” Climacus writes, “But is the earth not round? Does the 
madhouse demand yet another sacrifice on account of this assumption, as in those days 
when everyone assumed it to be as flat as a pancake? Or is he lunatic, the man who hopes 
to prove that he is not lunatic by stating a truth universally accepted and universally 
regarded as objective?”76 The insane man’s inability to recognize the proper way in 
which he should relate to an objective truth is what demonstrates his insanity. The lunatic 
is indeed correct that the earth is round, but by failing to recognize the proper place for 
that truth and the proper way that we should relate to that truth, he demonstrates his 
insanity. Such a truth belongs in a geology or astronomy classroom and it should help 
inform us in our scientific understanding of the world. It does not, contrary to the 
lunatic’s assumption, demonstrate that one is not insane. Yet, the claim of insanity is 
precisely what the objective approach makes of the subjective approach. “But the 
objective way is of the opinion that it has a security that the subjective way does not 
have. It is of the opinion that it avoids a danger that lies in wait for the subjective way, 
and at its maximum that danger is madness. In a solely subjective definition of truth, 
lunacy and truth are ultimately indistinguishable, because they may both have 
inwardness.”77 The objective approach likes to point out that the solely subjective 
approach is identical to madness, for truth just becomes whatever anyone says it is. 
However, the parable tries to point out that a solely objective approach does something 
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similar to us, for only through the subjective approach to truth are we able to properly 
relate to the objective and thus avoid the madhouse. It is for these reasons that both 
approaches to truth are necessary for Kierkegaard. 
Kierkegaard sees nothing wrong with the study of Christian doctrine; his issue 
stems from the transformation of Christianity into merely a set of doctrines. In that sense, 
we must strive to keep Christianity from becoming something that is only objective, and 
instead need to focus on the subjective approach to Christianity. The objective does not 
give us what Kierkegaard wants; it does not make us Christians. Instead, we have to 
adopt a subjective approach if we want to properly relate to the objective truth in the way 
that the escaped lunatic was unable to. 
Recognizing the value and importance of the subjective approach is paramount 
specifically because Climacus thinks that Christianity is essentially subjective. He gives a 
short example to argue this conclusion:  
“If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the 
true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but 
prays in untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the 
passion of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol – 
where, then, is there more truth? The one prays in truth to God although he is 
worshipping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in 
truth worshipping an idol.”78 
 
For Climacus, the passionate approach to God is the correct one, even if something is 
amiss objectively. In the situation that he describes we have one individual who has the 
correct objectivity but is lacking subjectivity. Climacus concludes that this individual is 
idolatrous. The view of subjectivity that we get from Climacus is one of intense 
inwardness and appropriation, as we see in his example.79 The individual whose eyes are 
                                                 
78 Ibid 201 
79 Appropriation, for Kierkegaard, is the act by which one interacts with something and in doing so, shapes 
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resting on the idol, though it is an idol, has nonetheless appropriated the idea of his idol. 
He has been changed, both in person and in action, as demonstrated by the fact that his 
prayer is full of passion. Thus, the proper approach to Christianity is one full of “the 
passion of infinity.” Climacus wants us to approach God as individuals looking to be 
changed, fully desiring God and humbling ourselves before God. This radical kind of 
appropriation is what Climacus sees as the essence of Christianity as well as the essence 
of subjectivity, which is why we must approach Christianity subjectively. Christianity for 
Climacus consists of an individual standing before God and being conscious of their sin 
and guilt.80 Accomplishing this requires us to humble ourselves before God and be 
transformed. This kind of action is not the mere acceptance of the doctrine of sin, but 
instead a kind of re-orienting of the self. If Kierkegaard wants to bring forth the Christian 
in his audience, then teaching them the correct doctrine will not suffice, for Christianity is 
a re-orienting of the self, not a mere agreement with doctrine. Thus, with Kierkegaard’s 
religious goals in mind, we recognize that Kierkegaard must engender subjectivity.  
 Climacus further demonstrates the need for the subjective approach when he 
directly compares it to the objective approach. “To objective reflection, truth becomes 
something objective, an object, and the point is to disregard the subject. To subjective 
reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to 
immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity.”81 The goal of Christianity is not to 
demonstrate something factual. Instead, Christianity is aimed at making disciples, making 
individuals into certain kinds of people. This is the problem for the objective approach, 
                                                 
it to oneself, taking it inward and making it apart of oneself. 
80 This is developed by Climacus in CUP 581-586. 
81 Ibid 192 
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for the objective approach wants to rid us of the person, as the individual only gets in the 
way of the objective. Thus, Christianity has a need for the subjective. Climacus highlights 
this when he writes, “The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into 
something accidental and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing 
something. The way to the objective truth goes away from the subject.”82 Kierkegaard’s 
Christianity is built on this subjective approach, on putting the single individual before 
God. It is for this reason that he must employ the style of communication that is 
ultimately tied to the subjective approach to truth, indirect communication. 
 However, it is important to remember that for Climacus and Kierkegaard, the 
objective approach isn’t meaningless or unimportant, nor is it separated from the 
subjective approach. Kierkegaard spends a great deal of time explaining objective truths 
that relate to Christianity. Ideally, we should be subjectively oriented towards these 
objective truths. It’s true that Climacus claims that the subjective is more important than 
the objective when it comes to Christianity, but that’s not to say that the objective is 
irrelevant. Rather, we should be subjectively oriented towards the objective truth. This 
overlap of subjectivity and objectivity is somewhat paradoxical, as we are taking two 
uniquely different approaches to truth simultaneously, but Kierkegaard refers to 
Christianity as a paradox, and so is right at home with such a claim.  
 The recognition that the truth of Christianity requires the subjective approach 
immediately puts upon us the idea that the truth of Christianity also requires indirect 
communication. Climacus also comes to this conclusion in the Postscript as soon as he 
establishes that truth, specifically Christian truth, is subjectivity. He writes, 
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“When I had comprehended this, it also became clear to me that if I wanted to 
communicate anything about this, the main point must be that my presentation 
would be made in an indirect form. That is, if inwardness is truth, results are 
nothing but junk with which we should not bother one another, and wanting to 
communicate results is an unnatural association of one person with another, 
inasmuch as every human being is spirit and truth is the self-activity of 
appropriation, which a result hinders.”83 
 
If the truth of Christianity is ultimately subjectivity, inwardness, and appropriation as 
Climacus claims, the only way that such a truth could be communicated would be 
through indirect communication. Thus, if Kierkegaard desires to not only teach his 
readers about true Christianity, but also wants to make them into Christians, he must 
employ indirect communication in his works.  
 The necessity of indirect communication for Kierkegaard also fits into the 
teacher/learner problem that was discussed in the previous chapter. Lane writes, “Indirect 
communication is required because the teacher is not The Teacher (only God can do this) 
but a fellow pupil (something the pupil must also know).”84 God does not need to 
indirectly communicate, for God has the power to change the heart of an individual. 
Kierkegaard does not possess such a power, to his dismay I’m sure. Viewed from the 
standpoint of God as The Teacher, both Kierkegaard and his audience are learners. Given 
this kind of epistemic equality, Kierkegaard can only bring about change through the use 
of indirect communication, through trying to bring inwardness to his readers. 
Kierkegaard needs to engender the kind of inwardness and appropriation (subjectivity) 
that will be needed for the individual to be willing to put in the effort required for 
salvation.85 The teacher is the one who brings objectivity, who increases knowledge. As a 
                                                 
83 Ibid 242 
84 Lane 110 
85 As I established in chapter one, for Kierkegaard the goal is always the religious, of which the ultimate 
end is salvation. This project is not primarily concerned with soteriology, and thus I won’t be focusing 
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fellow pupil, Kierkegaard can only act towards increasing our motivations and our ability 
to apply what The Teacher has taught us.  
 The necessity of indirect communication also arises when we examine what 
Strawser calls “the problem of language.” Strawser quotes Kierkegaard at length in 
drawing his conclusions.  
In a rich draft of Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard concisely states what he more 
gradually develops in the text. 
Immediately, then, everything is true; but can consciousness not 
remain in this immediacy? If this immediacy and that of animals were 
identical, then the question of consciousness would be canceled; but the 
consequence of that would be that a human being was an animal or that a 
human being was inarticulate. That which therefore cancels immediacy is 
language, if a person could not speak, he or she would remain in 
immediacy. 
This, he thought, could be expressed thusly: immediacy is reality, 
language is ideality, as I speak I produce the contradiction. Thus, when I 
want to express sense perception, the contradiction is there, for what I say 
is something rather different than what I want to say. I cannot express 
reality in language, since to characterize it I use ideality, which is a 
contradiction, an untruth. 
The possibility of doubt, then lies in the duplicity of consciousness 
(KW VII 255; JP III 2320; PIV B 14:6). 
Here Kierkegaard broaches the problem of language, and his analysis may be 
interpreted as providing grounds for the rejection of a purely phenomenological 
language.86,87 
 
This problem of language provides the grounds for the necessity of indirect 
communication. Language cannot perfectly communicate reality, for reality is immediate 
while language is not. Direct communication has no hidden information; everything that 
is being communicated is laid out before the reader. Indirect communication, on the other 
                                                 
on what Kierkegaard thinks is required for salvation beyond what I’ve already established in chapter 
one. However, we must always remember that the ultimate goal of Kierkegaard’s work is for the 
religious to come forward. 
86 Michael Strawser 77. 
87 I ran into this text not by reading Strawser’s work, but by finding it in Daise, who provides the entirety of 
this quote as well. 
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hand, uses language, but does so not to impart a specific idea like direct communication 
does, but instead to present a certain possibility to the reader. Thus, if Kierkegaard is 
trying to communicate a human reality, he has to do so indirectly. This approach helps to 
engender immediacy because the reader is prompted to make a choice with respect to the 
possibility that has been presented. The language itself still cannot perfectly represent 
reality, but it can push the reader to exist in reality, by presenting him or her with a 
choice. 
 This ties in with other claims that Kierkegaard makes regarding possibility and 
actuality. Kierkegaard, as Climacus, writes, “But existence-actuality cannot be 
communicated, and the subjective thinker has his own actuality in his own ethical 
existence. If actuality is to be understood by a third party, it must be understood as 
possibility, and a communicator who is conscious of this will therefore see to it, precisely 
in order to be oriented to existence, that his existence-communication is in the form of 
possibility.”88 Climacus recognizes here that existence-actuality cannot be 
communicated, though he doesn’t get into the problem of language here. Instead, he 
parses out the approach that needs to be taken by the individual who wants to 
communicate actuality. This kind of existence-communication, the communication of the 
idea of a type of personal existence, must be done as a possibility, as a hypothetical 
option that the reader can pursue. This framing lends itself to indirect communication as 
the ideal approach. If we are bringing forth an existence-communication as a message to 
be indirectly communicated, we should offer it up not as a brute fact of existence, for that 
would be a direct communication. Instead, we offer it up as a possibility, as a 
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hypothetical, and thus offer it indirectly. By saying that Isaac could have replied in such 
and such manner, and that if he did such and such would be the consequences, we offer 
up a possible type of existence, one that invites the reader towards inwardness. Reading 
about this possible woman causes the reader to think about what it’s like to exist as this 
possible woman, and thus inwardness and appropriation are achieved. In this way, when 
we examine the concept of language itself and how it relates to Kierkegaard’s Christian 
goals, we recognize the need for indirect communication. This section has examined the 
difference between the objective and subjective approaches and tied those approaches to 
direct and indirect communication respectively. Having done so, I argued for the 
necessity of indirect communication, but have yet to address a more basic question: what 
is indirect communication? 
Section 2: Speak if You Have Understanding 
 
 
 In contemporary philosophical literature, direct communication is the standard, as 
the purpose of the literature is to communicate a specific idea. Direct communication 
values clarity, a virtue of good philosophical prose. In this sense, what direct 
communication is working to accomplish is the dissemination of knowledge. You read 
Kant so that you can know about a priori intuitions, or Heidegger so that you can know 
about Dasein. So, direct communication is concerned with the transfer of information 
from one person or source to another. Ideally, nothing is lost in translation for a direct 
communication. Kierkegaard breaks the process down, writing, “When I think of 
communication, I think of four things: (1) Object (2) Communicator (3) Receiver (4) 
Communication.”89 If someone is using direct communication then the communicator 
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and the receiver should possess the same object. If I directly communicate to you that 
gravity is one of the four fundamental forces of the universe, both you and I should 
possess the same piece of knowledge. Thus, it should not matter who the communicator 
or receivers are if the communication is direct and if the object is the type of thing that 
can be directly communicated (as we have seen, Kierkegaard thinks that the essential 
truth of Christianity does not fit this mold).  
 Kierkegaard strives to separate the two forms of communication by clarifying the 
content that suits each style of communication. He writes, “All communication of 
knowledge is direct communication. All communication of capability is indirect 
communication.”90 As Daise notes, this gives us a distinction between knowing and 
doing.91 Direct communication is linked to knowledge, information, facts, those types of 
content that we consider objective. Indirect communication, on the other hand, is linked 
to human capability. Capability here doesn’t refer to what we as humans could achieve in 
some grand sense, but rather to the potential for human action. Indirect communication 
gives us possibilities, potentialities. This drives our actions as we see the possible things 
we can do and the possible people we can be. Thus, indirect communication is not merely 
trying to communicate an inert capability, but it is trying to activate one that already lies 
dormant within us. The communication of an existence-possibility, for instance, is not to 
inform the receiver of a possible way to be, but rather to motivate the receiver to try to 
exist as such. Thus, by inhabiting the existence-possibility, the individual has been 
moved to act by the indirect communication. So, while direct communication only gives 
us information which makes no necessary claims upon our existence or our actions, 
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indirect communication makes claims on both. 
 Sometimes the distinction between direct and indirect communication is claimed 
to be their relationship to interpretation. Direct communication seems to close 
interpretation. If I directly communicate something to you, I’m trying to give you 
information clearly and precisely. To that end, interpretation can get in the way, for if my 
communication invites interpretation, then the content might change between the 
communicator and the receiver. However, Daise argues against this approach, 
demonstrating that it isn’t the relation to interpretation that delineates direct 
communication from indirect communication. Referring to the one of the epigraphs that 
end the Exordiums in Fear and Trembling, Daise writes,  
“The form of what we identify as a piece of indirect communication may be 
identical to a piece of direct communication. ‘When the child must be weaned, the 
mother blackens her breast’ may be a piece of indirect communication (an 
invitation to consider one’s relationship to a dependent person) or it may be a 
report of child-rearing practice. In one context, interpretation as factual 
presentation would be ludicrous; in another context, it would not. So it could not 
be the form that makes the difference.”92 
 
Though we might think of indirect communication as being something that invites 
interpretation, Daise argues that there seems to be no way to perfectly distinguish indirect 
communication from direct communication in that sense. Unless we are directed to 
interpret in a non-factual manner, we would not know whether interpretation should be 
open or closed, we can only make more or less informed guesses. The command to 
interpret factually would also run into the same problem though, and thus does not offer a 
useful solution to the problem. In certain contexts, interpreting non-factually might be 
sensible, but at no point do we have perfect access to the contextual situatedness of any 
                                                 
92 Ibid 30 
64 
 
 
statement. So Daise argues that we can’t use the form of the communication to perfectly 
distinguish whether it is direct or indirect, as the form itself can work both ways.93 In 
chapter three we will be examining the form of parable and arguing that it works well as 
a vehicle for indirect communication. However, the presence of a parable itself does not 
indicate that the communication is necessarily indirect. Maybe the common parable of 
the tortoise and the hare is just trying to communicate to us the relative speeds of 
tortoises and rabbits. Thus Daise argues that it is not possible to judge the style of 
communication based only on the form that the communication takes. 
 So how exactly can we identify something as an indirect communication versus a 
direct one? Daise cannot identify a singular principle which helps us do so and likens this 
distinction to the challenging prospect of distinguishing art and non-art. However, he 
does offer some possible clues that we might look for. He takes the tragedy of Oedipus 
Rex as a story about ignoring the hidden powers of the universe and an example of 
indirect communication. “The same kind of point might be made in a sermon or a lecture, 
and we would not be inclined to regard the sermon or lecture as a work of art. What is the 
difference?”94 He points to the idea that the audience is “left to figure out” Oedipus Rex 
for themselves. The lecture tells one precisely what to think and tries to communicate the 
message as clearly as possible. But in the tragedy, there is not a clear message; it’s not 
even obvious that there is a message at all. Daise continues with this idea, writing, “The 
dramatic works presents a possible world in which the audience might locate itself and 
which is such that the audience may feel more or less empathy towards each other, 
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themselves, and their circumstances, but there is typically no authoritative editorial voice 
that calls for a specific response.”95,96 The lack of an authoritative voice seems to point us 
in the direction of indirect communication, Daise argues. While it doesn’t provide a kind 
of litmus test, it does provide some evidence. The authoritative voice need not be an 
individual, either. Any kind of regulative ideal can function as an authoritative voice. So, 
in looking for something that counts as an indirect communication, Daise argues that we 
can find clues in texts that lack authoritative voices, and thus function as a kind of art in 
which the individual is left to decide for themselves both what it means and how to 
respond.97  
 Kierkegaard, writing as Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity, seems to also 
take up the approach that choice is an important part of indirect communication. In a 
section entitled, “To Deny Direct Communication is to Require Faith,” Climacus writes, 
“There is no direct communication and no direct reception: there is a choice.”98 And a 
little bit later, “Faith is a choice, certainly not direct reception – and the recipient is the 
one who is disclosed, whether he will believe or be offended.”99 There are two important 
claims here. First, direct communication is antithetical to faith. This matches what was 
shown earlier in that direct communication is related to the objective approach, and 
Kierkegaard thinks that authentic Christianity requires the subjective. Here we see that 
taken a little further in that it’s not only authentic Christianity that doesn’t coincide with 
direct communication, but faith as a concept. The reason for this is the second important 
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claim. Faith and direct communication are opposed to one another because faith requires 
choice. Direct communication tries to deny choice, and the point of direct communication 
and the objective approach is to remove the subjective from the situation. When 
examining indirect communication, however, choice becomes a central component. 
Indirect communication wants to engender choice in the receiver so that appropriation 
and inwardness can come forward. How exactly this process works is not something that 
Kierkegaard spells out for us, but is something that I will discuss in the next chapter 
when examining how parables function as forms of indirect communication. Nonetheless, 
we have a few distinct markers of indirect communication even if we do not possess a 
perfect test. If a communication both lacks an authoritative voice and presents us with 
possibilities that are designed to make us choose, we likely are dealing with an indirect 
communication.  
In one of his later works, writing as Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard sheds a little 
light on the concept of indirect communication. Anti-Climacus writes,  
“Indirect communication can be an art of communication in redoubling the 
communication; the art consists in making oneself, the communicator, into a 
nobody, purely objective, and then continually placing the qualitative opposites in 
a unity. This is what some pseudonymous writers are accustomed to calling the 
double-reflection of the communication. For example, it is indirect 
communication to place jest and earnestness together in such a way that the 
composite is a dialectical knot – and then to be a nobody oneself. If anyone wants 
to have anything to do with this kind of communication, he will have to untie the 
knot himself.”100 
 
Here we see Anti-Climacus putting forward two aspects of indirect communication. The 
first aspect consists of creating something relatively opaque, for instance putting jest and 
earnestness together. This opacity stems from the opposite natures that jest and 
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earnestness possess. The second aspect is to then disappear, as an author, so that the 
context of the writing is missing. In this type of a situation the receiver is left with two 
options, either to ignore the passage or to untie the knot. Thus, the successful indirect 
communication seeks to draw the receiver towards the untying. Anti-Climacus also goes 
on to describe a second way in which indirect communication can appear. He writes,  
“But indirect communication can also appear in another way, through the relation 
between the communication and the communicator. The communicator is present 
here, whereas in the first instance he was left out, yet, please note, by way of a 
negative reflection. But our age actually knows no other kind of communication 
than that mediocre method of dialecticizing. What it means to exist has been 
completely forgotten. Any communication concerning existing requires a 
communicator: in other words, the communicator is the reduplication of the 
communication; to exist in what one understands is to reduplicate. But this 
communication still cannot be called indirect communication just because there is 
a communicator who himself exists in what he communicates. If, however, the 
communicator himself is dialectically defined and his own being is based on 
reflection, then all direct communication is impossible.”101 
 
This second kind of indirect communication is the communication of something that is a 
part of the communicator. Poole explains this quite well when he writes,  
“Reduplication is different in kind from doubled reflection. Doubled reflection 
implies a gap between the author who writes and the work that he is writing. It 
indicated a dialectical relationship between them and emphasizes the fact that the 
communicator is not, except in a joking sense, present in what he writes. 
Reduplication is, however, quite different and implies that the communicator and 
the communication are one and the same… to reduplicate is to exist in what one 
understands.”102 
 
And later, 
 
“What was noncommitted becomes committed; what was aesthetic and ironic 
becomes exposed and dangerous; what was merely intellectual becomes lived.”103 
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Anti-Climacus remarks that the God-man, Jesus Christ, used this kind of communication. 
Christ is trying to communicate his existence to his followers, but he cannot merely 
directly state, “I am the Lord your God” and communicate it in such a manner. That type 
of communication might functionally work for an impersonal conception of God, but not 
for the God-man, the Christ. The God-man is already defined in existence for his 
followers know him. They know him as a human being who eats and sleeps and talks to 
them. Thus, for him to state that he is God causes a contradiction, for one seemingly 
cannot be both human and God. This dialectical relationship, therefore is necessarily a 
part of his communications and thus he cannot communicate directly. This, as Anti-
Climacus says, forces a choice on those around him: to believe or not to believe. With 
Kierkegaard’s words in mind, and in order to better understand them, let us examine the 
approaches to indirect communication that different scholars give us. 
Poole points to a single quote of Kierkegaard’s as the central statement of what 
indirect communication is. “Inwardness cannot be communicated directly, because 
expressing it directly is externality (oriented outwardly, not inwardly), and expressing 
inwardness directly is no proof at all that it is there (the direct outpouring of feeling is no 
proof at all that one has it, but the tension of the contrastive form is the dynamometer of 
inwardness).”104 Thus Poole looks at indirect communication as creating a kind of tension 
that causes inwardness. Again, this does not help us identify an indirect communication 
as such, but it does help us recognize the fruits of its labor. Poole goes on to identify two 
ways in which indirect communication creates this kind of a tension. The first is a tension 
that the author puts into the work itself. Poole describes this as a kind of “aesthetic” 
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tension.105 The idea here is that the author creates a work the meaning of which the 
receiver is unable to discern. There is a kind of play or doubleness in effect that obstructs 
the receiver from directly apprehending the meaning of the work. Using Kierkegaard’s 
terminology, Poole refers to this as double reflection. “It is, in few words, a question of 
aesthetics, a manipulation of model away from meaning, a holding apart signifier and 
signified.”106 So the first kind of tension that we see occurs when the communication 
itself is intentionally made opaque by the communicator. This correlates with the first 
aspect of the first kind of indirect communication that was mentioned just above. When 
we add to this the absence of an author, and thus the absence of an authoritative voice, we 
get the first kind of indirect communication, that which comes forward in double 
reflection. 
Daise takes a different approach. He examines indirect communication as a 
communication of capability, as was mentioned above. If direct communication 
communicates factual knowledge and indirect communication communicates human 
capability, then we seem to have a working definition in hand. Daise argues that we 
shouldn’t read this as being the imparting of an ability. When we speak of 
communicating capability, we might mean that the receiver is gaining access to some 
ability that they did not previously possess. Daise thinks that this would be a mistaken 
approach, citing Kierkegaard’s papers, “The ethical must be communicated as an art, 
because everyone knows it.”107 This would imply that the receiver already possesses what 
the communicator is trying to communicate. In that sense the receiver is not gaining some 
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new ability as we might imagine the communication of capability would imply. Instead, 
Daise claims, “I have been led away from talking about communication of capability as 
aiming at inducement of action to talking about it as inducement to adopting some sense 
of oneself, from which some unspecified conduct would flow.”108 Daise’s point is that 
indirect communication doesn’t give us anything new, but rather that it re-orients us 
towards a certain capability that we already possessed. For instance, one might have 
learned a musical instrument as a child and then forgotten their musical abilities. To 
communicate capability in this situation wouldn’t be to somehow make that individual 
good at playing the piano; instead it would be to bring forward the piano player already 
present in the individual and thus bring forth a skill that was already present by re-
orienting the individual. This might remind us of Socrates’ theory of recollection that gets 
put forward in the Meno, where learning is simply remembering things that our soul 
already knows so that Socrates merely needs to ask the right questions to prompt 
recollection. With indirect communication, the communicator needs not to impart new 
information or new abilities to the receiver, but instead needs to turn the receiver towards 
that which they already possess. Mackey also takes this approach, writing, “The success 
of an indirect communication depends upon its capability to awaken in the recipient an 
awareness that the possibilities it objectifies – alluring, exciting, or frightening – are his 
own.”109  
 This all leads Daise to conclude that Kierkegaard wants indirect communication 
to lead his readers into a kind of freedom. He writes,  
“If the communicator is successful, the receiver acts without first reflecting. 
Kierkegaardian indirect communication, or rather, indirect communication as 
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used by Kierkegaard, aims at shaping the world in such a way that each recipient 
of the communication is fundamentally free to choose to shape the world as one 
sees fit. In fact, if the effort is successful, the receiver comes to see that one must 
choose.”110 
 
While I follow Daise’s construction of the concept of indirect communication up to this 
point, he seems mistaken in his understanding of its goals. Kierkegaard spells out on a 
number of occasions what he wants his writing to accomplish and thus while it is true that 
Kierkegaard wants to force his audience to choose, he is not merely interested in this 
choice for its own sake. Rather, the choice that Kierkegaard wants to put in front of his 
readers is that of authentic Christianity. Kierkegaard does not want the receiver “to see 
that one must choose,” but rather for the receiver to actually choose. He is not aimed at a 
kind of epistemic positioning on the part of the receiver, but instead at a crisis of the will. 
His goal isn’t fundamental freedom but fear and trembling before God. Thus, while I 
follow much of Daise’s work on constructing an understanding of indirect 
communication as a concept, I break with him on his application of that concept to 
Kierkegaard’s own works and goals. 
In addition, Daise’s earlier argument against the form being the recognizable 
aspect of the indirect communication seemed to neglect the position of the author. Daise 
neglected the authorial aspect of double reflection, the situation in which the author is “a 
nobody.” So Daise seems to be correct in that the form itself is insufficient, for a 
changing context could make something direct in one situation and indirect in another. 
However, he fails to take into account the possibility of communicating something in 
such a way that its context is manipulated. As I described in the previous chapter, 
Kierkegaard went to great lengths to try to ensure that no one would know him as the 
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author of his pseudonymous works. Besides publishing them under a different name, he 
held to a specific publishing schedule and spent time out in public doing his best to 
assuage any suspicions. This is the second aspect of double reflection. When the author is 
separated from the work, the work loses much of its context. If I know nothing about 
Johannes Climacus, I should not assume his intentions for writing or necessarily connect 
him with any school of thought. Instead, I have to let the words on the page do all of the 
speaking. Lacking context, the receiver is unable to identify a communication as direct or 
indirect, which itself makes the case for its being an indirect communication in that it will 
then elicit, if successful, a capability from the receiver: the ability to appropriate. This 
kind of inwardness and appropriation is precisely what Kierkegaard defines as being 
paradigmatic of the indirect and subjective approach on a number of occasions.  
An issue that Poole has, as we will come to see, is that in his overall analysis of 
Kierkegaard, he only seems to take the second kind of indirect communication, 
redoubling, seriously. As I examine in the next section, Poole’s entire interpretive 
apparatus is built on an examination of Kierkegaard’s personal life and thus Poole seeks 
to locate the works of Kierkegaard in his life situations. By doing so, Poole is certainly 
looking for reduplication, the communication of something that for the writer is a lived 
existence. Finding the connections between Kierkegaard’s works and his love of Regine 
Olsen, or his spat with the Corsair can do much to enrich our understanding of his works, 
but it certainly should not define our entire understanding of his works. Poole ends up 
interpreting the redoubling aspect of Kierkegaard’s works too intensely and in doing so 
seems to neglect the double reflective aspects, that is, the parts of Kierkegaard’s works 
for which an authoritative voice is absent and thus the reader is having to untie the knot 
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made from jest and earnestness for him or herself. It is this aspect of Kierkegaard’s works 
that I will primarily engage throughout this work. 
 As I worked to establish in Chapter One, Christianity does not function as a set of 
doctrines for Kierkegaard, but rather as something individual, as a certain kind of 
existence. As Climacus writes, “Christianity is not a doctrine but an existence-
contradiction and an existence-communication.”111 As several of Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonyms have suggested, direct communication cannot communicate an existence, for 
doing so requires inwardness, which is the realm of indirect communication. 112 For this 
reason, numerous scholars recognize the necessity of indirect communication for 
Christianity. Lane sets this up by examining the function of something like apologetics 
for Kierkegaard. If the goal is to persuade others of the truth of authentic Christianity, 
Lane argues that apologetics is rather meaningless.113 Lane writes, “Kierkegaard seems to 
say that it is either useless to argue for faith (because the argument will not bring faith) or 
unnecessary for one who has faith. The Kierkegaardian argument against the kind of 
position held by Evans is that it seems to want to put a net under the venture of faith – to 
get rid of the risk.”114 Apologetics wants to reassure our reason that Christianity is an 
acceptable venture, but that seems to deny the paradox of faith. Faith and Christianity, as 
characterized by Kierkegaard, exist as paradoxes that require risk on the part of the 
believer to be accepted. In Fear and Trembling, Abraham is portrayed as the paradigm of 
faith because he believes that Isaac will not be taken from him, despite having no good 
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reason to believe so. Reason would dictate that Isaac will be sacrificed, for God has 
commanded it, yet Abraham believes otherwise and nonetheless obeys God. Faith for 
Kierkegaard is not necessarily antithetical to reason, but it certainly goes beyond reason. 
To this end, apologetics does not provide an individual with faith, for apologetics only 
speaks to our reason. Apologetics would function as a kind of direct communication, a 
setting forward of arguments that are designed to be logically valid and sound in order to 
convince someone of their truth.  
But this is not Kierkegaard’s Christianity, for Christianity requires the 
communication of an existence. This is not to imply that Christianity lacks intellectual 
content. Climacus writes, “Furthermore, to say that Christianity is empty of content 
because it is not a doctrine is only chicanery.”115 Christianity for Climacus functions not 
as a set of doctrines, but it nonetheless has intellectual content. Daise describes this as a 
situation in which Christianity functions as a kind of regulative ideal.116 Authentic 
Christianity makes claims upon our individual existence that require us to be a certain 
kind of thing. Thus, Christianity requires us to exist in a specific way. This approach 
gives Christianity content, for there exist regulations and directives that guide us. 
However, the function of these regulations and directives is not for us to understand, but 
for us to act. Therefore, while there is intellectual content, the content is there for the 
purpose of action, of redirecting our individual existence. If Christianity functions in this 
manner, indirect communication is a necessity in order to bring about this regulative 
ideal.  
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Section 3: To Believe or Not To Believe 
 
 
 Understanding the necessity of indirect communication leaves us with two things: 
a recognition of the relationship between Christianity and certain kinds of 
communication, and an awareness of the fact that, given his admitted goals, Kierkegaard 
is committed to the use of indirect communication in his own works, for he is trying to 
bring about authentic Christianity in his audience. Accepting that at least some of 
Kierkegaard’s written works are intended to be indirect communications leaves us, as 
scholars, in a tricky situation in that the scholarly reading of a work is usually a 
disinterested reading. To that extent, the scholar struggles to recognize indirect 
communication by its effect on the reader because the scholar is striving to be unaffected. 
If we interpret everything as indirect communication, then we cannot even take seriously 
Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication, for if such a thing is being 
communicated indirectly to us, its purpose is to change us as individuals and not to 
inform us of some piece of knowledge. If we reject any of it as indirect communication, 
then Kierkegaard seems completely unable to accomplish his stated goals. This leads us 
to the question of whether or not we can take Kierkegaard seriously. Maybe his whole 
authorship consists of jokes made at the expense of Danish Hegelians. Given that we 
cannot identify indirect communication based solely on its form, as Daise argued above, 
we are left in interpretative limbo. It is precisely this limbo that has driven Poole to argue 
that Kierkegaard’s works cannot be interpreted. In response to this, Tietjen has attempted 
to develop a hermeneutics of trust when it comes to Kierkegaard’s authorship. In this 
section, I’m going to examine both approaches so that we can seek to understand the 
interpretive stance that we must take towards Kierkegaard’s works, given that they are at 
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least on occasion indirect communications meant to reorient us towards Christianity on 
an individual level. 
 In his book, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, Poole presents his 
argument for why we cannot come up with a definitive interpretation of Kierkegaard’s 
works. Overall he claims that Kierkegaard’s ironic style, his use of pseudonyms, and his 
indirect communication, make it so that we can’t tell what Kierkegaard himself thinks. 
Instead, we can only come up with disjointed views about certain small bits of text, but 
no grand overarching understanding of Kierkegaard as an author. Poole points to a 
number of reasons for this. First, we have Kierkegaard’s use of irony. Examining 
Kierkegaard’ dissertation, The Concept of Irony, Poole writes,  
“To revert, then, to the opening problem, which is the sense in which traditional 
readings of the dissertation have always seemed in the end to run up against some 
kind of fundamental unsayability in their task, might it not turn out to be the case 
that the reason for their discomfiture lies in the fact that The Concept of Irony is a 
piece of writing? It is not, in the usual academic sense, a piece of research, a piece 
of explanation, or a piece of careful exposition that shows the candidate has 
mastered all primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. It is a piece of writing. 
That, of course, was what the examiners were not expecting. And since it is a 
piece of writing, The Concept of Irony takes great pleasure in subverting the 
assumptions in the reader’s mind.”117 
 
“The Hegelian layout of the dissertation was meant to fox the original academic 
examiners, and it has succeeded in foxing most academic readers ever since. The 
work is about irony. True, the subtitle reads: “with Constant Reference to 
Socrates.” Nevertheless, the work itself is about irony, and, given the Romantic 
context in which both writer and readers of the 1841 dissertation were confined 
(Schlegel, Schleiermacher), it is surely to be expected that a work so titled will 
itself be ironic.”118 
 
Poole examines Kierkegaard’s work and finds it full of irony, which is ironic given its 
topic. Poole argues that instead of an explanation of irony and how irony worked for 
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Socrates, Kierkegaard has entire sections that seem to be nonsense, or which create such 
a spectacle that no one can disagree with them without looking foolish. Thus, Poole 
thinks that Kierkegaard’s dissertation is not itself a work of philosophy, but a work of 
ironic writing. If this is the case, then seemingly we cannot come up with a solid 
interpretation of what Kierkegaard is doing. It is unclear if sometimes Kierkegaard is 
defining irony in earnest or if he is doing so in jest. Some of his sections might represent 
his authentic approach, but others might represent a subversion of the Hegelian approach 
of his readers. If the work were philosophical at heart, then we should be able to use the 
bits of irony that show up here and there to assist our understanding of the concepts that 
are being explicated. However, Poole argues that it is clearly not a piece of philosophy, 
but a piece of writing, that is, something designed and written entirely for the purpose of 
playing with his readers. Poole writes, “The difficulty involved in coming to the plain 
sense of The Concept of Irony is that Kierkegaard has taken a great deal of trouble to 
make sure that there is no plain sense to be had.”119 From Poole’s point of view, 
Kierkegaard does this intentionally. Kierkegaard did not get along very well with some of 
his dissertation readers and was openly disdainful of their Hegelian approaches, and thus 
Poole’s claim is that he wrote a dissertation that is impossible to interpret, as a final prank 
to pull on them, in a sense.  
 The issue of irony is not limited to Kierkegaard’s dissertation, however. While the 
dissertation is certainly an extreme example, we run into the problem of interpretation 
whenever we encounter irony, as Muench pointed out above. Even when we examine 
works like Fragments or Postscript, we see plenty of irony afloat. So, we are constantly, 
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as readers, in the position of having to determine what is irony and what is not, and how 
far to take the irony. If we try to read Kierkegaard as an honest writer, we will end up 
accepting as true claims that he intended to only be ironical. If we approach Kierkegaard 
with distrust, then we will take claims as irony that he intended truthfully. This leaves the 
reader in the unfortunate position of never knowing exactly what Kierkegaard is trying to 
communicate, and thus unable to interpret with any semblance of precision. 
 This inability to determine authorial intent extends beyond irony as well. Poole 
examines Quidam’s Diary, a section in Stages on Life’s Way. Poole claims that the Diary 
is both “tasteless and boring” and that the first person to translate it into English, Walter 
Lowrie, shared similar sentiments. However, Poole claims that to thus assume that the 
Diary lacks useful content or that it fails as a piece of writing, is to assume normative 
authorial intent. Usually, philosophical authors want to persuade their audience of the 
same position that they hold and are writing about. However, in reference to Quidam’s 
Diary, Poole writes,  
“There was no place to write from, there was nothing to be remembered, without 
pain, of the past, and there was nothing to look forward to. The engagement to 
Regine was broken off. The plan to convince her that he was a trifler had to 
continue its hopeless path. There was nothing to do except kill time, and filling 
the page with the flow of consciousness is the best way to do that. The 
consciousness is, yes, not very attractive, but then the book was not written to 
place the author in an attractive light, but rather to fuel the rumor that Magister 
Kierkegaard was unattractive and insensitive. Lowrie is attesting rather to the 
success of Kierkegaard’s writing plan than of its failure.”120 
 
Poole maintains that it was Kierkegaard’s goal to produce a work that was boring, 
meaningless, and that painted Kierkegaard himself in a poor light. Kierkegaard intended 
to characterize himself in an unattractive manner so that he would appear so to Regine 
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Olsen, his ex-fiancée. When life issues such as these can enter into an author’s works, it 
causes an added layer of interpretation. Is Kierkegaard writing for Regine? Did he happen 
to have a poorly written book? Is it intentionally poorly written? The audience cannot 
absolutely determine the answers to these questions. Lacking a methodology or 
framework with which to approach the work, Poole argues that we cannot provide a 
singular authoritative interpretation, for the work itself eludes such an interpretation. 
Thus, we run into issues relating to authorial intent both in situations in which 
Kierkegaard employs the use of irony as well as situations in which Kierkegaard is 
publishing for reasons related to his personal life versus his philosophical interests. Since 
there is often no way to determine if something is or is not irony, or if Kierkegaard is 
writing for personal reasons or not, Poole claims that we are left in interpretation 
purgatory, unable to advance.  
 Poole adds in a third problem with interpretation; Kierkegaard published many of 
his works pseudonymously. On a number of occasions, Kierkegaard stresses that the 
viewpoints of his pseudonyms should not be confused with his own viewpoints.121 So 
when we examine the pseudonymous works, we are faced with a seeming inability to 
attribute any of the claims to Kierkegaard himself. Poole examines the language that’s 
used and claims that the pseudonymous works are not merely a matter of assigning a fake 
name to a book, but that they are written in entirely different voices. He writes, “Yet it is 
not the voice of Soren Kierkegaard himself. To check that out, one has only to compare 
his First and Last Declaration with the Appendix for an Understanding with the Reader 
with which Johannes Climacus signs off. The two tones are incompatible, dissimilar to 
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the point of alienation. No, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is not by Soren 
Kierkegaard himself as Walter Lowrie informs us.”122 By looking at the word choice, the 
tone, and the language used, Poole argues that the pseudonyms are quite clearly different 
individuals writing from different viewpoints. Thus, Poole claims that we cannot mistake 
Climacus for Kierkegaard because Climacus does not write like Kierkegaard, nor does he 
always present viewpoints that Kierkegaard would agree with. Instead, when Kierkegaard 
writes as Climacus, he seems to be adopting an entire identity and one that is dissimilar to 
his own. Poole goes on to claim that this problem has partly arisen because we read 
multiple texts that are all translated by the same individual who has adopted certain 
conventions when translating. The conventions tend to remain consistent across works, 
which oftentimes obscures the unique tones of each work and each pseudonym. Poole 
instead wants us to read the pseudonyms as Kierkegaard asked us to, as possibilities. 
Poole claims that reading the pseudonyms as possibilities complicates our ability to 
interpret Kierkegaard, as the possibilities all become something like thought experiments. 
We might be able to interpret a work within itself, but lacking any kind of authorial intent 
or authoritative voice, Poole thinks that we have to make do entirely with the text itself 
and the context that it provides. We are still unable to draw on or compare with any of the 
other pseudonymous works to help us understand. Thus, our third interpretive problem 
lies with the pseudonyms. 
 The fourth, and final problem that Poole examines when trying to interpret 
Kierkegaard’s works relates to his doctrine of indirect communication and his personal 
life. As has been mentioned, part of Kierkegaard’s plan involved the distance from the 
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texts that he intentionally created for himself as the author. By spending time around 
town, by looking like a “trifler”, by publishing according to a very specific plan, 
Kierkegaard worked to problematize any kind of authorial voice in his pseudonymous 
works. As was mentioned above, indirect communication seems to require the lack of an 
authoritative voice, and as Kierkegaard mentioned in Practice in Christianity, the author 
needs to “be a nobody”.  However, when the Corsair affair happens, Kierkegaard is no 
longer afforded this luxury. The Corsair affair consisted of a rather public interaction 
between Kierkegaard and a weekly satirical publication named The Corsair. Kierkegaard 
wrote some articles attacking the Corsair and inviting them to attack him in response. 
Instead of engaging him on an intellectual or witty level, as he seemingly had hoped, the 
Corsair published a number of caricatures of Kierkegaard. These comics significantly 
altered Kierkegaard’s public life, making him a constant object of ridicule. He eventually 
refused to spend much time in public and took trips out into the countryside just so that 
he could leave his house without being harassed.123 All of this leaves us with a 
predicament: Kierkegaard can no longer be a nobody. Poole argues that the Corsair affair 
thrust Kierkegaard into the public spotlight in such a way that he could no longer play the 
games that created distance between himself and his pseudonyms. If indirect 
communication requires, as he claims in Practice in Christianity, the authors 
nonexistence in relationship to the text, then Kierkegaard’s indirect approach becomes 
problematized by the Corsair affair. Indeed, much of Kierkegaard scholarship currently 
focuses on the connection between Kierkegaard’s personal life and his writings. Thus, 
Kierkegaard seemingly cannot indirectly communicate with us, for he is not a nobody 
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with relationship to his writings.  
 All of this leads Poole to conclude that Kierkegaard’s works cannot be interpreted 
in any meaningful manner. Given these multiple problems, Poole claims that Kierkegaard 
merely wants to invite us to participate, to interpret. Poole continues this line of thought, 
claiming that these interpretations are entirely subjective, as Kierkegaard has structured 
his writings so that no definitive interpretation can come forward. Thus, Poole thinks that 
we can only engage the text and can move no further. Poole argues that this is intentional 
on the part of Kierkegaard and that thus we cannot even look to Kierkegaard’s journals or 
personal writings for clues as to how we should interpret his pseudonymous works. 
Instead, we are left only in an interpretive haze, unable to produce a workable 
interpretation of the works but simultaneously invited to continually interpret. Poole 
claims, “Kierkegaard writes text after text whose aim is not to state a truth, not to clarify 
an issue, not to propose a definite doctrine, not to offer some ‘meaning’ that could be 
directly appropriated.”124  
 Poole’s work is useful for us in that it takes very seriously Kierkegaard’s claim 
that we should not mix up Kierkegaard with his pseudonyms. Poole’s approach helps us 
recognize the distance between the different pseudonyms and between the pseudonyms 
and Kierkegaard. Poole does a good job demonstrating the multitude of ways that a 
straightforward reading of Kierkegaard’s works is problematic and why we have to take 
the doctrine of indirect communication into account at all times when we are trying to 
interpret Kierkegaard. That said, Poole also takes things too far on a number of 
occasions. His conclusion is that no good interpretations of Kierkegaard are possible, but 
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this seems far too extreme given his evidence. Certainly there will be doubt in our 
interpretations, and it is unlikely that we can ever truly know what Kierkegaard thought, 
but that does not prevent us, as scholars, from coming up with better or worse 
interpretations of Kierkegaard’s various concepts and works, pseudonymous or 
otherwise. The absence of a perfectly definitive reading of an author does not imply that 
our readings and interpretations will be entirely subjective. Interestingly enough, while 
Poole consistently claims that we do not have access to the real Kierkegaard, he claims 
multiple times to have just that. Poole argues, on a number of occasions, that Kierkegaard 
is intending to write works that defy interpretation and thus cannot be meaningfully 
mined for philosophical content. So, Poole is claiming that we cannot know the mind of 
Kierkegaard, and he circularly builds his argument on his own ideas about the mind of 
Kierkegaard. It is against this overarching approach to Kierkegaard’s works that we see 
Tietjen respond. In his approach, we see Tietjen raise a number of these criticisms, 
working to establish that the doctrine of indirect communication does not prevent us from 
meaningfully interpreting Kierkegaard. 
 Tietjen works against Poole’s reading of Kierkegaard, and specifically against his 
claim that we cannot interpret Kierkegaard. Tietjen claims that much of Poole’s work is 
based on faulty reasoning. Looking at Poole’s overall project Tietjen writes,  
“[Poole’s] reasoning rests largely on a false dilemma: either take seriously 
Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication, commonly taken to include devices 
such as irony and pseudonymity, or read him ‘on religious grounds,’ as edifying 
or as having a serious message to convey through the pseudonyms. Poole claims 
that those who look for edifying purpose in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
literature read him bluntly; though in the end I contend that it is Poole’s reading 
that is blunt given its narrow understanding of what constitutes an indirect 
communication.”125 
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Tietjen thinks that Poole takes an overly narrow view of the ways in which we can read 
Kierkegaard. Much of Poole’s attack on definitive interpretations was based on 
Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication in his writings, but Tietjen argues that 
Poole doesn’t fully understand the doctrine of indirect communication. As Poole claims 
that other philosophers have read Kierkegaard bluntly, as if he is any other regular 
philosopher, Tietjen seems to attack Poole claiming that he is reading Kierkegaard 
bluntly by treating him in the way that a literary critic would and deconstructing the 
authorship. Tietjen claims that this reading runs contrary to much of what Kierkegaard is 
doing. We see Kierkegaard clarifying what an authentic Christian is while he 
simultaneously tries to motivate that authenticity in his readers.126 But this would mean 
that Kierkegaard has at least some specific goals and clear doctrines, something that 
Poole argues against. Thus, Tietjen’s task is twofold: first to break apart Poole’s reading 
of Kierkegaard and demonstrate that it is problematic, and second to build up an 
interpretive methodology that allows us to understand Kierkegaard’s works. 
 Poole, in an essay, argues that examining a few stories written by William James 
can help us understand how we should read Kierkegaard.127 In one story a novelist claims 
that a secret message is hidden throughout his works. Poole takes this as inspiration for 
how we should read Kierkegaard’s works, Fear and Trembling, to be specific. Tietjen 
examines two different ideas that Poole derives from this situation. First, the hidden 
message could not be revealed by the novelist, and second, no message can ever be 
legitimately derived from a work of literature. However, Tietjen points out that Poole 
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does not examine Fear and Trembling in order to discover if there exists a hidden 
message. Instead he assumes that one is already there.128 This assumption is something 
that ends up being somewhat endemic to Poole’s work, in Tietjen’s opinion. As Tietjen 
later notes, “it is questionable whether one may appropriately collect a smattering of 
quotations from a text, assemble them, and draw inferences from them.”129 Poole 
provides no evidence that a secret message exists in Fear and Trembling and instead 
gives us an interpretive lens first. Once we have the lens he them examines the text to see 
how certain quotes and sections might lend towards some kind of hidden message.  
 Tietjen recognizes the possibility of a more charitable reading of Poole that might 
come from the phrase written by Climacus, “subjectivity is truth.” Thus, the charitable 
reading of Poole is that he is pointing out how there is probably an idea that Kierkegaard 
is trying to indirectly communicate to us and referring to such a thing as a hidden 
message. However, Tietjen rejects this charitable reading noting that Poole never even 
hints that his reading of Kierkegaard might be this more charitable version. However, I 
think that Tietjen is reading Poole a little too uncharitably. Even if we recognize that 
Poole shouldn’t be given the charitable reading that Tietjen puts forward, we don’t have 
to agree with the uncharitable reading of Poole that Tietjen takes. Instead, it seems like 
Poole is trying to build an interpretive framework that begins with Kierkegaard’s own 
admonitions not to confuse the opinions of the pseudonyms with his own opinions. Thus, 
we could read Poole as not building up a definitive interpretive framework as much as 
offering an alternative possibility to the standard reading of Kierkegaard. Nonetheless, 
Tietjen does offer a useful criticism of Poole for lacking evidence and for seemingly just 
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taking snippets and quotes of Kierkegaard and assembling them.  
 Tietjen also critiques Poole’s approach to Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. Poole 
argues that the pseudonyms present a serious problem for interpretation in that we are 
never able to consider anything pseudonymous as representing Kierkegaard’s own views. 
Tietjen thinks that Poole takes this too far, writing,  
“Poole’s cautioning against conflating concepts across thought-worlds and 
pseudonyms is sound, but he presses the point too strongly. Per Kierkegaard’s 
request, one should keep the pseudonyms (and their concepts) apart as well as 
keep them apart from him. That is to say, the pseudonyms, their respective 
thought-worlds, and the concepts that belong to them should be understood as 
distinct. But one can acknowledge such distinctions and still affirm the possibility 
of conversation between them.”130 
 
Tietjen argues that Poole pushes things too far. Even if we keep the pseudonyms distinct 
in their positions, concepts, and worlds, we can still compare them and put them into 
conversation with one another. Though the pseudonymous authors of Fear and 
Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death are different, they both refer to the demonic and 
thus we can examine the differing conceptions that they have and whether or not anything 
can be put together from them. Doing so doesn’t commit us to conflating the two 
concepts, nor does it commit us to assuming that the concepts are ones Kierkegaard 
supports. It does, however, allow us to form some kind of interpretation with respect to 
the pseudonyms and to the concepts themselves. Maybe by examining Climacus versus 
Anti-Climacus and their respective works, we come to understand tensions that exist 
between certain concepts. This overall practice can at least guide us towards some overall 
view of what Kierkegaard is doing and what he’s communicating.  
 Having criticized Poole for going too far in his recognition of the roles of the 
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pseudonyms and of indirect communication, Tietjen puts forward his positive claims, 
specifically examining what indirect communication is and how it works. This project 
helps him develop his own interpretive apparatus, though I will not be examining that 
apparatus in this project, as my central goals lie with the concept of indirect 
communication and how it functions in Kierkegaard’s works. He writes, “Therefore, 
according to the lectures, indirect communication does not in the first-place concern 
literary devices like pseudonymity or irony. Rather, the salient factor of indirect 
communication involves what Kierkegaard calls a ‘communication of capability,’ as 
opposed to a ‘communication of knowledge.’”131 Tietjen looks at indirect communication 
as the same kind of communication of capability that was mentioned above but in doing 
so works to undermine Poole’s position. If indirect communication is primarily the 
communication of capability, then focusing on things like pseudonymity and irony is 
problematic, for it is not the form of the communication that is significant, but rather the 
ends of the communication. Things like pseudonymity and irony might help us reach 
these ends, and seemingly Kierkegaard employs them for that reason, but they alone are 
not the focus, rather it is the bringing forth of the capability. Indeed, most of the problems 
that cause Poole to advocate for his position stem from his misunderstanding of the 
doctrine of indirect communication, claims Tietjen. So, for Tietjen, neither the use of 
irony, pseudonymity, Kierkegaard’s personal life, nor the inability to determine authorial 
intent impede our ability to interpret, for none of these are necessary for Kierkegaard’s 
goals as a religious author seeking to indirectly communicate with his audience. Instead 
they only function as some of the tools that Kierkegaard employs to bring about 
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capabilities, but they do not in and of themselves have any inherent value. While they 
might make interpretation more difficult on occasion, and they certainly do, they do not 
create a system under which we are unable to interpret Kierkegaard.   
 Tietjen also attacks Poole for arguing that Kierkegaard is intentionally leading us 
into a place where interpretation is impossible. Quoting Poole, Tietjen writes,  
“The first pertains to a desire on the part of Kierkegaard to lure his reader 
alongside himself into an inescapable labyrinth. ‘The reader has to be gathered in 
as a potential ally, seduced and intrigued by the typographical and rhetorical 
waylayings of the text, and then involved in a kind of detective work, up to that 
point where (under ideal conditions) there is no unadorned instruction of doctrine 
or objective fact to be had, but only the mutually shared experience of 
perplexity.”132 
 
Tietjen is critical of this approach, thinking it unnecessary to believe that Kierkegaard’s 
works cannot be interpreted and thus that they exist only to leave us in an interpretive 
haze. However, while Poole takes the issue too far, there is something to be said for 
Kierkegaard intending to leave his audience in the labyrinth. Tietjen seems right with 
respect to interpretation, in that his previous criticisms of Poole have demonstrated that 
there are meaningful ways that we can interpret Kierkegaard. This pushes us away from 
the idea that all that we are left with is some experience of perplexity when it comes to 
interpretation.  
 Despite this, there does seem to be some value in an experience of perplexity, in 
being lost in the labyrinth. As has been explained earlier in this chapter, Kierkegaard 
again and again stresses how subjectivity is truth in reference to Christianity and thus 
how subjectivity was his goal and the goal of indirect communication. What is 
subjectivity? Inwardness and appropriation. If I am lost in the labyrinth, what am I to do? 
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I must search; I must struggle to escape. This process will necessarily involve some level 
of appropriation. Either I abandon the text, and thus the labyrinth altogether, or I 
appropriate the text as I fight to bring forth meaning from it. So, in this sense, the 
labyrinth serves a purpose. Kierkegaard is not setting us in a labyrinth as a practical joke, 
but rather because he is trying to engender inwardness in his audience. Thus, forcing his 
audience to actively engage with the text, he is able to put us into a situation where we 
either adopt subjectivity or disengage entirely. To the extent that he is successful, he 
needs us to engage, an issue that I will be addressing next chapter, but minimally the 
labyrinth is the perfect setup for indirect communication. If Kierkegaard wishes to bring 
forth a capability of mine, what better way than to make me active as a reader? If I must, 
on a personal level, participate with the text, then I am already being subjective in the 
way that Kierkegaard desires and the only thing that is left for him to do is to bring forth 
the capabilities that he thinks are necessary for authentic Christianity, or even just to re-
orient those capabilities that might already be active. 
 So, we see that a good middle ground exists between Tietjen’s and Poole’s 
approaches to Kierkegaard. Poole oversteps himself when he claims that nothing can be 
interpreted, but he does help us understand that there are interpretive limits when it 
comes to Kierkegaard. We need to very seriously consider the use of irony, misdirection, 
pseudonymity, and literary elements when we examine and interpret Kierkegaard’s 
works. At the same time, Kierkegaard’s doctrine of indirect communication is aimed at 
bringing forth a capability in the receiver and doing so might require some misdirection 
or deception. To that end, we cannot always trust Kierkegaard or his pseudonyms. Thus, 
our goal is to understand the use of indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s works by 
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examining clear instances of indirect communication. Up until this point, I’ve developed 
a line of reasoning that points to the goal of this type of communication: bringing forth 
authentic Christianity in individuals. Moving forward I’m going to look at the parts of 
Kierkegaard’s works that seem to function as a kind of motivation for the individual by 
looking at sections that aim to elicit something from the reader. Many of the pseudonyms 
often refer to themselves as poets, and Kierkegaard referred to himself in such a way as 
well. These poetic sections, I will argue, fulfill the goals that Kierkegaard has laid out in 
his doctrine of indirect communication. Thus, we need to examine the poetic side of 
Kierkegaard to both recognize how this style of writing functions as a tool of indirect 
communication and to get closer to our examination of parables and the way in which 
they function in Kierkegaard’s authorship.  
Conclusion 
 
 
 This chapter accomplished two primary goals. First, I argued for the necessity of 
indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s works. Given the argument that I make in 
chapter one about Kierkegaard’s goals, I here demonstrate that Kierkegaard needs to use 
indirect communication if he is indeed going to bring the religious forward. While there 
is something of a dearth of scholarship on Kierkegaard’s parables, there is a fair amount 
of scholarship concerning his doctrine of indirect communication, and thus the second 
accomplishment of this chapter was to provide something of a literature review of the 
available scholarship on this issue. Thus, overall we have so far moved from an 
understanding of what Kierkegaard intends for his works to accomplish to an 
understanding of the tools that he finds necessary to achieve that goal. This all leads us 
towards an analysis of parables themselves, as I will present in the next chapter. If we 
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know that Kierkegaard wants to bring the religious forward, and we recognize that 
indirect communication is an important part of that, we can now turn to the real topic at 
hand: parables. How exactly do parables function as pieces of indirect communication 
towards Kierkegaard’s stated goals? 
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Chapter 3: Kierkegaard the Poet 
 
 
“If the story-tellers could ha’ got decency and good morals from true stories,  
who’d have troubled to invent parables?” – Thomas Hardy 
 
 
 A, the pseudonymous author of part one of Either/Or, begins the book by 
examining the existence of a poet. He writes, “What is a poet? An unhappy person who 
conceals profound anguish in his heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and 
cries pass over them they sound like beautiful music.”133 A is referring, as he notes, to a 
torture instrument that would convert the screams of the tortured into music that sounded 
like the bellows of bulls. Poetry here is portrayed as something that transforms anguish 
into what is then perceived as beauty. He also claims that he would rather be a pig farmer 
only understood by pigs than a poet who is misunderstood by others. This image of the 
poet is certainly not a romantic one, yet we see both Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms 
refer to themselves as poets on a number of occasions. Something about the poetic mode 
of writing seems to transfix these authors such that they keep returning to it and 
transmuting their suffering into works of art. While Kierkegaard certainly had a number 
of personal sufferings in his life, I ultimately want to disagree with A’s claim, and I think 
that Kierkegaard does as well, that all poetry stems from suffering. Instead, I will argue 
that Kierkegaard uses the poetic mode, specifically parables, as rhetorical tools that will 
ideally cause his readers to make a choice that will lead to self-knowledge. 
 This chapter is going to explore the poetic side of Kierkegaard’s writings. I will 
begin with an examination of the poetic in Kierkegaard and the connections that the 
poetic mode has to indirect communication and the religious goal that Kierkegaard has in 
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mind for his works. Though the aesthetic mode of existence, typified by A’s views, often 
engages in poetic discourse, we will see that Kierkegaard has a much larger view of the 
poetic than the view that A puts forward. Indeed, Kierkegaard comes to view the poetic 
as a necessity for the religious, drawing connections to both appropriation and the 
distinction between actuality and possibility. As the poetic moves between these realms 
and concepts, I will argue that a poetic mode of communication is both dangerous in a 
way similar to what Plato saw, in that poetry may simply lead us to a world of 
imagination that separates us from our concrete existence and understanding of truth, as 
well as helpful in that it can cause us to recognize other possibilities that we can 
actualize.  
 Having examined the poetic in Kierkegaard I will then move to a discussion of 
metaphor as a mode of poetic discourse. I will examine some hermeneutic approaches to 
metaphor that help us understand Kierkegaard’s use of metaphor and parable. 
Specifically, I will argue that we can best understand Kierkegaard’s metaphors as 
producing a kind of tension between two possible interpretations that gives way to a 
synthesis provided by the reader.  
 Moving from an understanding of what a parable is, I will then explore the unique 
effects that a parable has and the ways in which these relate to Kierkegaard’s stated goals. 
Specifically, I will be examining the ways in which parables can bring about a change in 
the reader by bringing about a kind of sameness of vision in the parable and the reader. I 
will end this chapter with a classic example from literature, and one that Kierkegaard 
mentions both in published works and in his journals, the Biblical story of Nathan and 
David. The prophet Nathan uses a parable to reveal truth to David and it causes a drastic 
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change in David’s understanding of his own actions. I will explore this story as a kind of 
paradigmatic example of how parable can function and use it to set up the next stage of 
this project which will inspect a number of Kierkegaard’s parables and consider the 
specific uses that they have in his works.  
This chapter builds off what was argued in my previous two chapters. 
Kierkegaard has a specific goal in mind as an author, and that goal is to bring forward the 
religious in his audience. In order to accomplish this goal, Kierkegaard claims that he 
must use indirect communication, and as was explained in chapter two, part of that 
involves presenting his readers with existence-possibilities. This chapter works with that 
idea, examining what form these possibilities might take, and working to develop a 
general Kierkegaardian approach to metaphor and parable. This chapter will thus move 
us from an understanding of the poetic in Kierkegaard to an understanding of metaphor 
and parable in general, setting us up for chapter four where we will examine 
Kierkegaard’s use of parables. 
Section 1: Soothesaying Through Poetry 
 
 
  Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms often viewed themselves as poets with poetic 
goals. While Kierkegaard, later in his career, outlines precisely what his goals were all 
along, when we examine his diaries and the thoughts of some of his pseudonyms from 
earlier in his career there is already the inclusion of the poetic. On one hand, Kierkegaard 
identifies his goal as bringing people to authentic Christianity, that is, as a religious goal. 
At the same time, Walsh notes that “A survey of journal references to himself as poet 
reveals that he identifies himself with this role far more frequently in the period of the 
later religious writings than in earlier years. Again and again he declares in the later 
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journals that he is essentially a poet. In several entries he describes himself more 
specifically as a ‘poet of the religious’ and even more narrowly as a ‘Christian poet and 
thinker’.”134 So in addition to A identifying himself as a poet, Climacus implying that he 
is a poet, and numerous other occasions in the pseudonymous works, we also have 
Kierkegaard himself identifying as a religious poet.135 In an appendix to The Point of 
View for my Work as an Author entitled “Armed Neutrality” Kierkegaard writes,  
“The one who presents this picture [of Christendom] must himself first and 
foremost humble himself under it, confess that he, even though he himself is 
struggling within himself to approach this picture, is very far from being that. He 
must confess that he actually relates himself only poetically or qua poet to the 
presentation of this picture, while he (which is his difference from the ordinary 
conception of a poet) in his own person relates himself Christianly to the 
presented picture, and that only as a poet is he ahead in presenting the picture.”136  
 
Kierkegaard recognizes the necessity of the poetic approach as a tool in order to bring 
about his religious end. As discussed in Chapter 1, presenting an image of Christianity 
from a standpoint of superiority will cause many to reject the image.137 This rejection 
isn’t due to a problem in the image, but rather a problem in positioning the standpoint of 
the author. Thus, Kierkegaard thinks that we need to position ourselves religiously below 
the image. I must humble myself beneath the picture of Christianity that I put forward, 
recognizing and readily admitting that I fall short of it. When considered by someone 
viewing the image, I will not appear to be arguing for or stating my religious superiority, 
I will be either an equal to the other person or someone lesser. I will not be declaring 
myself better than others, instead I just happen to be filled with poetic inspiration. I have 
                                                 
134 Walsh, “Kierkegaard: Poet of the Religious” in Pattison 4 
135 PF 35 
136 POV 133 
137 What I mean by this is the presentation of the entirety of Christianity, both the subjective and objective, 
as a singular thing. 
96 
 
 
been gifted with a talent for words that has allowed me to communicate the truth. If I 
were claiming to be religiously superior, then those who are turned away from my claims 
would specifically reject my religious claims. But if I merely claim to be a poet writing 
out of inspiration, then the rejection that I might face won’t necessarily be of my religious 
ideas, but rather of my poetic mode. By taking the poetic approach and identifying 
himself primarily as a poet, even a religious poet, and thus someone lacking both 
religious and moral superiority, Kierkegaard is trying to put forward an image of 
Christianity that will not be easily rejected. Therefore, the poetic approach is very much a 
part of Kierkegaard’s religious goal.  
 Part of the reason for this also stems from Kierkegaard’s ideas about the kinds of 
creatures that we are. As was discussed previously, Kierkegaard views us as essentially 
subjective thinking things,138 and he thus must employ the indirect approach when trying 
to communicate certain things to us. He writes, 
“And just as it is a mediocre existence when the adult cuts away all 
communication with childhood and is a fragmentary adult, so is it a poor 
existence when a thinker, who is indeed also an existing person, has given up on 
imagination and feeling, which is just as lunatic as giving up on the 
understanding. And yet this is what people seem to want. They oust and dismiss 
poetry as a surmounted element because poetry corresponds most closely to 
imagination. In a scientific-scholarly process, it may be all right to classify it as a 
surmounted element, but in existence it holds true that as long as there is a human 
being who wants to claim a human existence, he must preserve poetry, and all his 
thinking must not disturb for him the enchantment of poetry but rather enhance 
it… The true is not superior to the good and the beautiful, but the true and the 
good and the beautiful belong essentially to every human existence and are united 
for an existing person not in thinking them but in existing.”139 
 
We see Climacus here describe two different approaches to life. First, we have the 
thinking person who employs a scientific process and second, we have an existing person 
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who wants to preserve poetry. We must engage with the poetic approach because we are 
existing creatures and not merely thinking creatures. For us, the beautiful and the true 
need to coalesce into one. Mackey refers to this idea when he writes, “in Kierkegaard 
philosophy becomes poetry.”140 Our existence can never be surmounted and thus we must 
always take the state of human existence into account when we examine our style of 
communication. In Chapter 2 I examined how the religious message often requires 
indirect communication due to its content. Here, we have Kierkegaard looking at the 
problem from the other end, not of the message or the communicator, but of the receiver. 
The receiver puts limitations on the modes of communication that will be successful due 
to the very nature of the receiver’s existence. This is again a push away from the thinking 
approach, something that Kierkegaard refers to here as a “scientific-scholarly process.” 
The goal is not merely to find the truth or to think something that is true, but rather to 
exist in what is true. Thus, with our goal being a certain kind of existence, we must 
employ the types of communication that are connected to the kinds of existing creatures 
that we are. For Kierkegaard, this is the transformation of philosophy into poetry. It is not 
merely that we are using poetry as an effective tool, though Kierkegaard certainly seems 
to indicate that on occasion, as noted above. Instead, philosophical thought becomes 
united with the poetic mode and with poetry itself.  
 Before fully endorsing the poetic mode of communication as fulfilling 
Kierkegaard’s goals, I want to turn to some work done by Sylvia Walsh. Walsh finds a 
number of concerns that Kierkegaard has about the poetic, and thus we must examine 
these potential problems before we can move forward with an argument about the value 
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of parable in Kierkegaard’s works. Walsh notes that we are faced with a limitation when 
we argue for ethical or religious principles, that of our own life experience. She writes, 
“From an ethical-religious standpoint, one may not communicate more than what one’s 
own life conforms to. If one seeks to communicate something higher, therefore, it must 
be made clear that the presentation is a poetic one.”141 Walsh’s contention here is that the 
presentation of something in the poetic mode is only an imaginative one, a presentation 
of a possibility. To that extent, the poetic mode allows us to explore ideas of which we 
have no personal experience. Thus, the poetic mode lets someone who claims to have no 
unique religious or moral experience make claims about what a certain religion should 
look like. This can occur when we don’t make such claims as scholars but rather as poets. 
We see this at work in Kierkegaard’s earlier pseudonymous works where the pseudonym 
is very clearly lower than the ideal that is being presented. In some later works, like those 
by Anti-Climacus, we see the pseudonyms explicitly mention that they are poets so as to 
avoid confusion.142 In both situations, the religious ideas must be presented poetically, for 
the author cannot claim, for practical reasons already mentioned as well as in truth, that 
their life conforms with the stringent religious principles that are being put forward. The 
poetic mode can explore ideas as possibilities, and thus even if I am not religious, I can 
think about what the religious should be like as a poet. However, a scholar can only 
approach the religious with the necessary authority to define exactly what Christianity is 
and how it functions. Thus, the religious communication should be poetic if it is to propel 
the reader and not merely exist as an argument about what authentic Christianity looks 
like.  
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 Walsh also notes a number of smaller problems that Kierkegaard has with the 
poetic. One of the reasons that Plato disliked poetry and did not want it in his ideal state 
was because poetry was false. It was distanced by an order of magnitude from reality and 
would thus represent a kind of deception. Walsh argues that Kierkegaard, in his quest for 
the religious, must contend with this possibility of deception. If Kierkegaard is using 
poetry as a kind of deception, then poetry starts to look like sophistry, and this is a 
problem that Kierkegaard considers. “Have I, after all (however much I should like to 
have someone share my point of view), the right to use my art in order to win over a 
person?”143 Kierkegaard here struggles with the ethical question as to whether deception 
is acceptable. His ultimate goal is the religious, but he has to take into account the reason 
for which his readers choose the religious.144 Seemingly his audience must choose the 
religious for the right reasons and not, for instance, because Kierkegaard’s beautiful 
language has made them think that the religious will be full of pleasure and thus appeal to 
the pleasure seeker in them. A true turn to the religious requires a recognition of certain 
religious concepts like that of sin, that one is bringing to bear on oneself. Beyond concern 
over the ethics of his methods, Kierkegaard also harbors further concerns about the 
efficacy of them.  
 Walsh gives a full explanation of multiple dangers that Kierkegaard or some of 
his pseudonyms think that poetry holds, which I will here represent very briefly.145,146 
One of the first problems is that poetry is ideal, it lives in the realm of possibility. 
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Because of this poetry is oftentimes indifferent to actuality. The poetic does not need a 
world (as A would put it) of nisses and trolls to actually exist, it only needs such a world 
to be imaginable in order to bring the reader into that possibility. Because of this 
detachment from actuality poetry carries the danger of driving the reader away from the 
concrete and losing them in the possible. This carries a real danger for the religious goal 
of Kierkegaard, for he wants to bring Christianity to bear on the concrete individual, and 
not on the individual lost in possibility. To that individual, a world of sin can be 
imagined, and we can think through the possible outcomes, and why such a world might 
need a savior, but in the end, none of it matters for it is all a thought experiment. Thus, 
poetry carries the danger of drawing us away from the actual world. In a similar vein, 
since poetry can lead us away from actuality, it can also pull us out of the ethical, for it is 
only immediate. Therefore, Walsh claims that poetry offers us immediacy in the form of 
fantasy or imagination and in doing so can remove us from the realm of the ethical and 
the relationships that are a part of that realm. We cannot be dialectical with something 
that is only immediate, nor can we make meaningful choice in such a world of 
immediacy.  
 In examining the problems that might lie with the poetic approach, Walsh also 
outlines what exactly she thinks is needed for the good version of the poetic that 
Kierkegaard is working towards. By examining some of Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Hans 
Christian Andersen, Walsh claims that something Andersen lacks, and that Kierkegaard 
thus desires out of poetry, is a positive life view.147 The poet must be able to reach 
beyond a fragmentary view of life or of a single experience and instead present a 
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substantial view of existence such that anyone reading the work of the poet can orient 
their life towards what the poet is presenting. Kierkegaard wants poetry to serve a 
specific function, that of bringing individuals closer to the religious, and thus poetry 
needs to be instructive towards the religious goals that Kierkegaard has in mind. Walsh 
also contends that the poetic requires reflection as a necessary ingredient in order for it to 
be of use. Poetry cannot be immediate, which the pleasure-seeking life is composed of 
according to A, for if it is then the reader can never move beyond the aesthetic realm. 
Thus, for Walsh, in order for poetry to be ethically or religiously instructive, it must be 
imbued with, and thus inspire, reflection. In this way poetry and the poetic can overcome 
the danger of pulling the reader into immediacy and thus away from the ethical. With 
reflection as an ingredient of the poetic, Walsh argues that we no longer have to worry 
about poetry driving the reader into immediacy.  
Lastly, Walsh makes a distinction between the imagination and the fantastic for 
Kierkegaard.148 Most poetry drives us towards the fantastic, which isn’t rooted in 
actuality and which leads away from the self. “In fantasy, the self does not become itself 
but rather loses itself in infinitude, gradually becoming volatilized in an inhuman state of 
abstraction… When the imagination or a capacity dependent upon it becomes fantastic in 
this manner, the self can be said to be in despair, the despair of infinitude.”149 The 
imagination, by contrast, is centered around oneself as an existing creature and thus 
always returns to the concrete. We can think of the imagination as the faculty which 
allows us to entertain possibilities, and the fantastic, as Walsh describes, as the 
imagination run wild. Imagination, though it is entertaining possibilities, is remaining 
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grounded in our concrete existence, whereas the fantastic loses this connection with our 
concreteness and instead runs wild, intoxicated with possibility. Thus, our poetry needs to 
engage the imagination but avoid the fantastic.150 As we move back to Kierkegaard, I 
think it is good for us to keep in mind what I’ve outlined from Walsh above. Walsh’s 
work helps us recognize categories like imagination when we examine Kierkegaard’s 
parables and his poetic style overall. 
 One of the reasons that Kierkegaard wants to engage the imagination is that he 
wants to put possibilities before us such that we can then actualize them. Here are two 
sections where Climacus addresses this issue directly, and I am quoting them at length.  
“But existence-actuality cannot be communicated, and the subjective thinker has 
his own actuality in his own ethical existence. If actuality is to be understood by a 
third party, it must be understood as possibility, and a communicator who is 
conscious of this will therefore see to it, precisely in order to be oriented towards 
existence, that his existence-communication is in the form of possibility. A 
production in the form of possibility places existing in it as close to the recipient 
as it is possible between one human being and another. Let me elucidate this once 
again. One would think that, by telling a reader that this person and that person 
actually have done this and that (something great and remarkable), one would 
place the reader closer to wanting to do the same, to wanting to exist in the same, 
than by merely presenting it as possible. Apart from what was pointed out in its 
proper place, that the reader can understand the communication only by 
dissolving the esse of actuality into posse, since otherwise he only imagines that 
he understands, apart from this, the fact that this person and that person actually 
have done this and that can just as well have a delaying as a motivating effect. 
The reader merely transforms the person who is being discussed (aided by his 
being an actual person) into the rare exceptions; he admires him and says: But I 
am too insignificant to do anything like that.”151 
 
What is great with regard to the universal must therefore not be presented as an 
object for admiration, but as a requirement. In the form of possibility, the 
presentation becomes a requirement. Instead of presenting the good in the form of 
actuality, as is ordinarily done, that this person and that person have actually lived 
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and have actually done this, and thus transforming the reader into an observer, an 
admirer, an appraiser, it should be presented in the form of possibility. Then 
whether or not the reader wants to exist in it is placed as close as possible to 
him.152  
 
The problem with presenting something as actually existing is that it too easily turns the 
reader into a mere observer. I can watch a professional athlete perform an incredible feat 
and think to myself, “Wow, I could never be that good.” The presentation as actuality can 
turn us into admirers, but Kierkegaard doesn’t want admirers of Christianity, he wants 
authentic Christians. Thus, Kierkegaard must present possibilities to his readers. When an 
actuality is presented, I am immediately made aware that it is possible for a human being 
to achieve such a thing, but I am also made aware very explicitly of the differences 
between myself and the person who just achieved what was made actual. I can look at the 
athlete and recognize that I am not strong or fast enough to do what they did. But when 
something is presented only as a possibility, I can tap into my imagination and then place 
myself within the possibility to see if it can be actualized. There is nothing for me to 
admire in a possibility, nor is there any way for me to excuse myself from action when I 
examine a possibility, for I do not yet know if I possess the ability to actualize what is 
being presented as possible. So, I am left with only two choices, to test myself against the 
possibility and try to actualize it, or to reject the possibility altogether as being unworthy 
of my time.  
 When looking at this question of possibility, I think it’s useful to turn to Mackey’s 
thoughts considering Kierkegaard’s poetic approach. Mackey, making a similar claim to 
the one that I made in chapter one about how Kierkegaard’s goal is to engender 
awareness, writes, “That in a way is the purpose of every poet: not to tell the truth, nor 
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yet to insinuate fabulous lies, but to make men aware of the options so that the emergence 
of truth within the individual is not hindered by the conceit of knowledge or the tangle of 
error.”153 The poet, and therefore Kierkegaard, to the extent that he considers himself a 
religious poet, is trying not to present a truth to the reader, but instead to present 
possibilities to the reader such that the reader can freely pursue the truth subjectively. 
Yet, Kierkegaard seems to want to take things a step further than Mackey implies. As we 
will come to see, Kierkegaard’s goal is not to merely to present possibilities, but to do so 
in such a way that the reader is prompted to choose for herself. This too ties back into 
Kierkegaard’s claims concerning indirect communication and appropriation. Climacus 
writes,  
“Inwardness cannot be communicated directly, because expressing it directly is 
externality (oriented outwardly, not inwardly), and expressing inwardness directly 
is no proof at all that it is there… but there is inwardness when what is said 
belongs to the recipient as if it were his own – and now it is indeed his own. To 
communicate in that way is the most beautiful triumph of resigned 
inwardness.”154 
 
Inwardness and appropriation are achieved via the use of possibilities that the poetic 
carries. When something is presented as a possibility the reader must turn inward and 
appropriate the idea if they want to engage it at all. Because of this, if Kierkegaard 
ultimately wants to engender inwardness, as Climacus seems to desire, then he must take 
a poetic approach so that he can present possibility to the reader. Having recognized the 
necessity of the poetic approach to Kierkegaard’s overall goals as an author, let us next 
examine the most common and striking forms of the poetic that Kierkegaard employs in 
his writings: metaphor and parable. 
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Section 2: Construct Additional Metaphors 
 
 
One of the common ways that we see Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms bring 
forward these kinds of possibilities is through their use of metaphor and parable. To 
examine this, I first want to return to a quotation from Anti-Climacus that I brought up in 
chapter 2. “For example, it is indirect communication to place jest and earnestness 
together in such a way that the composite is a dialectical knot – and then to be a nobody 
oneself. If anyone wants to have anything to do with this kind of communication, he will 
have to untie the knot himself.”155 I had used this to help explain the concept of indirect 
communication, something that I think this quote does well. But, given that metaphor and 
parable qualify as forms of indirect communication, I’d like to bring it in here as well. 
This dialectical knot of jest and earnestness causes the receiver to have to untie the knot 
for themself. It is unclear to the receiver if the communication is a matter of jest, if it is 
earnest, or if it is some combination of the two that is producing an entirely new third 
option. Thus, the receiver of the communication is faced with this challenge. They need 
to uncover the meaning of the communication, but the communication is offering them a 
number of different possibilities.  
Given that Kierkegaard wants to bring forward possibility such that it might 
provoke inwardness, we see a connection between this dialectical knot and his poetic 
concerns. So, when we ask why Kierkegaard often broke into metaphor and parable 
throughout his writings, I think we can trace a clear connection back to his concept of 
indirect communication, and therefore back to his religious goal. Metaphors and parables 
produce the same kind of effect that we see Kierkegaard describe with his dialectical 
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knot. The dialectical knot presents us with competing possibilities. The receiver, upon 
recognizing the possibilities must, if she is to seek any level of understanding, resolve the 
competition in some manner. So, we can see this dialectical knot as producing a kind of 
tension between multiple possibilities. When I run into a metaphor, I am faced with 
multiple possibilities of meaning, and it is up to me to decide on one of them as an 
avenue forward. If I encounter a passage that claims, “Man is a puppet” as I am reading 
through a text, I encounter the tension caused by possibility. Man is very clearly not a 
literal puppet, for I am made of flesh and bone instead of fabric. So, must I interpret 
things metaphorically? Metaphorically, this might be referring to my lack of free will, or 
maybe a hyperbolic statement about my quality of life. Regardless of the interpretation 
that I decide on, the metaphor presents me with this kind of tension. Lorentzen, one of the 
few scholars who has worked on Kierkegaard’s use of metaphor, makes a similar claim. 
He writes, “Metaphor provides Kierkegaard with the dialectical tension and the middle 
ground – as a kind of no-man’s land – that his indirect communication requires of the 
reader to struggle with existence itself, to examine not only life but ideas in life that 
ethically instruct and prompt the reader to choose.”156  
 Given this concern with tension as a central concept in Kierkegaard’s use of 
metaphor, I want to bring in another theorist who also examines the use of tension in 
metaphor: Ricoeur. Ricoeur focuses on the way that the reader interacts with and comes 
to understand metaphor. Ricoeur claims that we come to identify metaphors by finding a 
kind of confusion in the language being used. “So metaphor appears as an answer to a 
certain inconsistency of the statement interpreted literally.”157 When taking a literal 
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reading of “Man is a puppet,” confusion would ensue for human beings are not inanimate 
dolls with strings attached. This inconsistency is what makes us aware that the statement 
is probably metaphorical. In this vein, Ricoeur also argues that we must approach whole 
statements as metaphorical and not merely single words. It’s not that “puppet” is a term 
being used metaphorically, but instead that the entire proposition “Man is a puppet” is 
metaphorical. Giving us this ability to identify metaphors, Ricoeur presents his overall 
approach, for which he uses the term “tension.” Ricoeur writes,  
“Now substitution is a sterile operation, but in metaphor, on the contrary, the 
tension between the words and especially the tension between two interpretations, 
one literal and one metaphorical, in the whole sentence, gives rise to a veritable 
creation of meaning of which rhetoric perceived only the end result. In a theory of 
tension… a new signification emerges which deals with the whole statement. In 
this respect, metaphor is an instantaneous creation.”158 
 
Tension theory approaches metaphorical statements as statements that create new 
meaning. The tension between the possible interpretations of the text gives rise to a new 
understanding, a “creation” as Ricoeur calls it.  
 For Ricoeur, this tension stems from the existence of two possible interpretations, 
a literal interpretation and a metaphorical interpretation. These two interpretations aren’t 
at odds with one another, but instead they complement one another. The literal and the 
metaphorical mutually inform each other, the literal helping me understand the 
metaphorical and vice versa. Thus, when we take both interpretations as a totality, a new 
meaning is created. This new meaning is neither the metaphorical or the literal, but rather 
is the tension of the two. For Ricoeur, this breaks from a history in which the literal 
interpretation is often ignored in favor of the metaphorical. Instead, Ricoeur claims that 
the literal is an important part of what the metaphor does.  
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 I think that Ricoeur’s understanding of tension is helpful for us when we turn 
back to Kierkegaard’s use of metaphor. As I will explain in the next chapter, Kierkegaard 
also wants to take into account the literal. The structure of his metaphors and parables, 
the characters that he uses, their places and locations and words, are all valuable in 
helping us understand what Kierkegaard is trying to do as an author. Yet, Ricoeur wants 
tension to derive from two possible but complimentary interpretation, literal and 
metaphorical. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, seems to want some kind of competition 
between interpretations. I think that this is a minor point, but one worth considering. 
Where for Ricoeur the literal and the metaphorical work together to produce a new 
creation of meaning, for Kierkegaard the possibilities that the metaphor presents are in 
conflict with one another, though this conflict might have the same kind of resolution that 
we find in Ricoeur. The dialectical knot presents us with two competing possibilities, jest 
or earnestness. The earnest interpretation does not help me understand the jesting 
interpretation, nor vice versa. They are not analogues of each other in the way that the 
metaphorical and the literal are for Ricoeur. Yet, in the end, they might have the same 
kind of dialectical synthesis that Ricoeur sees in the literal and the metaphorical. For 
Kierkegaard, the goal of the poetic is to cause inwardness through the introduction of 
possibilities. Thus, when I am presented with the competing possibilities that a metaphor 
introduces, I must consider their likelihood. Does this metaphor lend more towards jest or 
towards earnestness? Does it lend more towards literal or metaphorical? But, if the 
metaphor doesn’t clearly lend itself to one interpretation over the other, then I am forced 
to make something out of it. I must figure out how to maintain both jest and earnestness 
in a meaningful way such that the metaphor still makes sense. This occurrence brings 
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about inwardness and appropriation. Where for Ricoeur the metaphor creates new 
meaning, for Kierkegaard the creation stems from the individual.  
 Given this understanding of how metaphor works for Kierkegaard, I’d like to 
briefly cover how this also extends to parables. Kierkegaard often gives us colorful 
metaphors, but we also find a large number of longer form parables. But how do we 
distinguish a parable from a metaphor or from a short story? There doesn’t seem to be 
any single demarcating feature that we can use to pinpoint something as a parable. 
Ricoeur notes this difficulty, writing, “To call a certain narrative a parable is to say that 
the story refers to something other than what it told… how does the narrative itself start 
the interpretive process which makes it into a parable?”159 Parables have the same 
metaphorical aspect to interpretation that metaphors do, which for Ricoeur brings about 
the same kind of tension between literal and metaphorical. But a parable is a narrative of 
some sort. Thus, Ricoeur concludes that, “The parable has been tentatively defined as the 
mode of discourse which applies to a narrative form a metaphoric process.”160 A parable 
does the same thing that a metaphor does, it just does it in a narrative form. For Ricoeur, 
just as we posit meaning of the entire metaphor and not just one phrase of the metaphor, 
so too do we posit meaning of the entire parable, and not just one character or action.  
Yet, there might also be a number of structural signifiers that can at least clue us 
in to the possibility of a parable. Donahue, in his work on Biblical parables, finds that 
parables are often marked by some traits, though the list that he comes up with, adapted 
from Rudolf Bultmann, present neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for a parable. 
Instead, they are more like markers that indicate the possibility of a parable. Donahue 
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finds that we usually have a concise narrative in which large groups of people are treated 
as a single individual and in which you rarely have more than two individuals interacting 
at the same time. He also claims that parables rarely give the reader access into the minds 
of the characters, and instead that all motivations and thoughts are portrayed through 
characters’ actions or speeches. He notes that parables are also often characterized by 
repetition of actions and situations, as well as a lack of a full conclusion, and thus with 
issues left unresolved.161 
So, we see that parables and metaphors fit very well both into the description of 
the poetic that Kierkegaard gives us as well as with his desire for indirect 
communication. Parables and metaphors present a kind of choice to the reader by giving 
them the dialectical knot that must be untied. The parable possesses a kind of tension that 
prompts the reader to unravel the knot, and in doing so, the parable causes inwardness 
and appropriation. As we move forward, I will endeavor to explain exactly how parables 
are able to not only provide this tension to the reader, but how they go further and prompt 
us to choose. 
Section 3: The Power Level of Parables 
 
 
 Parables present to us an interesting literary tool mostly because of the effect that 
they have on the reader. Parables are able not only to provide a creative imagining of a 
certain person or place, but also to present real choices to the reader. When working 
through a parable the reader is invited to participate in the parable. Reading through the 
parable of the workers in the vineyard, we are invited to wonder as to why the lord pays 
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all of his laborers the same amount regardless of the work that they have done.162 
TeSelle, a theologian who primarily works with metaphor, uses this idea to claim, “A 
parable of Jesus is not, then, only an interesting story; it is a call to decision.”163 The 
parable calls to the reader and invites them to seek understanding. We must understand 
how or why the lord acts as he does when his actions seem unfair. This understanding of 
ours then prompts a further decision, for the parable is trying to describe to us the 
Kingdom of God. So, we must decide whether to revise our understanding of the 
Kingdom of God or not. In this sense, the parable will often present some kind of conflict 
between our understanding of the world and the world that the parable presents, with the 
resolution of this conflict driving us to revise our understanding of the world. TeSelle 
writes, “The secure, familiar everydayness of the story of their own lives has been torn 
apart; they have seen another story – the story of a mundane life like their own moving 
by a different ‘logic,’ and they begin to understand (not just with their heads) that another 
way of believing and living – another frame or context for their lives – might be a 
possibility for them.”164 The parable presents a possibility to us, that God is like such and 
such, that the Kingdom of God is like such and such, that I need to live a life like such 
and such. Yet the parable does not present them as intellectual possibilities, things that 
we might need to merely assent to. Instead, they are presented as real possibilities for us 
that can impact our lives.  
Interacting with and engaging the metaphor empowers its ability to make us 
choose, and thus we realize that the possibilities in the parable are real possibilities for us. 
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Lorentzen’s examination of metaphor turns his attention to Kierkegaard’s The Book on 
Adler, in which he finds support for a similar hypothesis. “The intent is to push the 
primitive existential moment of choice to its crisis by compelling ‘one either to be 
offended or to believe,’ for, ‘contemporaneity is the tension that does not permit a person 
to leave it undecided.’”165, 166 The parable is contemporaneous for it offers us a choice 
that is always relevant to our lived experience, and thus is eternally contemporaneous. No 
matter my situation in life, recognizing my sin in the face of Christ, or understanding 
what the Kingdom of God is like, will always relate to me. The religious parable, in this 
sense, offers up offense or belief as the options that we must choose from. The parable is 
asking us to reorder our understanding of the world and to that extent, there is a chance of 
offense. In the act of asking me to reorder things, the parable is claiming that my 
understanding is incorrect and therefore I can respond with offense, which disallows the 
parable to be successful. Thus we can either ignore the parable and fail to engage it, or 
we are forced to choose between offense and belief. When faced with an understanding 
of our fallen state in the face of God we are either offended or we choose to believe, and 
it is parables that bring us to this tipping point. 
 Seemingly what I have just described amounts to a kind of persuasion. The 
parable will often either persuade me to believe or to be offended. Yet, Lane argues that 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous and philosophical works are not meant to be persuasive to 
the reader.167 Instead, he argues, the philosophical works are meant to clear up confusion 
and give an explanation of what true Christianity is. To that extent, they cannot be 
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persuasive, for their goal is knowledge. Thus, he argues, the religious works are the ones 
that are trying to be persuasive. However, this approach seems to me to neglect the 
literary side of Kierkegaard’s philosophical works. Parables, metaphors, analogies, 
allegories, all of these invite our participation and prompt us to decide. In order to 
understand how these tools fit into the context in which they are placed, we must 
endeavor to interpret them in a way that is meaningful to the text in which they appear. 
Thus they invite us to participate with them, and to the extent that they are designed to be 
persuasive, they prompt us to decide. This process is inherently persuasive to the extent 
that we go through with it. Thus, if the reader engages the parables in Kierkegaard’s 
philosophical works, we see the possibility of persuasion beyond just the religious 
writings.  
 But how exactly do parables persuade us? When considering their persuasive 
power, we have to take into account that it is the reader who is interpreting and thus 
constructing them. The author puts together a parable, in Kierkegaard’s case, with a 
specific goal in mind. But all that the author can do is write the parable and then give it to 
the reader. The reader, having now been invited to participate with the parable, has to 
figure out what the parable means. Given, as I have described, that the parable is going to 
offer an alternative account of the Kingdom of God for instance, one that the reader must 
then measure up against his or her own account, the reader must endeavor to uncover this 
alternative account. However, the parable does not outright describe this account. Instead, 
the reader must build it for themself. Yet, in order to understand what that account is, or 
if it even differs from your own, you must construct the account from the parable. It’s 
possible that you are unable to do so, maybe you just can’t make sense of the parable. But 
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if you can, then the account that you have created is at least somewhat coherent. So now 
you must measure this coherent, alternative account versus the one that you already hold 
yourself. This alternative account now has a good chance at being persuasive for two 
reasons. First, since it was a creation of yours, you feel like this is self-discovered 
knowledge, and thus the parable bypasses many of your defense mechanisms. You do not 
feel like your views are being attacked externally, for you were the one who constructed 
this account. Secondly, since the account is your construction, and you constructed it in 
order to make sense of the parable, you put together something that is at least somewhat 
coherent and rational. To that extent, you are unlikely to dismiss it immediately or 
offhandedly. You will instead give it some consideration and truly measure it against the 
account that you currently hold. Thus, the parable will possess a much greater possibility 
to persuade than say, a diatribe that attacks the account of the Kingdom of God that you 
currently hold. 
 Another ability that the parable has is what Arnold Isenberg refers to as “critical 
communication.” Isenberg’s work is primarily centered on aesthetics. One of his most 
famous pieces presents an argument about the duty of the art critic. Some take the job of 
the art critic to be evaluative. That is, the art critic is supposed to evaluate the value of 
certain works of art based on criteria that are more or less accepted. Isenberg claims that 
this usually goes about via a three-step process. The critic renders a verdict, gives a 
reason for the verdict, and backs up the reason by some norm. So, a critic might say that a 
painting is good (verdict) because it matches form to content very well (reason), and any 
painting that matches form to content is a good painting (norm).168 Taking issue with this 
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approach, Isenberg says that it leaves out something meaningful that comes along with 
criticism. He argues that it is not merely the critic’s job to evaluate art, but also to bring 
about a shared vision of a work of art. He writes,  
“And if communication is a process by which a mental content is transmitted by 
symbols from one person to another, then we can say that it is a function of 
criticism to bring about communication at the level of the senses, that is, to induce 
a sameness of vision, of experienced content. If this is accomplished, it may or 
may not be followed by agreement, or what is called "communion" - a community 
of feeling which expresses itself in identical value judgments.”169 
 
The job of the critic is to make you see what she sees. For example, the film critic does 
not exist so that I can know which movies I should see and which I should avoid. Instead, 
the film critic exists so that when I go see a certain film, I can see all of the depth, 
mystery, and symbolism that I would have missed without the help of the critic. She 
allows me to see what she sees, and assumedly what she sees is a fuller vision of the 
work of art.  
 How exactly does the critic do this? An evaluation is something that is easy 
enough to communicate, but how does one bring about a shared vision? The critic can tell 
me how she sees the work of art, but that won’t make me see it that way. Something 
beyond a communication of her vision must occur. Isenberg refers to this special kind of 
communication as “critical communication”. According to Isenberg, “In ordinary 
communication, symbols tend to acquire a footing relatively independent of sense-
perception.”170 When we communicate ordinarily, the words or symbols that we use to 
communicate have established their meanings independent of our individual sense-
perceptions. Thus, if we are trying to bring about a sameness of vision, ordinary 
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communication will be no good. Isenberg uses the following example to illustrate critical 
communication, and the difference between it and ordinary communication.  
““The expression on her face was delightful.”  
“What was delightful about it?”  
“Didn’t you see that smile?””171 
 
The final line here is important. Were the speaker to simply say, “The smile” there would 
be no special communication. Instead, we would merely have information being 
communicated. The speaker would be communicating that a specific smile was 
delightful. Instead, by asking the question, the speaker is prompting something very 
different to happen. The interlocutor must consider the question. Assumedly he did see 
the smile, but yet he didn’t notice that her expression was delightful. So, he has missed 
something about her expression. What he has missed is something interpretive. He hasn’t 
missed out on any content; he saw her face. So the “critic” in this situation is trying to 
share her vision of a woman’s expression. She asks if her interlocutor saw the woman’s 
face. What effect does this have? The interlocutor must now reconsider what he has seen. 
He saw her expression, and he saw her smile. But he somehow missed connecting her 
smile to a delightful expression. The smile is the key here. He must reinterpret what he 
has seen and center his reinterpretation around the smile. Once this happens, he should 
hopefully see the delightful face that the critic has seen.  
 This kind of critical communication is not something that can be objectively 
stated. Instead it is intuited from one to another, in Isenberg’s example through the form 
of a question. The critic is not informing their audience about qualities found in a work of 
art. Instead, they are trying to affect a change in their audience. They want their audience 
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to pick up on the same subtleties that they are picking up on. But telling you about these 
subtleties won’t make you see them. Instead, I have to get you to reorient your vision 
such that you then see the same things that I am seeing. Critical communication is what 
causes us to reorient ourselves in this way.  
Section 4: Come Now David, Where Has Uriah Gone? 
 
 
 Given this scaffolding that I have put together describing how parables function, 
let’s now look at a classic example of this in action, one that a number of scholars, and 
Kierkegaard himself, all consider: that of David and Bathsheba. I want to turn to this 
example primarily for two reasons. First, it is a parable that both Kierkegaard and a 
number of parable scholars examine. Thus, by looking at David and Bathsheba, we can 
gain at least a small understanding of how Kierkegaard’s analysis of parables fits in with 
that of modern scholars. Second, I want to examine this parable because it presents to us 
a perfect example of what I’m arguing a parable should accomplish for Kierkegaard. It is 
a story about a successful parable and thus gives us a good image for the process that I’m 
claiming we find in Kierkegaard’s works. In order to examine this parable, I’m first going 
to start by turning to Ted Cohen, a philosopher who primarily worked in aesthetics. 
Cohen uses the story of David and Bathsheba from the Bible to illustrate critical 
communication in action. 
One day, David sees Bathsheba bathing and invites her to his palace and has sex 
with her. She becomes pregnant soon after though her husband is away at war. King 
David thus calls her husband back from the front lines and tells him to go and be with his 
wife, hoping that Uriah would then be the assumed father of the unborn child. However, 
Uriah, the husband, refuses. He claims that it is not right for him to be with his wife while 
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his comrades in arms are fighting. So King David sends Uriah back to the front lines and 
arranges for him to die in battle. Upon his death, David summons the widowed Bathsheba 
to live in his palace. This course of action angers the Lord and he sends the prophet 
Nathan to speak to King David. David feels no remorse at his actions and thus Nathan 
tells him a story.  
““There were two men in one city, the one rich and the other poor. The rich man 
had a great many flocks and herds. But the poor man had nothing except one little 
ewe lamb which he bought and nourished; and it grew up together with him and 
his children. It would eat of his bread and drink of his cup and lie in his bosom, 
and was like a daughter to him. Now a traveler came to the rich man, and he was 
unwilling to take from his own flock or his own herd, to prepare for the wayfarer 
who had come to him; rather he took the poor man’s ewe lamb and prepared it for 
the man who had come to him” 
 
Then David’s anger burned greatly against the man, and he said to Nathan, “As 
the Lord lives, surely the man who has done this deserves to die. He must make 
restitution for the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing and had no 
compassion.” 
 
Nathan then said to David, “You are the man!””172 
 
The context of what Nathan says to David informs us that this is clearly something in 
need of interpretation. Nathan is not telling David that David stole someone else’s lamb 
and must have forgotten about it. He is telling David that David is the rich man from the 
story, but obviously not in a literal sense. This context demonstrates the need for 
interpretation, but where does this interpretation lead us? 
 Cohen brings up two points that are very important to keep in mind. “(1) Nathan 
has not told David anything David did not already know, (2) When Nathan has finished 
speaking, David has new feelings and thoughts about something he has already 
known.”173 If David did not know that he had done something wrong, he would never 
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make the connection that Nathan wants him to make between himself and the rich man. 
He must already know that he is guilty of taking something from someone less fortunate, 
when he had no need to take anything. So Nathan is not informing David that David has 
done something wrong, for David already know this. Instead, Nathan is making David 
feel something new about things that he already knew. He wants David to feel the guilt, 
shame, and anger towards himself that he feels towards the rich man. Also, it is important 
to note that the truth of the story is irrelevant here because we only need David to 
entertain the story seriously in order to bring about the emotive effect.174 When Nathan 
tells David that he is the rich man, Nathan has artificially closed interpretation. From the 
standpoint of David there is now only one meaningful way to interpret the story.  
 But what happens is more than just an issue of interpretation. The story of David 
and Nathan isn’t interesting because David is able to properly interpret what happens. 
Instead, the interest lies in the effect that the interpretation has on David; the critical 
communication that passes from Nathan to David. “David’s anger and moral outrage at 
the rich man have been transferred to himself.”175 How exactly does this happen? We 
should be very careful and precise in describing this, for in doing so we are hopefully 
elucidating one of the central powers of parable. Cohen writes,  
“No doubt David ‘is like’ the rich man in the story. But that itself leads to 
nothing. What matters is that some specific feeling attached to David’s sense of 
the rich man is provoked in David’s sense of himself, to which it had not 
previously been attached. This is not achieved simply by drawing David’s 
attention to the fact that he and the rich man share membership in some similarity 
class. Nathan needs the absolute particularity of the rich man. This is what 
arouses David’s feelings. Nathan does not effect the transfer of feelings by saying, 
“You resemble people whom you dislike.” David might accept the proposition 
that he is like these disagreeable people and yet not be moved to anger at himself. 
After all, any group can be judged similar in some respect or other, and the 
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question will remain, why should David identify himself as such a person with 
respect to his feelings? Nathan does not permit this way out. Instead of telling 
David that he resembles people who make him angry, Nathan says, with absolute 
specificity and particularity, that David is the rich man, exactly the man at whom 
he is angry. And David responds at once.”176 
 
It is the particular specificity of the instance that brings about the change in David. As 
was argued, David must have already known that what he had done was wrong. Yet, he 
did not have an emotive response to his moral wrongdoing. Thus, Nathan must do two 
things: he must evoke the emotive response from David, and he must make sure that the 
response is aimed at David himself. Nathan could have tried to do both at once, by telling 
David that he should feel bad for what he’s done. But that leaves David with an escape. 
He can verbally assent to Nathan without making the emotive connection. Nathan takes a 
different route. He evokes the specific emotion that David needs to feel, and then he 
redirects that emotion. By doing this Nathan is able to achieve a sameness of vision with 
David, he is able to critically communicate. He makes David feel what he feels, and then 
he redirects that feeling in an inescapable way. Thus, David feels guilt and anger towards 
himself, and the lesson is complete. 
 This example is demonstrative of the idea that this kind of change is only able to 
take place because of the specificity that the parable possesses. As individuals, we do not 
respond in a significant manner to general stories. Our empathetic response, for instance, 
is closely tied to individual, specific stories and actions. If critical communication is the 
bringing about of a shared vision, then we are referring to some kind of perceptive state 
and not merely a state of knowledge. I am not trying to get you to agree with me, I am 
trying to get you to see what I see. In order to see what I see, you need to adopt the 
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viewing stance that I have. This adoption, or as I referred to it earlier, reorientation, is 
brought about by the specificity that we gain from the parable. If they are viewing the 
situation in the same gestalt view that I am viewing it, their interpretation should be the 
same as mine and thus it will apply to them as it does to me.  
 When Nathan tells the story of the rich man, he is setting up David to see the 
situation in the same way that Nathan sees it. When Nathan tells David that he is the rich 
man, there is no escape. David could deny that he is the rich man, but there will be no 
logical way in which to do so. David can either be completely delusional, or he can 
accept the critical communication that Nathan is giving him. The option of delusion is 
one that is certainly available, but it is hard to take. David first is given the correct 
emotional orientation by the story about the rich man. Given this orientation, he interprets 
the story, and his interpretation reorganizes his view of himself. So, the parable allows 
for critical communication in those steps. First it reorients the reader to the orientation of 
the storyteller.177 By telling such a specific parable, we are able to prompt the reader to 
read the story in a specific way. The reader, having been reoriented, interprets the story. 
This interpretation should bring about a reorganization on the part of the reader, for 
something has been critically communicated to them and thus they are adopting a new 
point of view of themselves or of others. In this way, the parable effects a change in the 
reader, though this change is not merely one of knowledge. The reader has not just been 
taught a moral lesson. Instead, they now see the world in the same way that the author 
does, if the author has been successful in their endeavor.  
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 Kierkegaard himself addresses the parable that Nathan tells David in For Self-
Examination. He writes,  
“But do you not believe that David himself was well aware beforehand how 
abominable it is to have a woman’s husband killed in order to marry her? Do you 
not believe that David, the great poet, could himself easily describe this 
(eloquently, terrifyingly, shockingly)? Then, too, do you not believe that David 
was well aware that he was guilty and what he was guilty of? And yet, yet, yet 
someone from the outside was needed, someone who said to him: You.”178 
 
David was well aware that the law had been broken, and he was not so foolish so as to 
imagine himself as having acted righteously. However, what was missing was his 
personal connection to the truth. What he needed was an outside source that connected 
David’s own person to the truth. What Nathan was able to do was indirectly 
communicate the truth to David such that David appropriated the truth that Nathan 
presented and was able to immediately change. I think it is all too easy to imagine 
Kierkegaard considering himself to be like Nathan, bringing the truth to Denmark, his 
David.179 Kierkegaard is weaving the parable such that his audience becomes as enrapt as 
David was. They are caught up in the story, emotionally connected to it, full of 
inwardness. At that moment, Kierkegaard wants to turn to them and say: “You.”  
 Seeing this connection between parable and indirect communication by 
examining the way in which parable functions leads us towards an examination of 
Kierkegaard’s parables themselves. This chapter sets up the framework required to 
connect parables with Kierkegaard’s goals as an author, specifically that of his religious 
goal and his use of indirect communication. Understanding that parables can persuade, 
instructing the readers about themselves and offering up a sameness of vision with the 
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author, we see how a close look at Kierkegaard’s parables can help us better understand 
his works individually and collectively.  
Conclusion 
 
 
In chapters one and two, I worked to establish the goals that Kierkegaard had for 
his authorship as well as the conceptual tools that he saw necessary to use in order to 
accomplish that goal. Kierkegaard wants to bring us to Christianity, to make us aware of 
the true requirements of Christianity and of how much we lack in respect to them. He 
does this by using indirect communication to present possibilities to us. This chapter 
examined how parables fit into that schema and work towards advancing and fulfilling 
Kierkegaard’s goals. Having now established a Kierkegaardian approach to parables, our 
next task is to turn to some of the parables themselves and examine them in order to give 
demonstrations of how they function both towards his overall goals and towards the goals 
of each individual work. Thus, we will next look at a number of parables taken from 
different times of the authorship and analyze them with the Kierkegaardian approach to 
parables that I’ve just established. Having done that, in chapter four, our last chapter will 
finally put forward the argument that ties all of these pieces together by showing 
precisely how the Kierkegaardian parable functions on the reader. 
  
124 
 
 
Chapter 4: Kierkegaard the Storyteller 
 
 
Quantum theory provides us with a striking illustration of the fact that we 
can fully understand a connection though we can only speak of it in images 
and parables. 
 – Werner Heisenberg 
 
 
 Having examined the parable that Nathan tells David, we are now going to turn to 
a few of Kierkegaard’s own parables. In that spirit, I will begin with one such parable.  
“It is supposed to have happened in England that a man was assaulted on the 
highway by a robber disguised with a large wig. He rushes at the traveler, grabs 
him by the throat, and shouts: Your wallet. He takes the wallet, which he keeps, 
but he throws away the wig. A poor man comes down the same road, finds the 
wig, puts it on, and arrives in the next town, where the traveler has already given 
the alarm. He is recognized, arrested, and identified by the traveler, who swears 
that he is the man. By chance, the robber is present in the courtroom, sees the 
mistake, turns to the judge and says, “It seems to me that the traveler is looking 
more at the wig than at the man” and asks permission to make an experiment. He 
puts on the wig, grabs the traveler by the throat, and says: Your wallet – and the 
traveler recognizes the robber and offers to swear to it – but the trouble is that he 
already has sworn an oath. So it goes with everyone who in one way or another 
has a “what” and pays no attention to “how”; he swears, he takes an oath, he runs 
errands, he risks his life and blood, he is executed – all for the wig.”180 
 
As I have stressed a number of times in this project, we must pay attention to the “how” 
just as much as we pay attention to the “what.” So far I’ve argued that parables are an 
important part of Kierkegaard’s “how” because they have a specific function that lends 
itself towards Kierkegaard’s self-professed goals.181 We’ve examined the ways that 
parables function and thus work towards these goals. This chapter is going to examine a 
number of parables individually and demonstrate the way that each specific parable 
functions both in the work in which it is found, and in the overarching schema that 
Kierkegaard has in mind: bringing people inwards so as to turn them into authentic 
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Christians.  
 In my previous chapters I have outlined why we should pay attention to 
Kierkegaard’s parables. Kierkegaard wants to push individuals towards Christianity and 
given that Christianity has a specific subjective nature, Kierkegaard must employ the 
kind of communication that is tied to subjective truth: indirect communication. Taking 
into account his doctrine of indirect communication and examining his poetic side, we 
have been brought to his parables as the next object of examination. But before we dive 
into Kierkegaard’s specific parables, I want to consider a short defense that one of the 
pseudonyms, Johannes Climacus, gives concerning the use of parables and fairy tales.  
“Suppose there was a king who loved a maiden of lowly station in life – but the 
reader may already have lost patience when he hears that our analogy begins like 
a fairy tale and is not at all systematic. Well, presumably the erudite Polos found 
it boring that Socrates continually talked about food and drink and physicians and 
all such silly things that Polos never talked about. But did not Socrates still have 
one advantage that he himself and everyone else had the prerequisite knowledge 
from childhood on?”182 
 
Climacus here makes reference to the metaphors and parables that Socrates would often 
use. He finds that Socrates benefits from referring to concepts that everyone involved is 
familiar with. Everyone had the same ideas about the foods and drinks and physicians 
that Socrates mentioned. Thus, he is using a shared language of referents and concepts in 
his explanations and questions. The value here is that nothing needs to be introduced. 
Socrates does not have to teach his audience some new concept by referring to abstract 
ideas. Instead, he talks about food and drink metaphorically, and everyone knows the 
things of which he speaks. This is the defense that Climacus gives of his breaking into a 
parable in the middle of his philosophical discourse. Parables present a kind of shared 
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language that all, or at least most, individuals can partake in. I might not understand what 
you mean when you say “objective truth” or “sin” or “faith”, but I do understand a king 
and a maiden. I’ve read many stories about such individuals and I know many maidens 
and am familiar with kings. So while I struggle to even begin to understand your writings 
on sin, I can immediately begin to understand the story of the king and the maiden, for I 
already possess the prerequisite knowledge.  
 This chapter will provide a close reading of a few of Kierkegaard’s parables. 
Given the frequency with which Kierkegaard employs parables, it would be an unruly 
task to try to examine each of them, so instead I’ve selected a small number that I think 
provide good examples of well-crafted parables that serve Kierkegaard’s overarching 
goals. I’ve organized them chronologically so that we can see how they directly relate to 
different stages that Kierkegaard is hoping to usher his readers through. The first of these 
that I will examine is the parable of Agnes and the Merman that is found in Fear and 
Trembling. I’ve chosen this parable for a number of reasons. First of all, it contains the 
very first mention of sin in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works. I find this especially 
valuable for Kierkegaard’s audience consists of people who are sinners. Thus, Agnes and 
the Merman represents the very first communication that directly examines this important 
spiritual side of his audience. Agnes and the Merman also functions in Fear and 
Trembling as a bit of a foil to the Abraham and Isaac narrative, for Abraham is without 
sin in his actions towards Isaac. Therefore, as I will argue, the parable of Agnes and the 
Merman presents to us, the readers, something that the story of Abraham and Isaac 
cannot: a shared language and experience. Given that Kierkegaard’s own defense of the 
use of parables is built on this idea of a shared language, I think it especially valuable to 
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examine the parable that first speaks to sin as a factor in life.  
 The next two parables that I will look at both come from Philosophical 
Fragments. The first is the parable of the King and the Maiden, which begins with the 
excerpt just above. The second is the parable of the Tyrant Historian. I’m choosing two 
parables from Philosophical Fragments because both of these parables serve to illustrate 
some of the central themes in Fragments, as well as function towards Kierkegaard’s 
overarching goals in important ways. Fragments was written after Fear and Trembling 
and serves to continue the shift from the ethical to the religious that began in Fear and 
Trembling. Thus, in Fragments we see a lot of discussion about how we can be religious, 
how we can transition to faith. Fear and Trembling laid out the struggle between the 
ethical and the religious, and in Fragments we get the exploration of some of the basic 
questions that someone might have as they move into faith. Both of the parables that I’ve 
selected from Fragments help to serve this goal. The parable of the King and the Maiden 
addresses how humans can enter into a relationship with God when, due to sin, they 
know that they do not deserve one. Similarly, the parable of the Tyrant Historian 
examines the age-old question about the historicity and rationality of faith. How can I 
believe something written in a book thousands of years ago? Maybe I could believe if I 
had been there, or if I had known the disciples of Christ. The parable of the Tyrant 
Historian addresses this sentiment, trying to convince readers that it wouldn’t have made 
a difference, that the question of faith remains the same if we were best friends with 
Simon Peter or if we are reading about the actions of Simon Peter two thousand years 
later. So where in Fear and Trembling we see the introduction of some religious 
elements, for instance of sin instead of just unethical action, in Fragments we find the 
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transition to the religious.  
 After looking at Fragments, I want to turn to a much later work, For Self-
Examination. This work takes place long after Kierkegaard has hoped to reintroduce 
Christianity to his audience, an action that was initially planned to be completed in the 
Postscript. In For Self-Examination, we instead see a message aimed at those who 
seemingly consider themselves Christian. A lot of For Self-Examination consists of 
lessons and messages to Christians. I will be looking at two different parables from this 
work. The parable of the royal decree and the parable of the Beloved’s Letter appear a 
few pages apart and both address the same problem. Something that we see Kierkegaard 
referring to throughout a number of his works is how the truth of Christianity is 
essentially a subjective truth. It is a truth that should transform and change us. In these 
parables we see Kierkegaard trying to impart this to his audience, again using the shared 
language that parables bring. Both of these parables present situations in which direct 
action instead of careful study is the prescribed approach. Kierkegaard is pushing us to be 
doers of the Word and not merely scholars of the Word. 
 One of the reasons that this chapter is dedicated, almost entirely, to the 
examination of a few parables is that Kierkegaard scholarship generally ignores them. 
With very few exceptions outside of the errant reference here and there, the parables are 
never discussed. As you may note reading through this chapter, some of the 
interpretations that I provide are not complex, while others are. Kierkegaard’s parables 
are not all convoluted. Indeed, some of them are very straightforward. Nonetheless, it is 
worthwhile for us to examine them, for otherwise we neglect and dismiss significant 
portions of Kierkegaard’s work. The parables serve a function both in helping to explain 
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the concepts that Kierkegaard describes in standard philosophical prose, as well as to 
motivate the reader to enact the kind of individual change that Kierkegaard desires. This 
chapter will explain the former of these, primarily focusing on an understanding of what 
the parables are, how they explain ideas, and how they are related to the works in which 
they are present. My next chapter will focus on the latter, presenting an argument for the 
ways in which parables function to motivate us as individuals to change.  
 Overall with these parables I hope to present both a number of examples of how 
parables fit into the schema that I have outlined thus far, as well as to suggest a new way 
to read Kierkegaard. My goal with this chapter will be to demonstrate how we could 
focus on the parables found in Kierkegaard’s works to try to gain an understanding of the 
main concepts at work, and specifically to recognize how they apply to us as individuals 
struggling with our movement through Kierkegaard’s spheres of existence. A suggestion 
that I offer up for consideration: we may be able to construct a roadmap of Kierkegaard’s 
main ideas by putting together a chronological collection of his parables. Such a 
collection would serve the individual searching to subjectively, and not just objectively, 
interact with and appropriate Kierkegaard’s ideas.  
Section 1: Merman. MERMAN! 
 
 
The parable of Agnes and the merman appears in Problema III of Fear and 
Trembling. In this section, Silentio questions whether or not it was ethically defensible 
for Abraham to remain silent, that is, for Abraham to have concealed his intentions from 
Isaac, among others. In delving into this problem, Silentio turns our attention to four 
different stories. The story of Agnes and the merman is the second of these stories, and 
one that most Danes would be familiar with, as it was well known in Danish tradition. In 
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the fairy tale, a merman seduces a woman named Agnes. She desires to go to the bottom 
of the sea, and he takes her there. She has a number of children with the merman and one 
day wishes to return to the surface and go to church. The merman knows that if she 
leaves the sea she will never return, but Agnes does not relent. Eventually she does return 
to the surface and ends up staying there, leaving her children and the merman all alone in 
the ocean. This is the most common version of the story known by the Danes, although 
there are a number of slight variations depending on who is telling it. Hans Christian 
Andersen, for instance, wrote an unsuccessful musical about Agnes and the merman.183 
Kierkegaard, as Silentio, created his own version of Agnes and the merman that broke 
both with the regular tradition of the fairy tale and with Andersen’s retelling of it. The 
version of the story that appears in Fear and Trembling has a number of unique 
characteristics. 
 In Silentio’s version of the story, the merman is unable to take Agnes. He begins 
to seduce her, and she willingly submits herself to him, but just as he is about to whisk 
her away into the sea, she looks at him one last time, “not fearfully, not despairingly, not 
proud of her good luck, not intoxicated with desire, but in absolute faith and in absolute 
humility.”184 With this last look, the merman stops; he cannot continue his seduction. The 
sea is calmed as the wildness within the merman is calmed. Her absolute innocence wins 
the merman over and defeats him. The merman takes Agnes home and tells her that he 
just wanted to show her how beautiful the sea can be when it is calm. Silentio begins with 
this story, and he adds to it to create his particular treatment of repentance and thus of sin, 
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for one can only repent if one has transgressed.185  
When looking at this initial version, we already get a taste of the central 
problem—the clash between the faithful and innocent Agnes versus the unethical 
merman. Agnes’s faith is able to overcome the merman specifically because her faith is 
complete. She looks at the merman in “absolute faith and absolute humility.” Agnes is 
unlike any of the other women that the merman tries to seduce, and in this we recognize 
the merman’s problem. Agnes wants the merman faithfully, but he only wants her as a 
captured prize. Part of a successful seduction, for the merman, is winning a woman over 
despite her reservations. But Agnes has no reservations, and to that extent the merman 
has not seduced her. So Silentio envisions Agnes as being absolutely innocent, and it is 
that innocence that the merman cannot overcome. Indeed, the opposite occurs: Agnes 
overcomes the merman.  
The innocence that Agnes possesses is not a quality or trait that any real human 
being could have, and Silentio himself acknowledges that Agnes is an impossible human 
being. He claims that it would be an “insult” to envision a seduction in which the woman 
is as innocent as he portrays Agnes to be.186 We must keep this in mind as we work 
through the story. Agnes represents an ideal of innocence, faithfulness, and humility. In 
order to overcome the merman’s sin, we need something drastically non-human.  
 Silentio then elaborates on some possible outcomes of the parable. If the merman 
is overcome by Agnes’s innocence, then the merman can do one of two things. His first 
option is that of mere repentance by turning away from his initial plan to seduce Agnes. 
                                                 
185 Additionally, as I have noted multiple times throughout this work, the condition is also required in order 
for us or the Merman to recognize sin. God provides us with the condition, and Agnes provides it to the 
Merman. 
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He recognizes the wrongness of his actions and he experiences the unhappiness that is 
tied to that recognition. If he merely repents he does not communicate to her what his 
true intentions are, nor does he reveal the depths of his depravity. Instead, he lies to her. 
He tells her that he only wanted to show her how beautiful the sea looks when it is calm. 
Given this approach, the merman remains closed, for repentance does not in and of itself 
include disclosure to Agnes. This leaves Agnes upset, for she loved the merman and was 
ready to spend the rest of her life with him. The merman too is unhappy, for he loved 
Agnes but was unable to disclose himself to her and this now carries a new guilt. 
Therefore, repentance alone leaves both of them unhappy, for repentance alone leaves the 
merman without Agnes.  
 The second option that Silentio offers is repentance accompanied by disclosure to 
Agnes. In this scenario, like the first, the merman goes through the motion of repentance. 
However, in this case, he does not remain burdened by this guilt. Instead, he discloses 
himself to Agnes. He tells her of himself, of his treachery, of his indiscretion. But he also 
tells her of his love, and in this he pledges himself to her. He decides to marry her. He 
overcomes his guilt and does more than repent in the sense of merely turning away from 
his initial wrongness; he goes further, takes the step of faith, and gains Agnes. This is the 
expanded story that Silentio gives to us. But, the question remains, why should we 
examine the story of Agnes and the merman? 
 Fear and Trembling is primarily concerned with the account of Abraham’s near 
sacrifice of Isaac and attempts to understand how Abraham could have acted as he did.187 
Abraham is righteous both in the eyes of God and of men. Though Abraham is not 
                                                 
187 Kierkegaard refers to the Biblical story found in Genesis 22:1–19. 
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perfect, he is nonetheless chosen by God. Abraham can choose sinfully, but he is not 
currently possessed by sin.188 With Agnes and the merman, Kierkegaard offers the reader 
a story that bears some resemblance to that of Abraham and Isaac, but one with a number 
of differences, primary among them the presence of actual sin. The merman is a seducer, 
very clearly in sin. He wants to seduce Agnes, take her away to the bottom of the sea, and 
make her his own, but Agnes defeats him through her perfect innocence.  
While there is a sense in which the merman overcomes his own sinful urges, he is 
not the source of this change, Agnes is. Hall claims that it is through the accident of 
Agnes’s virtue that the merman is saved, and not through his own virtue.189 I agree with 
Hall’s assertion, though I want to carve out room for an additional claim. It is not the 
merman’s virtuous self that impedes the seduction, but rather is it Agnes’s. Nevertheless, 
it would be a mistake to think that the merman has no part in his repentance. Agnes’s 
innocence makes the merman aware of his need for repentance, but it cannot make him 
repent. He must make that choice for himself.190,191 Agnes’s innocent nature brings about 
a change in the merman that moves him to choose repentance.192 This is in contrast with 
Abraham’s faith: Abraham is a man who hears the voice of God and acts; Abraham’s 
nature does not change when he responds to God. The merman, on the other hand, 
relinquishes his seductive ways in the face of Agnes’s innocence. He changes himself in 
order to respond to the purity he sees in Agnes.  
 Thus, the merman repents. He is unable to seduce Agnes and this failure causes 
                                                 
188 This is to say that Abraham can choose to disobey God, and in doing so would be sinning, but prior to 
that choice, he is not a sinful individual. He is righteous in the eyes of God and is God’s chosen one. 
189 Hall 53 
190 That is to say that Agnes gives the Merman the condition. 
191 FT 99 
192 In this, the Merman has been transformed. He is no longer a seducer, or a person to whom seduction 
even sounds appealing. It is this new, transformed person that would choose to repent and disclose. 
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him to realize the error of his ways. When the merman recognizes his evil intent and must 
decide whether to disclose that intent to Agnes, the merman seems to hold a position 
similar to that of Abraham: after the real sacrifice was made, Abraham has to come to 
terms with his seemingly evil decision to kill his son and he must decide whether or not 
to disclose this information to Isaac or Sarah. However, the merman and Abraham are not 
identically placed. Abraham was chosen by God for his faith; the merman is not even a 
candidate for faith until after his encounter with Agnes. 
Silentio claims that if the merman decides to remain quiet then he is in the realm 
of the demonic. This category is something that Abraham did not experience, as it relates 
specifically to the fact that the merman is in a sinful state. The merman is in the realm of 
the demonic when he recognizes his sin, but in such a way that he rejects the possibility 
of salvation. The merman, in this scenario, does not accept forgiveness, and he sees this 
refusal as the only clear sign of his virtue: “Now the demonic in repentance probably will 
explain that this is indeed his punishment, and the more it torments him the better.”193 
The demonic individual bears his sin alone, refusing to share it with anyone, refusing to 
burden anyone with it. Bearing it alone isolates him from others and it estranges him 
from himself. Rather than accept the possibility of forgiveness and salvation, the demonic 
turns away from them out of warped respect for his unworthiness of them.194  
Silentio goes on to describe what one who succumbs to the demonic might do in 
this situation. Agnes is sad because she loves the merman and now the merman is leaving 
her. Thus, he will try to save her from her sadness, and will endeavor to remove the love 
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194 This is only a sketch of the state of the demonic. Given the constraints of my topic and the thesis that 
this project aims to argue, a full explanation of the demonic state is outside my parameters. 
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that Agnes feels towards him. He might “belittle her, ridicule her, make her love 
ludicrous, and if possible, arouse her pride.”195 So if the merman remains closed, he 
enters into this demonic state via a kind of self-imposed suffering.  
 In this we find Kierkegaard’s first discussion of both sin and the demonic. 
Interestingly, Silentio sees the demonic as being higher than the ethical. The merman 
must come to terms with the universal and then turn away from it in order to enter into 
the demonic.196 Silentio writes, “With the assistance of the demonic, therefore, the 
merman would be the single individual who as the single individual was higher than the 
universal. The demonic has the same quality as the divine, namely, that the single 
individual is able to enter into an absolute relation to it.”197 Speaking of the merman’s 
demonic approach, Lippitt writes, “Such an orientation does not just fail to express the 
universal, in the manner of shooting at a target and missing. Rather, the merman 
demonstrates a self-absorbed embrace of his (demonic) hiddenness.”198 
While Abraham embraces the divine directive, the merman instead embraces his 
desire to remain closed to Agnes. Thus, the merman must recognize the universal and 
intentionally move beyond it. The merman in the demonic stage recognizes the ethical 
category of existence and purposefully denies it. In this sense he too experiences a 
teleological suspension of the ethical, quite like Abraham. It is in this respect that the 
demonic resembles the divine, but the merman’s teleology is quite different from that of 
Abraham. Abraham’s telos is based on the word of God, whereas the merman’s telos is 
not. However, were we, as readers, not privy to their innermost experiences, these two 
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196 Kierkegaard uses the terms “universal” and “ethical” to refer to the same core concept. 
197 FT 97 
198 Lippitt 122 
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men might seem the same. They both recognize the ethical and purposefully choose to 
move beyond it, for reasons unknown. Only if they disclose themselves can we judge 
them to be demonic or divine.199   
 Having considered the demonic approach in which the merman remains closed to 
Agnes, Silentio turns his attention to the possibility of the merman repenting like before, 
but this time opening himself to Agnes. In such a case, the merman explains that he was 
intending to seduce Agnes, but that her innocence has won him over. Silentio writes that 
in this situation, the merman goes on to marry her. However, this is no simple choice. 
The merman cannot merely decide on a whim that disclosing himself to Agnes is a good 
idea. In order to come to the dialectical apex, the merman must first realize his own sin. 
That is, he must realize that his sin makes him unworthy of Agnes, for she is perfectly 
innocent. Given this realization, what is the merman to do? How can he disclose himself 
and marry Agnes? 
For the merman, repentance is what brings about the possibility of faith. He must 
repent in order to move past his sin. Given his repentance, the merman must then decide 
whether to disclose himself or to remain hidden. If he remains hidden then he enters into 
the demonic, but if he chooses to disclose himself to Agnes then he has the opportunity to 
enter into a relationship with her. As Keeley puts it, “Resignation is the last stage prior to 
faith, and repentance is a first possible sequel to sin.”200 So when we look at the actions 
of the merman, we first see him in sin. After sin, he enters a stage of repentance and that 
                                                 
199 One might think that Abraham and the merman are dissimilar in another way, specifically in that the 
merman can make himself understandable to Agnes while Abraham can make himself understandable to 
no one. I think that this is a poor reading of the parable. If we think of Agnes as God in the parable, then 
of course the merman can make himself understandable to God, just as Abraham can also do. So they 
can both make themselves understandable, it’s just that they can only be understood by God (Agnes). 
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repentance can lead him into faith, but it can also lead him into the demonic if he does 
not disclose himself. 
 Silentio describes this act of disclosure by the merman similarly to the way that he 
describes the movement of faith. Speaking of the merman he writes, “Then he marries 
Agnes. He must, however, take refuge in the paradox. In other words, when the single 
individual by his guilt has come outside the universal, he can return only by virtue of 
having come as the single individual into an absolute relation to the absolute.”201 The 
merman’s sin takes him outside of the ethical, and he chooses either to remain closed to 
Agnes, or to open up to her. The only way that the merman can re-enter into the ethical is 
by overcoming the ethical. Silentio describes this process as “entering into an absolute 
relation to the absolute.”  
This should sound familiar to the descriptions that Silentio gives of the movement 
made by the knight of faith.202,203 Indeed, Silentio even describes it as such when he says, 
“The merman, therefore, cannot belong to Agnes without, after having made the infinite 
movement of repentance, making one movement more: the movement by virtue of the 
absurd.”204 So, the merman becomes the knight of faith when he discloses himself to 
Agnes. Keeley writes, “But when repentance and Agnes both gain possession of his soul, 
the merman expressed the more difficult movement. It is this latter movement that is 
comparable to the movement of faith.”205 He becomes the knight of faith because he has 
no reason to think that disclosure will bring about a positive outcome. Instead, he has 
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“by virtue of the absurd, by virtue of the fact that with God all things are possible.” (FT 46) Abraham is 
a knight of faith because he believes that he will receive Isaac even though Isaac is to be sacrificed. 
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faith by virtue of the absurd. It is certainly beyond the bounds of reason to think that the 
merman would gain the love of Agnes, one who is perfectly innocent, by disclosing to 
her his sinful past and the perverse desire that he had to seduce her. He believes, for 
reasons that surpass the understanding, that by disclosing himself he will gain Agnes, just 
as Abraham believes that he will gain Isaac through obeying God’s order to sacrifice him. 
So the merman is able to make the same movement of faith that we see in Abraham, 
though they both are acting under very different circumstances.  
 Silentio’s descriptions of the merman after he has disclosed himself are strikingly 
similar to those that he gives of the knight of faith. In the act of disclosing himself to 
Agnes, the merman makes the movement of the absurd, which is precisely what Silentio 
targets as being the unique identifier of the knight of faith, for it is what separates the 
knight of faith from the knight of resignation. Describing the merman who discloses 
himself Silentio claims, “then he is the greatest human being I can imagine.” He goes on 
to say, “The merman, therefore, cannot belong to Agnes without, after having made the 
infinite movement of repentance, making one movement more: the movement by virtue 
of the absurd.”206 Silentio describes the knight of faith in much the same way. The knight 
of faith makes the infinite movement and then continues on to make the movement of the 
absurd. 
 The parable of Agnes and the merman presents to the reader an image of the 
knight of faith that is graspable in a way that the story of Abraham is not. Abraham was 
chosen by God and, in the confines of the Binding of Isaac narrative, was blameless.207 
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207 This is not to say that Abraham was supra-human or entirely sin-less, but merely that in the confines of 
the story, he heard the voice of God and acted correctly without hesitation. 
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But I, and I assume all of Kierkegaard’s other readers, am neither of those things. I have 
not heard the voice of God, and I am very much steeped in sin. Thus, if Abraham is the 
only vision of a knight of faith, then such a thing is beyond me. But when we view the 
merman, and see him as a knight of faith, the readership gains back the possibility of the 
knight of faith. I struggle to imagine being called by God to sacrifice my son, but I can 
easily imagine being a sinful person in the face of a pure creature. The parable of Agnes 
and the merman allows the reader to connect to a salvation narrative that we cannot find 
in Abraham. I share the experience of the merman, and thus I can consider his narrative 
from my own perspective, as an insider. I am the merman and I need Agnes. This is the 
critical communication, to return to a concept I explained last chapter, that this parable 
drives towards. Just as David needed to realize that he was the rich man who stole from 
his neighbor, I need to realize that I am the sinner in need of salvation.  
 Having presented a reading of this parable, we might next ask: Why examine 
Agnes and the merman? Fear and Trembling has a number of parables in it, and the 
Agnes parable is itself nestled in a series of four parables late in the book. Yet, the 
parable of Agnes and the merman has something unique in it: the very first mention of 
sin. Prior to this parable, readers of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms have not seen the concept 
of sin anywhere. We do not see sin discussed with relationship to Abraham, for he was 
sinless in his actions towards Isaac. The reader has therefore not yet had any existence 
possibility presented that is part of the reader’s shared experience. As was noted in the 
introduction to this paragraph, parables bring to the table a shared language and 
experience that the audience can understand and connect with. Up until the parable of 
Agnes and the merman, such a shared experience did not exist in Fear and Trembling. 
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Thus this parable holds special significance. For if, as I have contended, parables function 
as a part of Kierkegaard’s plan to bring his readers into authentic Christianity, the parable 
of Agnes and merman is where we must start, in sin and in need of salvation.208 The 
possibility of salvation and of becoming a knight of faith exists for the merman, as long 
as he chooses well. So too does Kierkegaard want us to recognize that we also can choose 
well. We therefore see how this parable, if successful, begins to move Kierkegaard’s 
audience towards faith for it provides a reminder of the initial realization of the need for 
salvation.  
 What I’ve presented here is primarily an understanding of the content of the 
parable. I haven’t yet dug into the form itself. In order for us to examine how the form 
functions, we need to first understand the kinds of content that we find in Kierkegaard’s 
parables and the ways in which they work within their individual texts. In chapter five I 
will be presenting my argument for their specific function, referencing the parables that 
are found here, like that of Agnes and the merman.  
Section 2: A Cinderella Story 
 
 
 The next parable that I will examine comes from the next pseudonymous work 
after Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments. Early on in the work we come 
across the parable of the king and the maiden. Climacus writes that there once lived a 
king who was very powerful and wise. He was well respected and feared by all the other 
nearby kingdoms. And on top of this good fortune, he was also in love. He loved a lowly 
maiden. His heart overflowed with love for her. And yet, as he was full of love, he slowly 
                                                 
208 Again, this is all premised on the possession of the condition, for without the condition, this entire 
discussion is fruitless. 
141 
 
 
began to feel sorrow as he realized something. “Alone he grappled with the sorrow in his 
heart: whether the girl would be made happy by this, whether she would acquire the bold 
confidence never to remember what the kind only wished to forget – that he was the king 
and she had been a lowly maiden.”209 The king realizes that the maiden might recognize 
that she could never repay the king for the love that he’s showing. She could never 
deserve to be so uplifted, for she is only a lowly maiden. So the king hopes that she can 
forget her upbringing and status. Climacus claims that the maiden would be happier to 
live a lowly and obscure life rather than to be uplifted by the King and to realize, every 
minute of every day, that she did nothing to deserve her treatment and that she can never 
repay it.  
 So, what is the king to do? The first option that Climacus presents is for the king 
to leave her where she is, living the life of a lowly maiden. The maiden is pleased by this, 
for she is content with her life before she knows of the king and his love. So inaction on 
the king’s part does not interrupt or damage the maiden’s life at all. From her perspective, 
she does not need to be uplifted, even though she might indeed be happier if her life were 
to be magically improved. Yet, though the maiden would be satisfied with the king’s 
inaction, the king would be left in sorrow. The king deeply loves the maiden and her 
contentedness does not calm his sorrow. The king wants the maiden selfishly and 
erotically, but he also wants to make her happy. Thus the king is saddened because even 
though the maiden is content with her current situation, she is unaware of the possibilities 
that she’s missing out on and the king also fails to have her as an object of love.  
 The next option that Climacus gives the king is the option to uplift the maiden. 
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Climacus writes, “the king could have appeared before the lowly maiden in all his 
splendor, could have let the sun of his glory rise over her hut, shine on the spot where he 
appeared to her, and let her forget herself in adoring admiration.”210 This is able to 
overcome the situation where the maiden recognizes how much she owes to the king for 
the change in her circumstance. By revealing himself in all of his splendor the king is 
overwhelming the maiden such that she forgets her worry. In view of all the king’s 
splendor, her memory of her lowly state disappears. She can think only of the king’s 
glory and his magnificence. Yet, the king is still unhappy for he considers this to be a 
deception. If the maiden only sees the king’s glory and can only think about his glory, 
then she cannot see him for who he truly is and she cannot see his love for what it is. 
“This perhaps would have satisfied the girl, but it could not satisfy the king, for he did 
not want his own glorification but the girl’s, and his sorrow would be very grievous 
because she would not understand him; but for him it would still be more grievous to 
deceive her.”211 By revealing his glory to her he glorified himself and made it so that she 
only saw his glory. Thus the maiden does not understand the king, for she does not know 
why he would uplift her as he did. She does not understand what he feels for her.  
Taking all of this into account, Climacus provides a third option that the king may 
pursue so that he may resolve his situation. Uplifting the maiden will be unsuccessful and 
thus Climacus brings up the possibility of the king’s descending. The king will become 
low, as low as the maiden, so that he can express his love in earnest. However, Climacus 
notes that this descent cannot be one of mere attire. The king cannot dress like a servant 
and hope that his descent is complete. “But this form of a servant is not something put on 
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like the king’s plebian cloak, which just by flapping open would betray the king.”212 The 
king cannot just dress like a peasant, for to only mask one’s clothing will eventually lead 
to the truth of the king’s identity being revealed one way or another. He might 
accidentally order the palace guards around or require niceties foreign to the average 
peasant. At the first sign of trouble he will claim that he is the king and must be treated as 
such. Instead, the king must wholly become a servant. In word, deed, appearance, and 
thought he must be as low as the maiden. Once he has descended, he can love her in truth 
and she can receive his love in truth. For Climacus, this is the only outcome where they 
can both be happy in their love.  
 The analogues to this parable are quite obvious, and Climacus even points them 
out. The king acts as god, the maiden as humanity. Humanity is low and though content 
in ignorance, could be made immensely happier by receiving the god’s love. So how 
must the god love us? As was demonstrated with the king and the maiden the god must 
lower himself. The god must descend into humanity and truly become one of us. The 
obvious metaphor here being a reference to Christ. So, we have a parable that seems to 
have a rather obvious metaphorical meaning, God sending his son Jesus to us as an act of 
love, so that we might be happy. Climacus notes most of this, for he tells the parable and 
then moves back and forth between the narrative and the metaphorical in his analysis. He 
writes about God in one sentence and then the king in the next, switching from maidens 
to humans when he sees fit. So the intended metaphorical meaning is made clear to the 
audience by the author as he analyzes his own parable. This is something that 
Kierkegaard rarely does so completely. Oftentimes he will have a few lines of analysis of 
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his parables, but the analysis is usually quite vague, noting only the general themes that 
the parable has in common with whatever his current subject is. Yet here we have a 
parable that is quite well analyzed by the author and broken down for the audience. Given 
this analysis, what use is there in my inclusion of this parable in this project? 
 When we take into account the goals and structure of Kierkegaard’s works as well 
as the approach to parable that I’ve laid out, I think that the parable of the king and the 
maiden provides us with a good example of how Kierkegaard’s parables are supposed to 
cause personal and individual change in the readers and not merely to impart knowledge 
to them. The parable doesn’t inform us of anything new. Climacus flat out describes why 
the god has to descend and how this relates to the overall problem of the teacher and the 
learner in Fragments. Yet, despite this, we are given the parable of the king and the 
maiden. At the end of the previous chapter I analyzed the story of Nathan and David, 
remarking that Nathan did not communicate any new information to David. David knew 
that he had done something wrong, he just didn’t seem to care very much. What Nathan 
was able to do was to transmute David’s knowledge about his wrongful act into a 
transformative experience for him. When we look at the parable of the king and the 
maiden, I think that we have Climacus attempting to do something similar. In the parable 
of Agnes and the merman, we were introduced to the concept of sin, we identified as 
mermen who needed an Agnes to save them. Moving from Fear and Trembling to 
Philosophical Fragments, we are now dealing with the possibility of salvation; how 
exactly can we be saved? How does Agnes save the merman? How can God save us? 
Well, let’s forget God and sin and all of these difficult concepts, instead let’s think about 
a king and a maiden. What can the king do? He can relinquish everything, leave his old 
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life behind, and become a servant. Only in this action is he able to love the maiden in 
truth and for their love to be happy. The king needs to descend if he wants to express his 
love. As an audience, this connects us to our blind ignorance for we see the same 
ignorance in the maiden. She would have been perfectly happy to remain where she was, 
and she would have been happy if the king uplifted her by a show of glory. But both 
would have left the king in sorrow and would have been deceptions. So, the king must 
become a peasant, a servant. As readers, we realize what the servant does not: how much 
the king is sacrificing and how little the maiden is aware of her situation. All that remains 
is for Nathan to point his finger at us like he did at David and say, “You are that maiden.” 
But David trusted Nathan, they were like brothers. I do not trust Johannes Climacus and 
thus he cannot do as Nathan did. Instead he can only hope that we take the parable to 
heart, recognizing it as a parable, as something additional that was added to the text. By 
investigating and unraveling the oddity of a story tossed into the middle of a serious 
philosophical inquiry, we might come to understand the content of the parable and also to 
realize that we are the maiden just as we came to realize that we were mermen.  
 As we move from the parable of Agnes and the merman to the parable of the king 
and the maiden we also move forward in Kierkegaard’s overall goal for his writing. If he 
is trying to engender inwardness such that authentic Christianity can come forward and 
blossom, both of these parables serve his needs. We have been made aware of our own 
sin, of our lowly state by the merman, and now the king and the maiden helps us 
recognize the vast difference between us and God. What could possibly bridge this 
difference? Only God descending to our level, God becoming human, the Christ. So we 
see these parables functioning not only to teach us these objective truths, but also, and 
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more importantly, to bring about a subjective relationship to these truths such that they 
might change who we are and how we think of ourselves. 
 As we move through Philosophical Fragments we eventually come to another 
parable that I wish to examine, the parable of the tyrant historian. At this point in 
Fragments, Climacus has become concerned with the issue of faith and its relation to the 
historicity of Christ. I might struggle to believe in Christ now, being two thousand years 
separated from him, but maybe I could believe if I had been there, or if I could speak to 
his disciples. It is this problem that the parable is in dialogue with.  
“Suppose there lived in the generation closest to the contemporary generation a 
person who combined a tyrant’s power with a tyrant’s passion, and he had the 
notion of concerning himself with nothing but the establishment of the truth in 
this matter – would he thereby be a follower? Suppose he seized all the 
contemporary witnesses who were still alive and those who were closest to them, 
had them sharply interrogated one by one, had them locked up like those seventy 
translators and starved them in order to force them to speak the truth. Suppose he 
most cunningly contrived to have them confront one another, simply in order to 
use every device to secure for himself a reliable report – would he, with the aid of 
this report, be a follower?”213 
 
Climacus notes that such information would not help the tyrant for he would have 
deceived himself. While he indeed may be able to attain the best possible history of the 
situation, even something that all eye witnesses were to agree on, that would not help him 
believe for faith is not a matter of history. If the parable of the king and the maiden made 
us realize why God descended to our level and became human, then we might next ask 
how we can know, with objective validity, that Christ is that human. The parable of the 
tyrant historian drives us to answer that we can’t, regardless of how strong our historicity 
claims are. The tyrant does not become a follower when he receives the perfect account 
that all agree upon because that account only gives him objective claims about when a 
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certain person went to certain places and said certain things. It gives an account of 
numerous people who all saw this certain person perform miracles. But even this does not 
demonstrate the godhood of a human being. Instead, it merely shows that a large number 
of people all saw what appeared to be a miracle.  
 This helps to demonstrate the difference between the objective approach and faith, 
which Kierkegaard has argued elsewhere to be primarily subjective. The objective gives 
us the facts, in this case the historical facts. But the historical facts do not give us faith. 
Knowing that Jesus was from Nazareth or that many people saw him change water into 
wine does not help me believe that he is God made flesh. Instead this belief is one that I 
have only through faith, through a subjective relationship with it. So, establishing the 
historical situatedness of the story of Jesus might help us as scholars, but it does not help 
us as followers, and for this reason the tyrant is not a follower. Fragments thus has 
advanced from introducing the necessity of Christ to demonstrating what is required in 
order to believe. We shouldn’t try to become scholars; establishing the history will not 
help us believe. We can imagine ourselves as the tyrant historian working to put together 
an exact account of what transpired. We can imagine interviewing each witness, testing 
their testimony against that of other witnesses. We might amass a huge amount of work 
all aimed at helping us paint the perfect picture of who Jesus was, what he was like, and 
exactly what he said and did. And despite all of this, my skepticism might remain. Maybe 
it was a mass delusion. Maybe Jesus was merely a very persuasive sleight of hand 
trickster. Maybe all of these stories are a false memory shared by many people. No 
amount of accounting for the story helps me believe that a god had become human. Thus, 
Climacus not only tells the reader that a history is not enough, he uses the parable of the 
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tyrant historian so that we can realize it for ourselves, as I will argue in chapter five. I 
could become a tyrant historian, but it will do me no good, so instead I must seek to be a 
follower by taking a subjective approach to faith. 
Section 3: I Obey the Letter of the Law, if Not the Spirit 
 
 
 Next, I want turn to a few parables from For Self-Examination, a book published 
much later in Kierkegaard’s career, and one published under his own name. For Self-
Examination has a general assumption that the reader is a Christian and is seeking self-
improvement or that the reader is earnestly seeking to become a Christian, and much of 
the book addresses issues related to becoming a more authentic Christian. Early on in the 
book, we run into two parables only a few pages apart, the parable of the royal decree and 
the parable of the beloved’s letter. They both touch on the same issues, so I’m going to 
describe both of the parables before we examine them more deeply.  
 In the parable of the beloved’s letter, Kierkegaard begins by making quite clear 
what the parable is about. He writes, “Imagine that a lover who has received a letter from 
his beloved – I assume that God’s Word is just as precious to you as this letter is to the 
lover. I assume that you read and think you ought to read God’s Word in the same way as 
the lover reads this letter.”214 So we have a parable about a letter from someone’s beloved 
and this letter signifies, in some sense, the Word of God. We are the lover and God is the 
beloved. Kierkegaard goes on to consider a rebuttal that his audience might make: but the 
Word of God is written in a foreign language, and we must decipher it. Thus Kierkegaard 
adds to his parable the claim that the beloved’s letter is written in a language that the 
lover does not understand. So what is the lover to do? He obviously cannot just read the 
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letter, for he cannot understand the language in which it is written, and so he must instead 
begin to translate it. The lover finds a dictionary so that he might translate the foreign 
tongue into his own and begins the arduous task of translating. Kierkegaard describes 
what might happen were an acquaintance of the lover to enter and take notice of the 
labors of the lover. The acquaintance might say,  
“‘Well, so you are reading a letter from your beloved’- what do you think the 
other will say? He answers, ‘Have you gone mad? Do you think this is reading a 
letter from my beloved! No, my friend, I am sitting here toiling and moiling with 
a dictionary to get it translated. At times I am ready to explode with impatience; 
the blood rushes to my head and I would just as soon hurl the dictionary on the 
floor – and you call that reading – you must be joking!’”215 
 
Kierkegaard goes on after this to note a distinction here between two different forms of 
reading. There is reading to translate and reading to understand. The lover is currently 
focused on the former so that he might eventually be able to accomplish the latter. 
Having finally completed the translation the lover can transition from one kind of reading 
to the other and can finally read the letter from his beloved.  
 After this initial setting, Kierkegaard goes on to offer another stipulation: what if 
the letter not only contained the standard professions of love that we would expect, but 
also expressed a directive aimed at the beloved? This directive would “require very 
much” of the lover, and thus there seems ample reason, Kierkegaard thinks, for anyone to 
pause and give thought to the directive. Yet Kierkegaard imagines that the lover, upon 
reading the directive, immediately jumps to action and runs off to accomplish what was 
asked of him. But what would happen if, when the lover accomplished the task and 
returned to his beloved, she were to tell him that he must have mistranslated her letter or 
misunderstood her, for what he accomplished was not the directive that she gave him? 
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Would she be happy or upset with him? Would he be pleased with himself or full of 
regret? In order to answer this, Kierkegaard takes a quick detour into another short 
parable. He has us think of two students, both instructed to learn their homework lessons 
very well. One student goes home, and in his attempt to learn his lesson well, reads twice 
as far and learns twice as much as he needs to, but he learns it well. The other student, 
curious about what it means to learn a lesson very well, goes around asking his friends 
from school what they are studying or how they were learning. Soon he got sidetracked 
enjoying a discussion with a friend and the night was over before he had learned any of 
the lesson.  
 Kierkegaard uses this second parable to explain part of the problem in the first. 
He claims that the beloved would not be upset with the lover who acted instantaneously, 
wanting to immediately fulfill the directive he’d been given. Similarly, the schoolboy 
who studied twice as much did more than was necessary, but his teacher will not be angry 
with him. However, the boy who spent all of his time trying to figure out exactly how he 
should learn has wasted his time and accomplished nothing. Kierkegaard finds this 
analogous to the lover who spends all his time working on a translation such that if he 
comes across a directive he redoubles his efforts to make sure that he gets the perfect 
translation of the directive so that he can be sure that he will act in the correct way. 
Kierkegaard finishes these parables by returning to the topic at hand, the Word of God. 
He claims that we need to treat the Word of God like the lover who acts on the beloved’s 
directive and like the schoolboy who learns twice as much as is necessary. As fits in with 
many of his claims that we’ve already discussed, Kierkegaard wants to make sure that we 
do not become overly concerned with the scholarly approach to Christianity if doing so 
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impedes our ability to act as God wants us to act. We see this theme quite clearly in the 
parable of beloved’s letter and the short parable of the schoolboy’s homework contained 
within it.  
 A few pages later we find another parable, the parable of the royal decree. 
Kierkegaard writes, 
“Imagine a country. A royal decree is issued to all public officials, subordinates – 
in short, to the whole population. What happens? A remarkable change takes 
place in everyone. Everybody turns into an interpreter, public officials become 
authors, and every blessed day an interpretation is published, one more learned, 
more penetrating, more elegant, more profound, more ingenious, more wonderful, 
more beautiful, more wonderfully beautiful than the other. Criticism, which is 
supposed to maintain an overview, can scarcely maintain an overview of this 
enormous literature; indeed, criticism itself becomes such a prolix literature that it 
is impossible to maintain an overview of the criticism: everything is interpretation 
– but no one read the decree in such a way that he complied with it. And not only 
this, that everything interpretation – no, they also shifted the view of what 
earnestness is and made busyness with interpretations into real earnestness.”216 
 
The contemporary reader will likely immediately recognize how applicable this parable is 
to current academic philosophy. Despite this clear similarity, let us instead think of the 
context in which Kierkegaard was writing this. This parable goes on to lament this type 
of response. As we saw in earlier chapters, Kierkegaard very much saw Christianity as 
something that required action. Here we see the popular response not being action, but 
instead study. Everyone is to become a scholar and a critic. It is this approach that 
Kierkegaard finds so problematic.  
 Both of these parables deal with similar themes. In the parable of the beloved’s 
letter, we have a character who can seemingly choose between making sure he gets the 
exact perfect translation of a call to action or acting on an imperfect translation. In the 
parable of the royal decree, we have an entire country who so strongly desire to 
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understand a royal decree that they all become scholars and critics, though no one follows 
the decree. Prior to these two parables, in between them, and after them in the text, 
Kierkegaard writes about the Word of God and the proper orientation that we should have 
towards it. It seems quite clear that we need to be doers of the Word and not scholars of 
the Word. The Word of God does not ask for us to be scholars, it demands action on our 
part. So again, given that Kierkegaard seems to describe his intended meaning and theme 
with the parables, what use do the actual stories hold? Why tell these two parables instead 
of just instructing us to be doers of the Word? 
 Both of these parables seem poised to instruct the reader to act on the commands 
of God rather than to spend time making sure that one is interpreting them correctly. Yet, 
this is a rather straightforward message and one that Kierkegaard laid out in plain words. 
The form of the parable allows the individual to access that common experience and 
language that they share with Kierkegaard and to activate their ability to imagine 
different possibilities. I do not know what it is like to, with authority, give commands to 
all humans. I have no experience relating to what is expected in such a situation. But I am 
familiar with a couple in love, either through experience or through popular literature and 
storytelling. If I had sent a letter to my beloved that directed her to act in some way, but I 
had done it in a foreign language or had coded it in some other way, what I want most is 
for her to do the thing that I’m asking her to do. If I sent a coded message to my wife 
asking her to pick up some butter on her way home from work and she mistranslated my 
message and instead brought home olive oil, or bread, or coffee, I would likely find the 
whole situation amusing. I’d be glad that she had tried her hardest to do what I had asked 
and I would recognize that coded messages are not easy to understand. If I think of 
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myself being put in the parabolic situation that Kierkegaard describes, I would very much 
want action and not study. If my wife came home empty handed but assuring me that she 
had spent hours poring over my message, working with different cyphers and translators, 
I would be quite annoyed. The purpose of the message wasn’t to obtain a good 
translation, but to cause an action on the part of my beloved.  
 Similarly, when we examine the parable of the royal decree, I’m sure that many of 
us find the situation already frustrating. The royal decree orders us to act in a certain way, 
to follow certain rules. For everyone to become scholars and critics concerning the decree 
is to obviously miss the point of the decree. What makes the situation even worse is that 
the general populace becomes so warped that they begin to think that this critical and 
scholarly attitude toward the decree is true earnestness! Everyone can imagine the 
frustration that the ruler must have at this outcome. Even if you’ve never ruled a country, 
you could think about this in terms of your own children, for instance. If you gave your 
child a command and your child spent all of her time analyzing and studying the 
command instead of completing it, you would rightfully be quite angry with her. The 
parable of the royal command describes a situation where a command is received from a 
place of power and authority, and so every individual only needs to recognize and 
understand those concepts in order to be able to individually connect and personally 
imagine themself in that type of situation. These parables tap into shared individual 
experiences and the emotional responses that those experiences elicit in order to bring 
about the kind of critical communication that Kierkegaard wants to take place.  
 Something interesting that is worth considering is that in both of the parables that 
I just described, that of the beloved’s letter and of the royal decree, I have interpreted 
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them from the standpoint of the God character. In both parables, I have imagined myself 
as the ruler who made the decree or as the letter writer who was amused at the response 
of the lover. If we look at the parable of the beloved’s letter, the lover is the main 
character of the narrative. We see the entire situation through his eyes as he struggles to 
translate the letter and has to decide whether or not to act on it. So naturally, we might try 
to interpret the parable from his point of view. However, we are unable to judge the 
actions of the lover unless we take the beloved’s position. From purely the lover’s 
perspective, studying the letter to get a perfect translation or acting on the first translation 
that is made are both quite sensible actions. In order to judge which action is correct, we 
must ask ourselves what the beloved must have wanted. Why would she include a 
directive in her letter? Thus, we must adopt her perspective, and indeed Kierkegaard 
makes her perspective easy to adopt, for it is only that of a beloved writing a letter to her 
lover. So, we see that we can identify with both characters here. This is a bit different 
from the situation of Agnes and the merman where I cannot imagine what it is like to be 
Agnes, for I have never been pure and innocent. Therefore, when we examine the parable 
of the beloved’s letter, we have to think through the situation from both perspectives in 
order to recognize the proper response and thus in order to recognize how we should act. 
We have a similar situation with the parable of the royal decree. We need to think 
through the situation from the perspective of the public as well as the perspective of the 
ruler in order to make a judgment call about the actions of the public.  
 This does lead to some interesting conclusions when we look at the place of 
parables in Kierkegaard’s works that I want to briefly mention here, though these will be 
heavily expanded upon in chapter five. First, I want to note that I think that Kierkegaard 
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intends for these parables to be interpreted this way. They are written such that we have 
to take the “God” position in the parable in order to glean the intended meaning from it. 
One might contend that I am instead interpreting these parables incorrectly and taking the 
wrong meaning from them, but they are heavily contextualized by the works in which 
they are found and, at least in the case of these two parables, the context leads us to a 
very clear meaning. So Kierkegaard wants us to take the “God” position as we read 
through these parables.217 Recognizing that forces us into another conclusion, namely that 
we cannot always interpret parables from the standpoint of the character that is most like 
us. In the parable of Agnes and the merman, I cannot be Agnes so I must think it through 
from the perspective of the merman. But this is not the case in the parable of the 
beloved’s letter. So it seems unnecessary for the reader to be able to identify as a single 
character and to thus derive their subjective relationship to the parable from that 
character. In the parable of the beloved’s letter, I will think through the situation from the 
standpoint of both characters, even if one of them is an analogical representation of God.  
 When we examine all of these different parables from different works of 
Kierkegaard, we find a few primary things of interest. First, all of these parables try to 
use images, experiences, or stories that the majority of Kierkegaard’s Danish audience 
would be familiar with. The Danes knew the story of Agnes and the merman, so 
Kierkegaard retold it, changing some things to make it fit his purpose. Everyone was 
familiar with the concepts of kings and maidens for such things were, directly or 
indirectly, a part of everyday life. So too can they imagine tyrants and lovers and royal 
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orders. All of these topics and concepts were a part of the shared experience and language 
that Kierkegaard’s audience possessed. Thus, because both of the specificity of these 
stories, as well as with their commonality, readers are able to imaginatively project 
themselves into these stories in order to understand them. I imagine myself as merman, or 
as king or, as a lover, and am able to work through the consequences of the parable from 
those positions. Given the various arguments that I’ve presented up to this point, I think 
we can conclude that Kierkegaard is trying to indirectly communicate to us with these 
parables and bring about a kind of shared vision of ourselves. As I will argue next 
chapter, the parable of the royal decree doesn’t exist so that I can agree with Kierkegaard 
about Christianity requiring us to be doers of the Word and not scholars of the Word. It 
exists so that I become a doer of the Word! 
 Second, many of these parables deal with love as a central concept. I picked the 
parables that I did for this chapter not based on this shared theme, but rather because I 
thought that they were all excellent examples of Kierkegaard’s use of parables, and that 
they all served to seriously prod the reader. However, what I’ve ended up with are a 
bunch of parables about love. The parables of Agnes and the merman, the king and the 
maiden, and the beloved’s letter are all focused around an individual struggling to love 
another or to successfully express their love for the other. The parable of the tyrant 
historian doesn’t deal with love in any obvious way. The parable of the royal decree 
doesn’t appear to deal with love, though one could argue that underneath all of it, we 
have a king’s love for his people and the people’s love for the king. Nonetheless, love 
ends up appearing not only in the parables that I selected, but in a great many of 
Kierkegaard’s. In recognizing this, I want us to remember Kierkegaard’s ultimate goal for 
157 
 
 
his authorship: to bring the religious forward. As I noted in chapter one, Religiousness C, 
as Westphal calls it, carries with it the requirement of agape. We must love others in a 
self-emptying way as we try to imitate Christ, who did the same. If Kierkegaard wants to 
bring the religious forward, the ability to love others in a self-emptying way is a 
necessary part of that. Thus, we can directly connect the concept of love to Kierkegaard’s 
intended goals for his writings. 
 Yet, despite this connection, Religiousness C demands agape of us, and most of 
the parables deal with some variant of romantic love. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard 
separates love into different kinds: neighborly and preferential. Neighborly love is the 
kind of love that Religiousness C demands of us. It is a self-emptying, other-focused type 
of agape love. Neighborly love requires that we love all others as neighbors, and that we 
want what is best for them in a fashion that neglects or denies our own selfish desires. 
Preferential love, on the other hand, would refer to the more common types of love that 
most people experience like romantic love, the love of friends, or familial love. So the 
parables mostly present versions of preferential love even though neighborly love is the 
goal that we need to strive for. The parable of Agnes and the merman has a bit of both, in 
that the merman certainly feels romantic love towards Agnes, but he also seems to 
experience self-emptying love, as evidenced by his refusal to seduce her and his desire to 
disclose himself to her. In order to respond to the prevalence of preferential love in the 
parables, I want to very briefly refer to some of Sharon Krishek’s work. 
 Krishek examines the place that love holds in the writings of Kierkegaard in a few 
of her works. One of her interests is in the parallel structure of Fear and Trembling and 
Works of Love. Referring to this she writes, “In this central text Kierkegaard presents, 
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side by side with stories of romantic love, an account of the double structure of faith, 
which includes two seemingly contradicting movements: the movement of resignation 
and the movement of faith. There is an important connection, I claim, between these two 
movements and a possible understanding, and fulfilment, of love.”218 Krishek argues that 
we must understand preferential and neighborly love like we understand the dual 
movement of faith, for Kierkegaard. Just as faith requires two contradictory motions, 
resignation and groundedness, so too love requires two contradictory motions, self-
emptying (neighborly) and self-fulfulling (preferential) love. Thus, while the parables 
might be focused quite heavily on preferential love, this type of love, on Krishek’s 
account, still very much holds value for us in fulfilling Kierkegaard’s goal of becoming 
Christ-like. The parables are modeling different types of love for us, showing us 
variations of romantic love, familial love, self-emptying love, among others.219  
 Last, these parables, as we might expect, mirror some of the main themes that 
Kierkegaard is working through in the texts in which the parables are found. However, 
the parables sometimes take a different approach to these themes than the rest of the work 
does. If we look at Agnes and the merman, for instance, we find a parable about how 
someone in sin might work towards becoming a knight of faith. The rest of Fear and 
Trembling, though, doesn’t deal with sin at all. Instead it is mostly concerned with 
Abraham. So the parable provides us with an individual connection to the overarching 
concepts and themes that the main work does not. Abraham’s story was not one of sin 
and thus one that we ultimately cannot understand from an insider perspective for none of 
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which we find parables focused on love, but doing so is outside the bounds of this project. For excellent 
discussions of Kierkegaard’s understanding of love see the work of both Hall and Krishek. 
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us are without sin. When we add the parable of Agnes and the merman we are able to 
examine a narrative about becoming a knight of faith that we can make sense of, for we 
who are in sin must deal with sin and repentance in ways that Abraham didn’t. We can 
thus see this parable, and others, as walking us through, on an individual level aimed at 
our inwardness and appropriation. His works also function to lay out a kind of road map 
on becoming a Christian. We start in the aesthetic stage, move to the ethical, and finally 
to the religious. Once we have become authentic Christians the writings then turn towards 
our steady improvement as Christians. So while we might view Kierkegaard’s sections 
that are closer to standard philosophical prose as sections that explain important concepts 
to us in this path towards Christianity, I will argue in chapter five that we see his parables 
as actually doing the work of prompting the individual to move closer to Christianity. 
Conclusion 
 
 
 The examination of these parables sets us up for the argument that I’m going to 
put forward in the next, and final chapter, which is that Kierkegaard’s parables function 
as a mirror for us. Once we recognize that these parables guide us through the stages 
towards the religious by critically communicating to us through this common experience 
and language of kings and lovers and maidens, we can begin to see how in order for the 
parable to truly succeed, I must see the possibilities that it is offering as real possibilities 
for myself. Since Kierkegaard never points out, as Nathan does with David, that “You are 
that man,” we must be able to recognize this for ourselves within the parables themselves. 
Otherwise we are only left angry when we consider the parable of the royal decree, much 
as David was angry when he heard of the rich man who stole his neighbor’s lamb. We 
must be able to transform that anger into action by recognizing the truth that the parable 
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reveals is a truth about us, regardless of if we come to that conclusion by taking the 
stance of the God character or the stance of the human character. 
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Chapter 5: Kierkegaard the Metaphorical Mirror 
 
 
You use a glass mirror to see your face; you use works of art to see your soul. 
- George Bernard Shaw 
 
 
 In my heart of hearts, I wish that chapter four was the final chapter of this work. 
I’d like to end things with a few parables, and I still might, instead of with a lengthy 
philosophical discussion. Some of the power of the parable is lost when we demystify it, 
it seems to me. Nonetheless, a demystifying is now in order and this chapter will seek to 
provide an argument for the overall value that we find in Kierkegaard’s parables. In order 
to properly frame this argument, I’d like to briefly sketch out a number of the concepts 
and conclusions that have been covered in the previous chapters.  
 As has been noted constantly throughout this work, Kierkegaard’s goal for his 
writings seems to be to turn his countrymen and women towards an authentic version of 
Christianity.220 A number of times in his later works he claims this as his purpose. 
Though it may merely be a tired writer in hindsight making sense of what he’s done, I 
think that the structure of his works backs up this claim. Kierkegaard finds that many in 
his society claim to be Christian, but they lack what he thinks is of central importance to 
what is truly Christian, and that is a passionate subjective relationship to the truth. Thus, 
his goal seems to be to bring this about. Yet, at the same time, he claims that he cannot 
make people Christian, for that is something that only God can do. Early on in 
Fragments, Climacus considers the learner’s paradox as it relates to Christianity. How 
can someone come to know that they are in sin? It cannot be taught to them, for being in 
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sin, in untruth, specifically implies an ignorance of your own untruth. So Kierkegaard 
cannot speak to those in untruth; doing so would be, to quote Epictetus, “fighting against 
a God, opposing Zeus.”221 Making the individual aware of their untruth is something only 
God can do, and it occurs via a transformation of the individual. Kierkegaard, being 
unable to effect this transformation, seemingly cannot bring the individual to Christianity. 
Instead, what he can do is remind them of a truth that has already been revealed to them. 
An individual, having been transformed by God such that they can now see the truth, can 
go on to ignore or forget what they’ve seen. It is this individual whom Kierkegaard is 
targeting with many of his pseudonymous works. He cannot make us become Christians, 
for he cannot reveal to us our untruth; instead he can speak to those that have what he 
calls the “condition.” The condition is the ability to recognize your own untruth, and the 
condition can only be granted by God. Once someone has the condition, Kierkegaard can 
then speak to them and remind them of the truth, remind them of their sin. This is what 
we see occurring throughout his works. Kierkegaard is trying to remind us of something 
that has already been revealed to us, yet something that we have consciously or 
unconsciously forgotten. The argument that this chapter will present very specifically 
works within this framework, trying to show how the parables help to bring about this 
goal. Kierkegaard is not speaking to heathens who have never heard the Gospel, but 
rather to individuals who already consider themselves Christians but who seem to have 
forgotten what that means. They are thus in need of a reminder, and I will demonstrate 
that Kierkegaard’s parables do an exceptional job at offering this. 
 In order to remind us, Kierkegaard writes that his goal is to turn us inward. He 
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notes inwardness and appropriation as being central to his project and as being central to 
Christianity in Fragments, Postscript, For Self-Examination, and Point of View. If we 
have the condition, and thus Kierkegaard wants to remind us of what we’ve forgotten 
(our own untruth), he doesn’t need to present any new information to us. Rather, he needs 
to reorient us towards information that we already possess. If asked, I would admit that 
I’m a sinner in need of salvation. Yet Kierkegaard imagines that when faced with this 
question, I would likely follow it up with some claim about how I attend church, tithe, 
and properly believe the correct doctrines, and thus am on my way to salvation. He thinks 
that I have forgotten that Christianity requires something very specific of me. It is not 
enough to believe the correct things; instead I must have a certain type of relationship 
with the things that I believe. This relationship is what Kierkegaard is working to 
engender. He wants to turn us inward, to see the things that we already know, but to see 
them in new ways that changes how they affect us and the kinds of people that we are. 
 Part of the reason that Kierkegaard wants to turn us inward is because he claims 
that Christianity is essentially subjectivity. That is to say, true Christianity is not a set of 
beliefs, but a special orientation towards those beliefs. In Postscript he imagines two 
different individuals. The first individual prays to the correct God, but does so in untruth. 
The second prays to an idol, but does so with the “passion of infinity.” Climacus then 
asks, which of the two is truly worshipping God? His answer is that the second individual 
is, despite praying to an idol, specifically because he is correctly oriented towards the 
divine, even if it is an idol.222 He is full of passionate subjectivity and so though he might 
have the wrong name for God, and though he is looking at an idol, his subjectivity is 
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what matters. Thus, Kierkegaard is trying to bring about a certain kind of subjectivity 
when he turns us inwards. He’s not merely trying to communicate a set of correct 
doctrines, though he does seem to do this as well. Instead, his primary goal is to cause his 
readers to subjectively relate to the truth that has already been revealed to them by God.  
 In order to do this, he must examine his style of communication. Kierkegaard 
considers two different forms of communication, direct and indirect. Direct 
communication is the communication of facts. Direct communication relates to objective 
knowledge and thus is concerned with things that can be demonstrated. The vast majority 
of formal education is direct communication. When you take a physics class, you are 
trying to learn about the rules that govern the natural world and how they interact. 
Similarly, when you take a religious studies class, you are likely to learn about the belief 
systems that a number of different religions have and how they have changed over time. 
Both of these would be the direct communication of objective knowledge. But 
Christianity is not as concerned with the objective as it is with the subjective. Thus, 
Kierkegaard cannot employ direct communication to bring about his desired end. If he 
did so, we would end up with something that would likely give us a list of rules to follow 
and doctrines to believe, with rational defenses for each rule and doctrine. But this is not 
Kierkegaard’s goal. Instead, since Christianity is essentially subjectivity, Kierkegaard 
employs indirect communication. Indirect communication works not to inform me of 
certain bits of information, but to bring about inwardness, appropriation, and subjectivity.  
 Using indirect communication, Kierkegaard specifically wants to communicate 
existence-possibilities.223 To communicate an existence-possibility is to communicate an 
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section two. 
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entire life possibility that one can inhabit. The communicator is trying to give to the 
receiver a view of a possible life that could be theirs. This is precisely the type of thing 
that cannot be directly communicated, for if I were to hand you a list of what your life 
would be like if you were a true Christian, there would be something missing from that 
list. No list could properly communicate what it is like to be a Christian, to exist in a 
certain way. So Kierkegaard has to use indirect communication to bring us existence-
possibilities. As has been noted, Kierkegaard is trying to change us in a specific way, so 
you might ask, “Why use an existence possibility instead of an existence actuality? 
Would it not be more effective to actually demonstrate these things instead of offering up 
possibilities?” Climacus responds, 
But existence-actuality cannot be communicated, and the subjective thinker has 
his own actuality in his own ethical existence. If actuality is to be understood by a 
third party, it must be understood as possibility, and a communicator who is 
conscious of this will therefore see to it, precisely in order to be oriented to 
existence, that his existence-communication is in the form of possibility. A 
production in the form of possibility places existing in it as close to the recipient 
as it is possible between one human being and another. Let me elucidate this once 
again. One would think that, by telling a reader that this person and that person 
actually have done this and that (something great and remarkable), one would 
place the reader closer then by merely presenting it as possible. Apart from what 
was pointed out in its proper place, that the reader can understand the 
communication only by dissolving the esse of actuality into posse, since otherwise 
he only imagines that he understands, apart from this, the fact that this person and 
that person actually have done this and that can just as well have a delaying as a 
motivating effect. The reader merely transforms the person who is being 
discussed (aided by his being an actual person) into the rare exception; he 
admires him and says: But I am too insignificant to do anything like that.”224 
 
Climacus’ reasoning for using existence-possibilities stems from a fear, shall we say, that 
the reader, upon hearing that our moral exemplar is an actual person who has done such 
and such, will think of the communicated existence as something impossible for themself. 
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When the communication is of an actuality it is all too easy to compare oneself to that 
actuality. When I am told that a friend of mine spends all her free time volunteering, I can 
find a number of ways to dismiss her actions and describe why those would be 
impossible for me. Her job is less demanding, or she’s not married and thus doesn’t have 
duties at home, or any other reason. The actuality of the existence allows me to compare 
it to my own in concrete terms and come up with concrete reasons as to how I cannot 
inhabit that existence. But possibility does not run into this problem. If something is 
presented as a possibility to me, then I am comparing myself not to a concrete individual, 
but to an imagined fictional character. The existence-possibility is presented as an option 
to the reader in a way that ends up being different than the presentation of an existence-
actuality. I compare myself to the concrete person in order to determine if the actuality is 
something that I can fulfill. However, with the possibility I don’t compare myself to the 
fictional character, for I recognize their fictional nature. Instead, the comparison becomes 
one of self-examination. I compare myself to another possible myself. I imagine me as 
moral exemplar versus me as I currently am and wonder if I can bridge the divide 
between the two, actualizing what has been presented to me as a possibility.  
 Engaging in this action requires an imaginative effort on my part. I have to 
imagine myself as the possibility being presented. Stokes examines this issue of moral 
imagination and existence-possibilities, eventually noting an issue that we have to 
contend with. Stokes, referring to a section from Sickness Unto Death, writes, “Here 
Anti-Climacus makes it clear that any actualization of the self is dependent upon the 
subject’s ability to posit another, ideal self which it is to become.”225 Stokes goes on to 
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claim, “What is posited in imagination has the specific quality of becoming possibility, 
and this already adds something to the content of imaginative thought. What we imagine 
is not simply an inert piece of representational imagery or conceptual construct, but 
instead something that bears a distinct modal relationship to the world and the imagining 
subject.”226 Stokes looks at this question of possibilities and sees that imagination plays a 
significant role. In order for the existence-possibility to become a real possibility for me, 
I must imagine it. As Stokes notes, this imagination is not merely a considering of the 
thing in some abstract manner, the way that one might imagine a triangle when doing 
geometry. Instead, this imaginative process has a close relationship to the imagining 
subject. Thus, as I imagine the existence-possibility, I imagine it as a possibility for 
myself. There is no absolute reason why I connect it to myself, I could instead imagine it 
as a possibility for someone else. Yet, I know myself more intimately than I know anyone 
else, and I can much more easily imagine myself in various scenarios than I can imagine 
others. My default, my instinct, is to imagine myself in the existence-possibility that’s 
been presented to me.  
 Stokes examines this process of imagination and, noting that other scholars have a 
similar approach such as Ferreira and Gouwens, proposes imagination occurring in a kind 
of two-step process. Our first step is to imagine the possibilities that are being presented 
to us. Yet Kierkegaard’s goal here is not merely for imagination to occur. Instead, he 
wants us to somehow relate this imagination back to our concrete selves.227 So, we need 
to transcend imagination and actualize the possibilities that are being presented to us. 
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even our body. 
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This is the second step. We might think of this in a very simple way. You are going to 
meet someone for the first time so you imagine a few different ways that you might do 
so. You imagine yourself shaking their hand or waving and introducing yourself, or 
waiting for someone else to introduce you, etc. There are a number of possibilities that 
you imagine. When you meet the person, you select one of the possibilities that you 
imagined, and you actualize it. So, we have a two-step process of, first, imagination, and 
second, action.  
 Stokes, however, claims that while this two-step process is sensible folk-
psychology, it runs aground of some of Anti-Climacus’ claims about how imagination 
works. Stokes writes, 
“[Anti-Climacus] takes it that feeling, willing, and knowing are all, at base, 
dependent upon imagination. Imagination pervades all psychic activity; and if this 
is so, we cannot say that imagination comes first. Fidelity to Anti-Climacus’ 
insistence that imagination is inseparable from reflection and active at the same 
moment as resolution, will compel us to avoid a picture of the reflective self 
which first imagines possibility and then chooses deliberately from the options it 
has imagined.228 
 
Stokes thinks that in order to remain true to Anti-Climacus we cannot think of 
imagination as occurring first and acting as second, as the folk-psychology approach 
would claim. Thus, when we examine the question of existence-possibilities, the idea 
would be that these possibilities are not presented to us and considered at one point in 
time, and then a change occurs within us and we choose one at a different time when we 
are no longer imagining them. Rather, imagination is constant. We are imagining the 
possibility as we actualize it. It both remains possibility and becomes actuality 
simultaneously, somehow. Yet, Stokes’ claim here only ends up being problematic for us 
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if we think of imagination as an action of pure thought. As I’ve argued, when we are 
asked to imagine an existence-possibility, we are not merely thinking of a possible thing 
for an unknown person. We are imagining it for ourselves. I am, for instance, imagining 
myself as a merman. To that end, I am already mixing my concrete existence with an 
imaginary possibility, and thus am doing more than just involving the faculty of thought 
or imagination, I am also employing my will. Bringing my concrete existence to bear on 
an existence-possibility requires me to will, for I am not an abstract creature. I struggle to 
imagine myself as an abstract thing in an abstract situation. I already bring my 
concreteness to my imagination of the existence-possibility. I am willing myself to 
consider the possibility that I could be other than as I am, or as I think I am. So we can 
grant to Stokes that we don’t imagine first and act without imagination second. The 
possibility is always a live possibility in our minds. Even the initial act of imagining 
requires an act of will, such that we are always engaging in willing and imagining to the 
extent that we are bringing our concrete selves to bear on the imagination.  
 Thus, Kierkegaard is looking to turn us inwards by offering us existence-
possibilities that he hopes we will actualize. These existence-possibilities come to us 
through indirect communication and they work to activate our imagination so that we will 
be prompted to remember, and therefore, choose to see, the truth about ourselves that has 
already been revealed to us by God. These possibilities do not always present the truly 
Christian. However, taken as an entirety, they demonstrate the movement into the truly 
Christian. Keeping these concepts in mind, let us now turn to the topic at hand: parables 
and the ways in which they act as a mirror for us so that we might see our true selves. 
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Section 1: Nobody Expects the Merman Parable! 
 
 
 As has been argued, Kierkegaard is hoping that his readers appropriate what he is 
writing, ideally bringing forth inwardness. But there is an open question here as to what 
the reader is appropriating. Appropriation is a bit challenging because seemingly the 
reader can appropriate Kierkegaard’s works however he or she wants and end up acting 
or changing in a way that Kierkegaard doesn’t want. I can read the fairy tale about the 
Tortoise and the Hare in Aesop’s fables and learn that I must never give up. I appropriate 
the story, examining the situations in my life in which I lack perseverance and I work to 
overcome that lack. I become a new person, someone who perseveres regardless of the 
challenge ahead of me. But maybe Aesop wanted me to take from the story that over-
confidence is a dangerous fault. Maybe instead of becoming more perseverant in the face 
of extreme difficulty, I should lessen my pride and humble myself. In one retelling of the 
story the forest animals elect the Tortoise to be their messenger as he must be the fastest 
since he won the race. A forest fire soon threatens their habitat and so they send the 
Tortoise to warn everyone, resulting in the deaths of most of the forest creatures. So 
maybe what I need to change about myself is my reliance on specific outcomes as the 
source of my everyday judgments. Maybe the best student isn’t the one who gets the best 
grades. Maybe my wife should not be angry when I don’t do the dishes. The problem 
with appropriation is that it is at the whim of interpretation. So if Kierkegaard is trying to 
bring about inwardness and appropriation, we need some way to overcome this issue. 
 Lorentzen examines the preface to Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions and 
notes that Kierkegaard seems to have a specific kind of appropriation in mind, at least 
with that text. Referring to the book, Kierkegaard writes,  
171 
 
 
“[this book] quietly waits for that right reader to come like a bridegroom and to 
bring the occasions [for learning] along with him. Let each do a share – the reader 
therefore more. The meaning lies in the appropriation. Hence the book’s joyous 
giving of itself. Here there are no worldly “mine” or “thine” that separate and 
prohibit appropriating what is the neighbor’s… The appropriation is the reader’s 
even greater, is his triumphant giving of himself.”229 
 
The book is giving itself to the reader, but Kierkegaard claims that the reader should do 
more than receive the book. The reader must also give himself. But to whom? The book 
is being given to the reader so that the reader can appropriate it. The reader can collapse 
the distinction between “yours” and “mine” such that the book is both Kierkegaard’s and 
the reader’s. So when it comes to the book giving itself, we have some kind of clarity of 
what is happening. But when we think of the reader giving himself, things are much more 
difficult. What is the reader giving and to whom is he giving it? The first question here 
isn’t too challenging. When we talk of the book giving itself, we mean that it is giving its 
content, its identity, its ownership to someone or something else. So to with the reader. 
The reader is giving his person, his identity, everything that makes him, him. But to 
whom is he giving it? I contend that the clearest answer to this question, both in the 
context of this quote and in the larger context of Kierkegaard, is that the reader is giving 
to himself. The reader is being appropriated by himself. Lorentzen remarks something 
similar when he writes, “The ethical-religious poet’s indirect communication essentially 
allows a reader to map out his own actions personally through the appropriation of 
parables (or any metaphorical speech) onto the reader’s thoughts, thereby prompting 
meaning into the reader’s deeds.”230 Lorentzen claims that our interactions with parables 
and metaphors provide us with situations where we examine our own thoughts and 
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actions. Let’s imagine that the three interpretations of the Tortoise and the Hare that I 
outlined are the only possible interpretations. Lorentzen is arguing that I will end up 
supplying the interpretation that most evenly matches onto myself and my own struggles, 
thoughts, and desires. With that interpretation in hand, I will then appropriate what 
appears to me to be the parable. Though, what I’m really appropriating is what I’ve 
already supplied, my own concern that I am too prideful or that I lack perseverance, or 
that I’m too quick to judgment. If that’s the case then really my appropriation is of 
myself, for what I am gaining from the parable and thus changing about myself is 
something that I’ve put into the parable. I think it’s somewhat telling that Kierkegaard, 
especially in the Postscript, often lists appropriation and inwardness together as being 
what make up subjectivity. On the surface, these seem like different things. Inwardness is 
an examination of the self, but appropriation is taking something external and making it 
part of yourself. Yet, if we think of appropriation here as taking part of yourself, maybe a 
part that you’ve ignored or forgotten, then inwardness and appropriation seem quite 
similar.231  
 In For Self-Examination, Kierkegaard claims that the Word of God acts like a 
mirror for us, so that what we are really seeing and learning about is ourselves. “If you 
are to read God’s Word in order to see yourself in the mirror, then during the reading you 
must incessantly say to yourself: It is I to whom it is speaking, it is I about whom it is 
speaking.”232 Kierkegaard goes on to describe the experience of reading the parable of the 
good Samaritan. A man is robbed and left injured and half naked on the side of the road. 
The first person to pass him is a priest. When we read about the priest passing him by, 
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Kierkegaard thinks that we should think of ourselves as the priest. We are to think to 
ourselves, “Alas, to think that I could be so callous, I who call myself a Christian.”233 He 
claims that we shouldn’t avoid this thought by noting that we are not actually priests. We 
should identify as the villain of the story, for in that we can see our faults and become 
better. Here again, what we are appropriating is something about ourselves. As much as I 
like to ignore it, I am sometimes very callous and unloving or uncaring towards others. 
The parable of the good Samaritan should remind me of that fact. Thus the real subject of 
the parable isn’t Samaritans or priests, the subject is me. It is a parable about me, and I 
am to learn about myself from it.  
When we ask about appropriation, and how we can be sure that the reader is 
appropriating the right thing, to some extent we still can’t. We can’t be sure that the 
reader identifies as the priest and not the Samaritan or the man who was beaten and 
robbed. Nonetheless, if appropriation is of self, then at least we have narrowed the 
possible ways in which someone could interpret and appropriate. The parable will appeal 
to me in certain ways and I will fill it with my thoughts, fears, and desires. It will then 
turn these around and show them to me, allowing me to appropriate parts of myself that I 
had neglected or forgotten. And given that part of Kierkegaard’s goal here is to remind us 
of the truth that God has already revealed to us, this seems to be an especially relevant 
consideration.234  
If what I am appropriating is myself, as I have argued, why not just 
straightforwardly tell me the faults that I have? Why should we use the song and dance of 
parables just to tell me that I’m sometimes callous like the priest? Part of the reason 
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comes down to the issue of offense. If you were to outright tell me that I’m a callous 
person, I will likely be somewhat offended, and that offense will strengthen my rejection 
of your claim. You’ve upset me, so you must be wrong. Yet, if God does this we are not 
offended.235 Seemingly the experience of recognizing your own sin does not cause 
offense when this experience is caused by divine revelation, for the divine speaks with 
authority. On the other hand, when a human attempts to inform me about my sin, I 
become angry and upset. Because of this, Kierkegaard needs to devise a way to remind us 
of our sin and of our untruth without tripping those psychological alarms that go off when 
we are confronted by another human. Climacus writes, “but there is inwardness when 
what is said belongs to the recipient as if it were his own – and now it is indeed his own. 
To communicate in that way is the most beautiful triumph of resigned inwardness.”236 
For Climacus, the goal of indirect communication is for the recipient to experience the 
communication as if it were his own. To refer to the popular film, Kierkegaard wants to 
practice inception. The ideal scenario occurs when I read something that Kierkegaard has 
written, and as I think about it, interpret, and consider the ideas, I come to realize 
something for myself. This realization has some relation to the text, but it is not what is 
found in the text, and thus it appears to me to be an idea that originated with me. Since 
the idea is mine, I am not offended and no psychological defense systems are tripped. 
Thus, Kierkegaard needs to write and communicate such that the communication belongs 
to the receiver so as to avoid the possibility of offense.  
                                                 
235 I am using the term “offense” here in the way it is normally used in English, and not in the way that 
Kierkegaard uses it. Where Kierkegaard describes our offense to God, he is generally referring to the 
faculty of reason rebelling against something that extends beyond reason. I am not describing this kind 
of offense to reason, but instead I am merely describing the experience of becoming antagonistic 
towards an individual who said something that upset us.  
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Stokes examines this approach in the context of the David and Nathan parable 
that was first discussed in chapter three. David has sinned though he refuses to admit it, 
so Nathan tells him a story which is a metaphorical version of David’s own actions. 
David is enraged at one of the characters in the story and Nathan then informs him that he 
is that man. Thinking about this, Stokes writes, “Once again, the meaning conferred by 
the image is nowhere to be found in its direct content, but in the viewer’s engagement 
therewith. That is not, however, to say that David simply imports a meaning into the story 
that properly does not belong there; rather, he uncovers a meaning that is only accessible 
if he engages with the story in an immediately self-referential attitude.”237 Nathan can’t 
just tell David that David has done wrong. David either already knows this but is refusing 
to acknowledge it or he is unaware entirely, though the latter seems unlikely. If he’s 
already actively refusing to acknowledge his wrongdoing, pointing it out to him will be 
fruitless. So instead Nathan tells David a story and David recognizes the wrongness of 
the actions of the man in the story. Though he requires Nathan’s help to do so, David is 
appropriating himself. He’s not putting meaning on the story that doesn’t belong there, 
though he is putting meaning on the story. His interaction with the story is what provides 
the meaning that is then appropriated by him, with Nathan’s help. Since Nathan’s help 
was required, David does have the opportunity to reject Nathan’s assertion that he is that 
man. He is a king, not a shepherd (anymore). He did not take an animal from his neighbor 
to slaughter. He matches none of the literal analogues of the story. Yet, he does match 
them metaphorically. Part of Nathan’s success stems from his ability to rouse David’s 
anger. Being that he is somewhat in a fit of rage upon hearing the story, David is not in 
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full possession of his rational faculties, and thus is not quite in the proper state of mind to 
separate the literal from the metaphorical and argue that since he doesn’t fit the literal 
that the story cannot be about him. Instead, when Nathan informs him that he is that man, 
his heightened emotional state collapses the literal and metaphorical into one, and he 
recognizes himself in the story.  
It’s worth noting that Kierkegaard doesn’t think that scripture has need of a 
Nathan who will tell us that we are that man. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes, “The 
interpretation is that you, you who read the words of the gospel, you are the tree. What 
the prophet Nathan added to the parable, “You are the man,” the gospel needs not add, 
since it is already contained in the form of the statement and in its being a word of the 
gospel.”238 The Word of God does not need a Nathan character, for it already speaks with 
authority. Thus, one could dismiss Kierkegaard telling us that we are sinners, for who is 
Kierkegaard? What does he know? But we cannot do so with the Bible, for it is the Word 
of God. We can therefore see why the Bible does not need a Nathan character. The 
assumed interpretation is that we are the sinners that the Bible is speaking of, for we have 
all fallen short of the glory of God. No one needs to say, “you are that man,” as that is 
already built into the fabric of the Word. Kierkegaard himself is another issue though. He 
never says that we are that man. He never directly claims to be writing about his 
audience, at least, unless you do the sort of thing that I am doing now and connect a 
bunch of errant pieces of his works to put that together. He doesn’t tell the parable of 
Agnes and the merman and right afterwards say, “Oh by the way, you’re all mermen.” 
Nathan was able to make that transference by way of David’s anger, but Kierkegaard 
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doesn’t often provoke that kind of intense emotional reaction in his readers, I assume. 
Thus the task for Kierkegaard seems to be greater than that of Nathan. Nathan had to 
merely tell the story and then point out that it was really about David. Kierkegaard has to 
tell the story, but he needs to tell it so well and structure it so perfectly that the audience 
realizes for themselves that it is about them. That is quite a difficult task, and I will argue 
that Kierkegaard attempts to accomplish it by using his parables as mirrors for his 
readers. 
Section 2: The Man in the Mirror 
 
 
 In order to answer the question of how Kierkegaard attempts to get his audience 
to realize that he is talking about them, and not some pagan, un-Christian, “other,” let us 
turn to Anti-Climacus. 
“And only the sign of contradiction can do this: it draws attention to itself and 
then it presents a contradiction. There is a something that makes it impossible not 
to look – and look, as one is looking one sees as in a mirror, one comes to see 
oneself, or he who is the sign of contradiction looks straight into the 
contradiction. A contradiction placed squarely in front of a person – if one can get 
him to look at it – is a mirror; as he is forming a judgment, what dwells within 
him must be disclosed. It is a riddle, but as he is guessing the riddle, what dwells 
within him is disclosed by the way he guesses. The contradiction confronts him 
with a choice, and as he is choosing, together with what he chooses, he himself is 
disclosed.”239 
 
There seem to be at least two distinct things going on here. First, we have a discussion of 
the divine. Kierkegaard’s use of the term “contradiction” is, at least in part, referring to 
the God-man, to Christ. Christ is a contradiction because he both God and man, he is God 
in time and in flesh. So, on first pass, we have a selection that describes human’s 
interaction with the divine. When the divine reveals itself to us, we must choose to 
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believe or not and to follow or not, and in choosing we disclose ourselves. But I think 
that there is also a second thing going on here. This passage is bookended with 
discussions about direct communication and its efficacy, or lack thereof, to communicate 
the truth of Christianity. Given that context, I think that it’s also important for us to read 
this passage as Anti-Climacus offering us some considerations about Kierkegaard’s 
overall method as a writer. As we have seen multiple times, Kierkegaard wants to bring 
about inwardness and appropriation, for he cannot do much more in bringing true 
Christianity to his audience.240 We have here a discussion about how a concept, a 
contradiction, can cause a reader to disclose themself, even unintentionally. This 
disclosure acts as a kind of self-revelation. The individual, in choosing and in their 
choice, makes visible something about themself that was previously invisible. This 
person becomes disclosed like the merman was, and his disclosure was his first step to 
salvation.  
 Let us consider how this works with reference to parables. There seem to be a few 
key ingredients to the situation that Kierkegaard is describing. First, we need a 
contradiction. As I mentioned, Christ acts as his own contradiction, but Kierkegaard does 
not have this luxury. So instead Kierkegaard must provide one. As was argued in chapter 
three, Kierkegaard’s parables are implemented so that they present a contradiction to the 
reader and force the reader to choose for themself. Metaphors and parables carry with 
them a tension in that they present the reader with a dialectical knot that the reader must 
untie. In untying the knot, the reader has to choose and thus disclose themself. The 
tension that was described in chapter three was a result of a dialectic in which the 
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found in Chapter one section one.  
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metaphorical and the literal are superimposed on each other. The reader must make 
something out of this tension, and I argued that in doing so the reader is creating 
meaning, though that creation is directly tied to the metaphor or parable. We see how this 
fits into what Anti-Climacus is describing. Anti-Climacus shows us a contradiction that 
forces us to choose and that when we choose we are disclosing ourselves. The tension in 
the parable is the contradiction that forces us to choose, and that when we choose and 
disclose ourself, we are thus creating something. We are combining what is found in the 
parable with what is found in ourselves. This is appropriation and inwardness just as 
Kierkegaard wants. 
 Another ingredient that we see in Anti-Climacus’ description is that the reader or 
viewer must look at the contradiction. The contradiction must draw attention to itself so 
that the reader investigates it. This investigation can then lead to the untying of the 
dialectical knot and thus the disclosure of the reader. So Kierkegaard not only needs to 
craft a contradiction, a dialectical knot, but must also bring it to our attention. As a 
reminder, this must all occur indirectly. Kierkegaard cannot tell us that we all need to pay 
close attention to the contradiction that he’s about to present to us, for doing so makes the 
communication direct and then instead of subjectivity we find objectivity. Instead of 
bringing the reader closer to Christianity it teaches the reader some aspect of soteriology 
(or any other such academic, doctrinal pursuit of Kierkegaard’s writings). He would be 
taking something that was intended to be transformative to the reader and instead making 
it educative to the reader. So Kierkegaard has to draw our attention to a crafted 
contradiction without actually telling us any of the above. Parables and metaphors are 
wonderful vehicles for accomplishing this. Specifically, most of Kierkegaard’s parables 
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appear tossed in the middle of his normal philosophical, though poetic, prose. He 
generally does not explain his parables, giving only a few brief remarks about them 
before moving on. The experience of reading through them is an interesting one. You are 
reading about some philosophical concept, like that of objectivity. Climacus is explaining 
his criticisms of objectivity and some of the strengths of subjectivity as a route to truth. 
Then, all of the sudden, we have a story about an escaped mental patient from an insane 
asylum. Climacus finishes this story and moves back to his discussion of the objective 
subjective distinction, without explaining the story. We are left wondering about the 
nature of the story. Why was it included? Is it just to lighten the mood and keep our 
attention like a professor telling a joke in the middle of a lecture? It certainly does lighten 
the mood, for the story is amusing. In this, we see that the story is inviting. Its placement 
and its pleasure serve to invite the reader to inspect it. What purpose does such a story 
serve? In this way Kierkegaard is able to present contradictions that draw attention to 
themselves without Kierkegaard having to explicitly call our attention to anything. The 
parable wants to be read, and we want to read it.  
 We read the parable, are invited to explore it, and in doing so come into contact 
with the contradiction. We are then prompted to choose, and in choosing we disclose 
ourselves. But to what end? My contention is that parables are to act as mirrors for us, 
disclosing ourselves to ourselves. The parable reveals something about me, but the 
revelation is for myself and not for anyone else. Stages on Life’s Way begins with an 
epigraph that is a quote from one of Georg Lichtenburg’s notebooks, “Such works are 
mirrors: when an ape looks in, no apostle can look out.” Kierkegaard is tasking himself 
with reminding a populace who are complacent and confident in their Christianity that 
181 
 
 
they are not apostles, but indeed are closer to apes when it comes to their religion. I think 
that this epigraph is a fitting claim about what Kierkegaard is trying to do overall with his 
parables. He presents to us the dialectical knot that wants to be untied. As we untie it and 
interpret it, we create something and thus disclose ourself, for the creation was ours. We 
are then faced with what we have disclosed, and we must recognize that it is ours. In this 
way we come to see ourself, or at least, some facet of ourself, in the way that Kierkegaard 
sees it. He sees us as being in untruth, as having forgotten the radical requirements of 
Christianity. He sees me as thinking that I am already saved and thus need to only make 
sure that I act in accordance with what I am told to do at church. I must make sure not to 
murder anyone, for instance. But I am no murderer, and thus I sit confident in my 
salvation and my faith. Kierkegaard then shows me Agnes and the merman. I find the 
story very intriguing, for somehow it’s supposed to help me understand Abraham, which 
I’d like to do. The more I dig into the parable of Agnes and the merman, though, the 
more I can’t understand any of Agnes’ actions. As I try to resolve the dialectical tension, 
I try to think things through from the stance of the merman. This helps me make some 
progress, as I can at least understand some of the merman’s actions. As I do so I also 
recognize that this is likely metaphorical and I start to think through what Agnes and the 
merman stand for. Ideally, Kierkegaard wants this thought process to end with the 
recognition that I am the merman, and that Agnes is Christ. Kierkegaard wants me to see 
that I am sinful, like the merman. This is a facet of myself that is already there, but it’s 
one that I’m ignoring. So the parable works to get me to see part of myself. This mirror 
image is difficult to alter once it’s been made. Just as David could not dispute Nathan’s 
claim that he was that man once he had already become full of anger and judgment, so 
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too, we struggle to deny the image in the mirror when we’re the ones who have made it. 
When an ape looks in, no apostle can look out.  
 But what about the possibility in which I do not see myself in the mirror? What 
happens if I am disclosed through the process just described, but I do not recognize the 
disclosure as myself? Stokes, in his work on moral imagination and moral vision 
considers this possibility. Stokes’ overall project is to map out Kierkegaard’s thoughts on 
moral vision and his attempts to get us to see things a certain way. This work ends up 
being relevant to my argument here, and Stokes also considers some of the mirror 
metaphors that Kierkegaard uses. Stokes writes,  
“Looking at oneself is therefore not the same as seeing oneself. One can look at 
oneself (literally, as in the Peasant example, or imaginatively, as in the case of 
positing possibilities for action) and yet not see oneself. This brings us back to the 
“mirror of possibility”, into which one must look in such a way as to see 
‘‘oneself’’ rather than ‘‘a human being merely’’. This mirror metaphor thus 
brings into focus the conditions necessary for cognition to maintain an essential 
connection to the subject’s concrete reality. Central to this is a mode of vision in 
which we see ourselves such that there is an immediate experience of co-identity 
with the imaginatively posited self. This is apparently necessary even where the 
“objective” content of my imaginings contains me. I may imagine a possibility 
that contains me (say, my responding to a present situation by undertaking some 
action) but I can still fail to “recognise myself”, that is, experience my co-identity 
with the “me” in this possibility. In such a case, I fail to maintain the connection 
between my lived reality and what I imagine. Such a self’s will has, according to 
Anti-Climacus, become “fantastic.”241 
 
We have to seriously contend with the problem of the individual who does not recognize 
their reflection. Stokes introduces a terminological distinction to help clarify things: the 
difference between “looking” and “seeing.” To look at yourself in the mirror is to focus 
your attention on the image. To look at the mirror of metaphor or parable is to read it 
closely and to imagine the situation and examine the contents of that imagining. In doing 
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so, I might run into an image of myself as a character in the story or even as the topic of 
the story. The disclosure that comes with interpretation might render myself for myself. 
Yet, I am only looking, and thus lack self-recognition. As Stokes puts it, I might fail to 
experience co-identity with the “me” that I am looking at.  
 Seeing, on the other hand, is to experience that co-identity. I look at the image and 
I recognize it as being me. I identify with what I am looking at, and thus gain a new 
perspective on myself. This seems to be precisely what Kierkegaard desires out of his 
parables, so we must figure out how to move from looking to seeing. We see this occur in 
the King David narrative when Nathan tells King David that he is that man. Prior to 
hearing this, David looks, but he does not see. He recognizes the wrong-ness of the 
actions and might even be imagining someone very like himself committing them, but he 
does not identify with the person doing so. Only when Nathan informs him does he 
change over into seeing himself and thus seeing his faults. One of the key ingredients that 
we see in the David story that is missing from the straightforward mirror approach is 
emotional attachment. David looked, felt, and then saw. He heard Nathan’s story and was 
overcome with anger. The anger was targeted at the man in the story and so Nathan 
turned that anger on David, and once that attachment was made, David saw himself truly. 
Stokes refers to this as moving from an objective mindset to a subjective one. Referring 
to Nathan telling David that he is that man, Stokes writes,  
“This statement is needed to take David from his objective approach from the 
story, an objectivity which he uses to keep awareness of his own moral culpability 
at arm’s length. Had David been more concerned for his own moral condition, the 
implication seems to be, he would have seen himself in the story without needing 
to be told that it was a story about himself (even though the story itself concerned 
the slaughtering of sheep). In the same way, Kierkegaard re-tells the Good 
Samaritan parable and claims we are to understand that the Priest who passes the 
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injured man by is us.”242 
 
For Kierkegaard, holding up mirrors won’t be enough as it will leave us hoping that the 
reader changes from looking to seeing. We do not want to rely on hope when it comes to 
readers who are self-assured in their Christianity. In the retelling of the Good Samaritan 
parable, Kierkegaard takes on the mantle of Nathan and tells us that we are the Priest. 
Yet, this is a rather uncommon occurrence, and this happens in For Self-Examination, 
which was one of his later works, and which was not written pseudonymously. Here he 
directly communicates, telling us how to interpret. It’s interesting to note that somehow 
Nathan is able to use direct communication to bring about inwardness, something 
Kierkegaard doesn’t seem to consider. Nathan telling David that he is that man is a 
moment of direct communication, but it is directly communicating about an indirect 
communication, and thus the subjective approach is still preserved. Nathan has also been 
established as a prophet, and thus as someone with authority, something that Kierkegaard 
lacks, as he stresses multiple times. This direct communication was able to move David 
out of his objective approach and appropriated his anger, changing its target from a 
fictional person to himself. The direct approach is not something that Kierkegaard will 
take in his pseudonymous works, for doing so would ruin his entire indirect approach. 
Just as Nathan waited until the story was over to directly communicate, Kierkegaard 
waits for pseudonymity to be over before he directly communicates with us. Thus 
Kierkegaard still needs some way to get his audience to move from looking in the mirror 
to seeing themselves truly in the mirror. He needs for us to be emotionally invested and 
focused with interest on what he is doing in order that he has the best chance for the 
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change to occur. 
 Parables again provide an ideal opportunity for this. In reading through the 
parable (if it is well written, at least), we should come to find ourselves identifying with 
characters, or cheering for heroes, or trying to predict the outcomes. Though the parables 
may be short, they engage us and focus our interest. We likely do not end up as overcome 
with emotion as David was, but parables serve to do more than just invite us to look, as I 
discussed above. They actively engage us in a way that has already bypassed our 
psychological defense systems. We read the parables almost naively. We think that we 
are just trying to understand Kierkegaard and his odd writings, but we are not worried 
about ourselves. We do not think that an attack is coming. So, we investigate recklessly. 
That investigative spirit leads us to engage with these stories and to become invested in 
them and their meanings. That investment is then turned around on us. We begin by 
looking, but Kierkegaard is able to make some kind of emotional attachment with us 
through his parables, and this leads to us seeing. Yet, there is no guarantee of this. I might 
not be moved by the parable. I might not find it interesting or engaging. Seemingly this 
happens all the time as regards Kierkegaard. I find it unlikely that all readers of 
Kierkegaard have had transformative experiences when they work through his parables. 
Minimally, the scholarship seems to treat the parables as unimportant, so even among 
Kierkegaard experts, the parables do not seem to always have the desired effect.  
 Nonetheless we see how Kierkegaard’s parables are put in place to move us from 
looking to seeing. Kierkegaard wants to hold up a mirror in front of us. He makes the 
image in the mirror interesting and attractive, so we really look closely and engage with 
it. He has not developed the rapport with us that Nathan developed with David and so he 
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cannot point out to us that in the mirror is an image of us. Instead he uses repetition. He 
creates many mirrors, all with slightly different images drawn on their surface. As we 
investigate these over and over, he hopes that we slowly come to realize that we are not 
looking at paintings of some other person, but at images of ourselves deceptively 
shrouded in imaginative drawings. In doing so we move from looking to seeing, as we 
begin to identify with the image placed in front of us. We slowly come to realize that not 
only is the merman in need of Agnes, but that I, too, am in need of an Agnes.  
Section 3: Through a Mirror, Darkly 
 
 
 The ultimate goal of these mirrors is not only that we see ourselves, but that we 
see ourselves truly (not darkly). If we look into the mirror and are able to see ourselves 
and identify with the thing that we are seeing, then in order for the Christian to come 
forward, we also need to see something that is true. It’s not enough for me to identify 
with the image in the mirror that I see if that image presents some falsehood about me. 
This occurs plenty in literary works. The reader thinks themselves like the protagonist, a 
hero or heroine who really would stand and fight and save the world. In reality, none of 
this might be true, we may all be cowards. But when we read the Iliad, we imagine 
ourselves as Hector, tamer of horses, fighting to protect his homeland (or, at least, I do). 
Thus, the image that Kierkegaard wants us to identify with is markedly not heroic, or 
even positive. Instead, he’s trying to get us to identify with a rather negative image of 
ourselves. I am not being presented as the hero, but the sinner, the morally corrupt, or the 
ignorant. Yet, upon seeing myself portrayed this way, I am likely to dismiss the portrayal, 
or to never identify with it. Kierkegaard remarks in Christian Discourses, concerning 
why this shouldn’t even be a problem, writing, “One tells him a story. This now puts him 
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completely at ease, because he understands well enough that since it is a story the 
discourse is not about him. A few words are introduced into this story that perhaps do not 
immediately have their effect but sometime later are suddenly transformed into a question 
of conscience.”243 If Kierkegaard were to plainly present these unflattering mirror 
images, we would ignore him. But the parable doesn’t appear to be a mirror to us, at first. 
So we engage it, we examine it, for the parable is just a story about some imaginative 
occurrence. But, in doing so, we run into the image and only after considering it do we 
slowly realize that it is a mirror, an image of us.  
 But this image is not supposed to just be Kierkegaard’s thoughts of what we are 
like. Instead, he is trying to make true claims reveal themselves to us. King David, on 
some level, knew that he was guilty. Were this not the case, he would struggle to 
understand how he could be the man that Nathan was accusing him of being. Unless he 
knows, but is suppressing the knowledge, that he is guilty of terrible things, he would be 
unable to make the connection that he did when Nathan spoke. Nathan was thus not 
revealing anything new to David, he was showing David something that was already 
known, however much ignored or suppressed. Kierkegaard envisions himself as having a 
similar task. As has been discussed, he cannot make us Christians, for only God can do 
that. Instead, his task is to remind us of what has already been revealed to us by God, that 
we are sinners and that Christianity requires our passionate, subjective investment in our 
beliefs. Thus, Kierkegaard is not only trying to convince us of something that he thinks is 
problematic, though that too is clearly the case. He is also trying to show us something 
true.  
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 Part of his project here is to remind us of what God revealed to us, and thus to 
somewhat try to re-do what God has already done. God revealed to us what was true 
about us from the standpoint of absolute knowledge. Because of this, the content of what 
Kierkegaard wants us to realize is something akin to divine knowledge, though not in any 
problematic way. There is a sense in which Kierkegaard wants to give us a God’s-eye-
view of ourselves. To that extent, some of the parables have us as the subject, but some of 
them have God as the subject that we identify with. In the last chapter we looked at the 
parables of the Beloved’s Letter and the Royal Decree. In both of these parables, the 
natural interpretation leads us to think about things from the metaphorical standpoint of 
God. This doesn’t help much if the goal of the parable is to present a mirror for us, for 
then I would begin to see myself as if I were God. Instead, the goal here is for me to see 
myself truly, and taking a divine standpoint is helpful in doing so. If I can see myself the 
way that God sees me, I have gained much. So when I think through the parable from the 
standpoint of the Beloved or the King, I learn to see myself the way that God might see 
me. I recognize the frustration or annoyance that I would feel if I were in God’s position 
watching my actions. Initially, I probably fail to realize that this parable is about how 
God sees me, but as Kierkegaard noted in Christian Discourses, sometime later these 
words will ideally be transformed into a question of conscience. 
 Thinking through this experience of anger, frustration, or annoyance that the King 
in the parable of the Royal Decree would feel also provides part of what was mentioned 
earlier as regards the need for an emotional response. David felt anger, and Nathan was 
able to redirect that anger from a fictional character back onto David himself. This anger 
is part of what motivates the efficacy of the parable. Kierkegaard, when he gets us to see 
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ourselves the way that God might see us, is able to do something very similar to Nathan. 
The emotional response is a powerful one, and one that will not easily go away. Had 
Nathan informed David that his story was only a parable, David’s anger would not have 
immediately dissipated. Our emotions stick with us, and so rousing an emotional 
response is a good way to make sure that we do not turn around and deny the claim that is 
then made upon us. If I, thinking of myself as the King in the parable of the royal decree, 
feel anger and frustration at the inability of the general population to follow my 
commands, then all that needs to happen is for me to realize that God must feel that way 
with me, that God is the King. As soon as I realize that, my anger or frustration does not 
disappear, for I am already in a heightened emotional state. Instead, my emotions are 
transformed, for now I am angry and disappointed with myself and I feel sorrow and 
regret. Thus we can see that Kierkegaard’s parables seek to present to us a true image of 
ourselves. Yet this image might come from different perspectives. Maybe I identify as the 
merman and remember that I am a sinner. But maybe I see myself as the king and give 
consideration to God’s view of me. Both of these approaches work to elicit a specific 
response from me such that I entertain the story, become engrossed by it and emotionally 
invested in it, and then slowly come to realize that the story is really about me, revealing 
truths that I knew, but had forgotten or was suppressing, about myself to myself. 
Section 4: Objects in Mirror are Closer Than They Appear 
 
 
 I’ve argued that parables do a great job at providing us with a true image of 
ourselves, but I also want to provide the inverse of this, that mirrors alone cannot provide 
this and thus that parables are in a weak sense, necessary for Kierkegaard. As I’ve noted a 
few times throughout this work, Kierkegaard cannot directly communicate our failings to 
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us. This is for at least two reasons. First, Christianity is essentially subjective for 
Kierkegaard, and thus while he could directly communicate that we are failing in that 
subjectivity, it will not have the desired effect.244 Secondly, doing so would likely cause 
our defense systems to kick into gear. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous method wasn’t 
implemented for the mere fun of it, rather he saw it as a necessity so that his readers 
couldn’t dismiss what was being written by connecting it to his concrete person. Upon 
hearing that Kierkegaard was criticizing them, the public might respond by thinking that 
these are the errant thoughts of a lonely man who scorned his fiancée, or maybe the 
thoughts of one angry at a system under which he struggled to flourish. Generally 
speaking, his claims and criticisms would fall on deaf ears. We see a similar problem 
when we consider the possibility of Kierkegaard adding straightforward mirrors to his 
works. If Kierkegaard put together true images of us, but did not hide them within poetic, 
metaphoric, or parabolic language, his audience would ignore them. I do not think myself 
a terrible sinner who has forgotten his religion and been led astray, so if Kierkegaard 
were to claim that I was, I would likely respond by rejecting his claim outright. For this 
reason, mirrors by themselves will not accomplish enough, for as Anti-Climacus claims, 
“Even in seeing oneself in a mirror it is necessary to recognize oneself, for if one does 
not, one does not see oneself but only a human being.”245 Kierkegaard needs to not only 
present mirrors to us, he needs to present mirrors that we do not reject. This mirror also 
needs to stir us from merely looking, into feeling, and then finally into seeing ourselves. 
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The mirror does not hold truth within itself. Instead, it is through active use of the mirror 
that truth comes forward. To that extent, a plain mirror does not suffice. The objective 
description of his audience’s shortcomings will not assist Kierkegaard. Instead, he must 
deceive us to some extent. He must get us to look at something that we do not suspect is a 
mirror but that actually is.  
 In order to see how the mirror would work in an ideal situation, we can briefly 
look at Kierkegaard’s words concerning the Word of God.  
“What is Required in Order to Look at Oneself with True Blessing in the Mirror 
of the Word? The first requirement is that you must not look at the mirror, 
observe the mirror, but must see yourself in the mirror… The second requirement 
is that in order to see yourself in the mirror when you read God’s Word you must 
(so that you actually do come to see yourself in the mirror) remember to say to 
yourself incessantly: It is I to whom it is speaking; it is I about whom it is 
speaking… Finally, if you want to look at yourself in the mirror with true 
blessing, you must not promptly forget how you looked.”246 
 
The first two considerations that Kierkegaard has here are quite similar, both aimed at 
pushing the reader to see themself in the mirror.247 Similarly, the third is aimed at making 
sure that whatever is learned from looking at the Mirror of the Word is not forgotten. 
Again, we have to note that Kierkegaard and God are in somewhat different positions 
with respect to how appropriation and inwardness function. God can transform the 
learner, Kierkegaard can only remind the learner. So the instructions given here are 
aimed at making sure that the transformation takes place. One could, for instance, read 
the Word as if it were a purely fictional tale and thus gain nothing from it. Kierkegaard’s 
advice here is an attempt to correctly orient the reader of the Word so that they realize the 
truth found within. Yet, despite the difference in positions between Kierkegaard and God, 
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there is still a focus on being able to see oneself in the text. Whether you are reading the 
Parable of the Prodigal Son or the Parable of Agnes and the Merman, you must see 
yourself in the mirror in order for the desired outcome, of moving closer to authentic 
Christianity, to occur.  
 Stokes analyzes the second aspect of Kierkegaard’s claim about how to read the 
Word as an act of volition. He notes that Kierkegaard goes on to claim that when 
someone sees themself in a mirror unexpectedly that they do not recognize themself. 
While this is, at most, a rare occurrence, it does help us understand Kierkegaard’s point. 
In order to see myself in a mirror I must, in some sense, be prepared to do so. Thus 
Stokes argues that there is some amount of openness required in order for us to be able to 
see ourselves in the mirror. “Self-recognition requires an attitude of receptivity, and 
adopting such an attitude will be a willed act.”248 In order for the mirror to be successful, 
I must be open to whatever it reveals. Had Kierkegaard approached me and claimed that 
he would show me what I am truly like, I would not be open to whatever he revealed. I 
would probably be quite guarded and dismissive if he painted me negatively. Yet, with a 
parable, the reader’s default position, to the extent that the reader is engaging the parable, 
is openness. The reader can pass over the parable or treat it as mere amusement, and to do 
so is to remain closed. But if the reader engages, doing so requires willed openness. 
Engaging with the parable is acknowledging that there is something that I don’t yet 
understand that is hidden in the parable, and that I want to uncover. This, my first step is 
to will to learn, willing a recognition that the parable possesses something that I currently 
lack. The parable wants to be interpreted, it wants me to work with it. I might have some 
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guesses as to how to interpret it or what it means, but since I don’t think that it is about 
me, I am not guarded or dismissive. I am open to considering whatever the parable puts 
forward. I still might dismiss it at the end, but my initial stance is one of openness. Thus, 
parables assist in providing an impetus for the initial act of volition that needs to be in 
place in order that we might see ourselves in the mirror. 
 Kierkegaard’s mirrors therefore require the activity of the reader in order to have 
their desired effect. We see him claim as much in Upbuilding Discourses when he writes,  
“The discourse does not address itself to you as a specific person, it does not even 
know who you are; but if you think about the occasion very vividly, then it will 
seem to you, whoever you are, as if it were speaking directly to you – this is not 
the merit of the discourse, it is your self-activity’s doing, that you for your own 
sake assist the discourse and of your own accord will be the one to whom it says: 
you.”249,250 
 
Kierkegaard is claiming that the eventual outcome of reading his discourses will require 
both the discourse and the reader. It is not as if the discourse works on the reader, who 
remains passive. Instead, the reader is an active component is making the discourses 
meaningful. Stokes analyzes this passage in a similar manner, writing,  
“Again, Kierkegaard is not suggesting that we project meaning onto discourses 
such that we ‘find’ meanings in these discourses that are actually in ourselves. 
Rather, it is only through a specifically self-reflexive mode of receptivity that the 
moral meaning of the discourse can become evident. The capacity of a discourse 
to prove morally upbuilding depends upon the ‘self-activity’ of the reader, 
without which the moral communicator is helpless to communicate her 
message.”251 
 
So while we are playing an active part as readers, it’s not as if we are putting meaning 
into something that lacks meaning. I’m not merely projecting something into a story that 
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has nothing, and then “finding” that thing in the story. Kierkegaard’s goal was to bring 
about appropriation and inwardness, not to convince the reader of some moral truth. 
Stokes’ reference to “moral meaning” here would therefore best be interpreted to refer to 
the moral change that I must undergo. Kierkegaard doesn’t want to tell me that stealing is 
wrong, he wants me to react with disgust to the thought of stealing. The “meaning” in the 
story cannot be some kind of objective claim. There is nothing to find, for the desired 
outcome is a change in us. Thus, we have to be an active participant in the creation of 
meaning, for we are part of the meaning. The parable is for me and it is about me. But 
Kierkegaard does not know me, he lacks knowledge of any of my particulars. So, he must 
craft something that applies generally, and I supply the particulars. His parable and I 
work together to create meaning, that meaning specifically being my appropriation of my 
true situation vis-à-vis my religion. 
 Putting this all together we see something akin to a list of requirements that is 
placed before Kierkegaard if he is to complete his task of causing his audience to become 
more authentic Christians. First, he must communicate something to his audience.252 This 
initial requirement is rather straightforward. Kierkegaard is trying to speak to each person 
individually and communicate something to them. Second, the thing that he is trying to 
communicate is about the audience.253 Though parts of his works look to explicate 
Christianity, he claims that his primary goal is to bring about Christianity in his audience. 
Thus, the thing that he is communicating is not about the nature of religion, or truth, or 
any other concept. Instead, he’s looking to reorient us towards something concerning 
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ourselves: our sinful nature and our need for salvation. The third requirement is that he 
cannot communicate this thing to us directly.254 He cannot straightforwardly tell us what 
we’ve done wrong or how to fix our mistakes. Christianity is, at its root, subjectivity, and 
thus he must use the style of communication that matches subjectivity, indirect 
communication. The goal of this indirect communication is to bring us inwards, to cause 
appropriation. It’s not that he needs to use indirect communication to clue us in to some 
concept, rather the indirect communication should work to change us as individuals. 
Fourth, in order for this change to occur, we need to engage the indirect 
communication.255 We need to be active participants with the text in order to appropriate 
any meaning from it. Kierkegaard does not want to merely hope that this occurs. Instead, 
he has to craft his indirect communication such that it invites this kind of interaction and 
engagement. And the last requirement, this communication needs to bypass our natural 
psychological defenses since the content of the message has the strong possibility of 
causing offense.256 Telling someone that they are not a real Christian when they consider 
themselves otherwise will likely not elicit a positive reaction. Instead, you will be 
dismissed, ignored, or attacked. Kierkegaard needs to find a way for his communication 
to overcome this problem. He needs to craft something that we willingly engage with 
despite the fact that it attacks us. 
 I’ve argued for all of these pieces in different parts of this work. Ideally, we now 
see how parables perfectly fit as a solution to this requirement. Parables create the 
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opportunity for Kierkegaard to tell us something about ourselves by using them as 
mirrors. Parables function as indirect communications that invite us to engage with them 
and require us to be active participants in the creation of meaning. Parables also bypass 
our defense systems for we do not initially believe that they are about us. Through all of 
this we see that Kierkegaard tries to accomplish something very significant with his 
parables that cannot be accomplished with his philosophical prose. Taking into account 
the discussion that I’ve put forward concerning some of Kierkegaard’s claims about his 
goals as an author, we have to very seriously consider parables as being of paramount 
importance to our study of Kierkegaard.  
Section 5: “I Deceived Her by Pretending I was a Deceiver”257 
 
 
I want to end with a parable and by offering up the possibility that we must thus 
treat Kierkegaard as something of a trickster, a deceiver. To begin, a short parable of his 
found in The Sickness Unto Death,  
There is a story about a peasant who went barefooted to town with enough money 
to buy himself a pair of stockings and shoes and to get drunk, and in trying to find 
his way home in his drunken state, he fell asleep in the middle of the road. A 
carriage came along, and the driver shouted to him to move or he would drive 
over his legs. The drunken peasant woke up, looked at his legs and, not 
recognizing them because of the shoes and stockings, said: “Go ahead, they are 
not my legs.””258 
 
Kierkegaard gives us a wonderfully humorous little tale about a failure in recognition.259 
To use some of our language from earlier, the man looks at his legs, but he does not see 
his legs. He does not identify with the legs that are in front of him, and thus he tells the 
                                                 
257 This is a line of Kierkegaard’s taken from his journals, referring in part to his relationship with Regine 
Olsen. JP VI 6762. 
258 SUD 53 
259 Some, I have heard, do not find this story humorous, but instead find it creepy. 
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carriage driver to run over them (with no care shown for whosever legs they might be). 
However, he will likely soon realize his mistake when the carriage runs over his legs and 
he experiences intense pain. He will move from looking to seeing upon feeling his legs 
shatter. However, instead of deep-diving into this parable from the standpoint of the 
reader who is being pushed towards authentic Christianity, I’d like for us to consider how 
this might help us understand Kierkegaard’s actions as a writer. 
 When Kierkegaard presents to you a mirror as a parable, you do not initially think 
it is a mirror, for you are entranced by the parable. You think you are looking at an image 
of someone else. Someone terrible, or downtrodden, or ugly, and you are none of those 
things. But as you examine it from different angles and look closely, you slowly start to 
realize that it’s you in the image. And at that point, you’ve already condemned the image 
as ugly, and so you’ve already passed judgment on yourself. You are like the drunken 
man in Kierkegaard’s parable. We look at our legs and judge them, make comments 
about how out of shape that person is, how lazy they must be, how ugly they are. But, 
unbeknownst to us, Kierkegaard had slipped the stockings over our legs so that we 
wouldn’t immediately recognize them. Yet, slowly, as we look closer, we realize that the 
legs are ours. 
 Kierkegaard, in order to bypass our defenses, has to play a trick on us. He has to 
slip stockings over our legs so that we don’t recognize them at first glance. We can 
imagine him tiptoeing around, tying our shoelaces together, hiding our keys, or putting 
food-coloring in our toothpaste. His parables are invitations, but we don’t quite fully 
grasp to what we are being invited. We think that we are going to participate in a 
pleasant, but abstract, philosophical exercise, but lo and behold, we are actively being 
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self-critical. Kierkegaard gets us drunk on philosophy, and in that abstract philosophical 
stupor, he slips stockings on our legs. We cast abstract judgments on those legs, for we 
do not recognize them as our own. But as we judge and examine them, we slowly come 
to realize the truth that was revealed to David by Nathan. Those are our legs, we are that 
man. This realization places us in a precarious position, for we need the carriage to stop, 
lest our legs get run over. Action is now required of us. David must atone, the drunken 
man must tell the carriage driver to stop, and we must repent. 
Conclusion  
 
 
We return to the problem first sketched out by Climacus in Fragments, that of the 
teacher and the learner. The teacher cannot demonstrate to the learner that the learner is 
in untruth, for one of the properties of being in untruth is being ignorant about your own 
state of untruth. Socrates repeatedly professed that he did not know what virtue was. 
Meno responded by asking how Socrates would then know if Meno had not properly 
answered the question. Meno could have given a perfect answer, but Socrates, being 
ignorant of what virtue is, would not recognize it. Socrates responds by claiming that we 
can remember it, for our soul has already gained all knowledge prior to us being born. 
Kierkegaard refers to this as the Socratic version of the problem. His version of the 
problem is much worse, however, for we cannot remember not being in sin. We have 
been born into sin for Kierkegaard, and thus our memory cannot save us. Instead, only 
God can save us by transforming us. This transformation both reveals the truth to us and 
allows us to recognize it as true.  
 Only God can function as this kind of teacher, so what space can Kierkegaard 
occupy? If he is trying to bring us closer to authentic Christianity, and he cannot 
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transform us, what can he do? Seemingly, he can return to the Socratic, he can prompt us 
to remember. Though we have forgotten the terrible truths about ourselves that have been 
revealed to us, Kierkegaard can prompt us to remember. But to do so is no easy task. 
Kierkegaard must engage with us indirectly, using pseudonyms and parables. He has to 
trick us into engaging a text or story that we find interesting only to realize, potentially in 
terror, that we are the subject. The use of parables throughout his works doesn’t function 
to obfuscate his philosophy or to serve as humorous interludes. He is not telling stories 
the way that many do in the classroom so that they might recapture the attention of their 
audience. Kierkegaard’s parables work to serve a very specific function in his overall 
goal as a philosopher. He needs to disarm us before he shows us how ugly we are, and he 
needs for us not to reject the true image that he is presenting. Parables work to 
accomplish both of these things, as I’ve demonstrated.  
 If my argument has been successful, I think that it requires us to read Kierkegaard 
a little differently. We have to read his parables as philosophy, and not merely as 
companion examples to his philosophical prose. Beyond that, though, I think that there is 
still quite a lot to be gained from this study despite Kierkegaard having a relatively small 
audience these days and despite Christianity being taken less and less seriously in the 
West. If my argument has been successful, which I think it has, and if Kierkegaard is 
correct in his approach, we might need to change the way that we try to spread 
philosophy. We might want to take a page from C.S. Lewis and write stories. If our goal 
is to change individuals and to reorient them towards wisdom, academic philosophical 
prose likely won’t do the job. Instead, we need to become storytellers. 
 I’ll conclude with a short epigraph that I’m using to mourn the state of 
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Kierkegaard scholarship vis-à-vis his parables, 
“In a theatre, it happened that a fire started offstage. The clown came out to tell 
the audience. They thought it was a joke and applauded. He told them again, and 
they became still more hilarious. This is the way, I suppose, that the world will be 
destroyed – amid the universal hilarity of wits and wags who think it is all a 
joke.”260 
 
  
                                                 
260 EO1 30. 
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